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The object of this study is to draw art into the common net of organization, 
along with those other enterprizes more commonly associated with the exer- 
cise of intelligence. The method chosen for this is based upon the idea 
of effective procedures, namely by setting out to construct a (notional) 
'art machine'. The argument falls into two parts, the first dealing with 
the general concept of authorship and the second with its products. Part 
I offers a definition of an abstract, rudimentary productive process and 
describes its observers. There is an examination of the relation between' 
structure and purpose, which moves towards a general definition of author- 
ship made in terms of extracting order from a surrounding. Principles of 
order extraction are examined, with particular reference to the Law of 
Requisite Variety. Examination of extracted order, as structure, heur- 
istics and the like, leads to discussion of the transmission of purposes 
between purposeful systems, as well as general problems of constraint, 
and of regulation and control. Part I ends with a proposal for a paradigm 
for a rudimentary mechanical author. Part II concentrates on the products 
of authorship, seeking characterizing features of those that may be 
classified as art. There is discussion of objective knowledge and its 
value and of the characteristics of experience as a form of objective know- 
ledge. It is suggested that art is concerned with experience and that 
this dictates its method, which is to produce simulation procedures based 
on a language constituted by the synthetic structures discussed in Part I. 
Lines are suggested for realizing an 'art machine' and there is a review 
of prospects. A section of notes consisting of speculative ideas and 
empirical applications connected with the conclusions of the text follows 
Part II. 
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PREFACE 
Almost no literature considers directly the relation between cybernetics 
and art. Philosophy, where it has touched on art, has concerned itself 
principally with aesthetics and questions of art's ontological status, 
both of which interests fall substantially outside the present subject. 
Psychologists' interests in art have shown similar inclinations. Even 
approaches such as Arnheim's, which attempts to combine notions of ent- 
ropy with gestaltist views, are largely irrelevant to the present study. 
Closest, though still with a quite different outlook from the one adopted 
here, is Molests (1966) which approaches art through information theory. 
In the absence of previous investigations, it has been impossible to pro- 
vide an orthodox historico-bibliographical background to the present study. 
Instead the attempt has been to incorporate the basic notions of cyber- 
netics piece-meal, as and where they have been needed, supplementing these 
general concepts with more recent, more specific results where they were 
relevant. 
Mostly - notably in chapter 2, which is in a sense at the bottom of the 
whole argument - presentation makes little attempt to cover the traces 
marking the paths of reasoning that have led to the conclusions reached. 
The object has been to display the scaffolding, not simply the finished 
structure, in a belief in the helpfulness of this towards offering a 
fuller grasp of the argament's aims. Also with this intention, sections 
and paragraphs as well as chapters have been furnished with brief titles, 
a general synopsis has been provided, each of the argument's two parts 
has been introduced by a paragraph outlining its aims, and each chapter 
has an introductory section of two paragraphs devoted respectively to 
detailing its aims and providing an abstract of its contents. 
The main argument of Parts I and II - the text - restricts itself as far 
as possible to the consideration of abstract systems in a more or less 
rigorous way. But the entities involved, designated by the names 'A', 
'W', &c. are not always referred to as 'it'; clarity often makes 'he' 
preferable. Usage follows no particular rule. The reader may under- 
stand 'it' whenever 'he' refers to an abstract entity. 
Applications to the real world of art of the arguments and conclusions 
of the text, along with other empirical considerations and also the more 
speculative notions that arise are dealt with in the notes that follow 
Part II. These notes refer to individual chapters, and are written in 
a way that permits the whole work to be read either consecutively from 
page one, or with each chapter followed by the notes that refer to it. 
It remains to thank my supervisor, Dr David Stewart, to whom I an indebted 
for his valuable and unobtrusive suggestions, and his patient criticism 
and guidance. Where my own efforts only dully reflect his, he is 
naturally in no way to blame. 
Professor Frank George's helpfulness, encouragement and imperturbable 
forebearance throughout, from the moment of taking on trust my proposed 
subject, have greatly smoothed my way. To him, to Professor Pask, and 
to the other members of the Department and participants in seminars, for 
the leavening of their ideas and criticisms, to the Department's secretary, 
Mrs Kilbride, for her help and always friendly welcomes, and to Mrs ER 
Creecy, Miss Susan Pinn and Mrs Elaine Towsey, for their concern, care, 
understanding and hard work in typing a difficult manuscript, I am also 
most grateful. 
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1. 
CHAPTER 0 
ART AND SCIENCE 
This introductory chapter is self-contained. Its object is to look 
at some attitudes to art, especially the claims and counterclaims of 
the worlds of art and science, rather than to furnish a background 
to art theory or to offer any specific preparation for the argument 
that follows. The wish that animates this aim is to break away from 
the somewhat narrow confines of traditional art theory, in order to 
construct an approach that will admit the theory's entry within a wider 
framework, not merely as an off-shoot of philosophy or psychology, 
but as an integral part of the study of organization. It is th.: s 
that prompts the recognition from the outset of widely-canvassed, non- 
specialist opinion. But perhaps the ultimate justification for sett- 
ing out to treat art theory within the realm of cybernetics must be 
the hope of benefitting cybernetics in some way, as well as art 
theory, and this is the spirit in which the enterprize is undertaken. 
0 
2. 
SECTION 0 ART'S PLACE IN THE MENTAL WORLD 
0.0.0 The theory of art is of interest both in itself and more particularly, 
because it brings to light a number of questions in the broad study of 
intelligence. Traditionally treatments of these subjects have tended 
Art and to associate with art such capacities as words like creativity, imagina- 
intelli- 
gence tion and aesthetics denote, usually combining connotations of emotion in 
some degree; and with intelligence faculties of reason and deduction, 
and the pursuit of logical agrument. Ironically it has been left to the 
study of 'artificial' intelligence to display the arbitrariness of the 
distinctions that these various terms imply, and reveal in a rractical 
way the inescapable intimacy that unites the different elements they 
signify in intelligent behaviour. 'Works of art' are part of a wider 
class of enterprizes commonly supposed to need intelligence. The diffi- 
culty of defining what is meant by art, which any art theory encounters 
at the outset, is simply an aspect of the wider problem of deciding what 
qualities characterize intelligence. 
I 
0.0.1 The traditional distinction between art and the capabilites needed for 
it, and intelligence and its characterizing capacities, has been facili- 
tated by the view that both sets of faculties are characteristic but 
Mind distinct aspects of the a11-embracing faculty of mind, taken to be the 
defining principle of homo sapiens. But mind itself has shown peculiar 
resistance to attempts at capturing its quality by succinct definition, 
principally because such efforts have usually set out with tacit or even 
+ Inverted commas are placed about this phrase to indicate that its meaning has not 
yet been roperly defined. Hereafter it will be denoted simply by the letters WOA (pl. WOAs) as a reminder of this. As in the case of the elements of the 'productive 
procedure' introduced later (1.1.0), the main argument attaches no meanings or conno- 
tations to the symbols used, beyond those of their definitions. The object is to 
allow the various elements to develop and, become familiar in their own right, like 
characters in a novel, free from pre-conceptions carried over from earlier acquain- t ca" . ter-rrýtatio-. s of the eymbolio eiewetits are provided, its the notes. 
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explicit assumptions of its incorporeality. Such assumptions are not 
disinterested. They underpin the claim to a quality that sets men apart 
from the rest of the universe, which results from a conviction that is 
probably among the most deeply rooted in cultural history. 
0.0.2 To believers in such uniqueness, science appears inimical, compelling 
men to concede their own supposedly unique capacities to lesser creatures 
and making them common subjects of the same universal laws, from whose 
Art the jurisdiction god-like pre-eminence had once unquestioningly been supposed 
last 
stronghold to exempt them. Repeated scientific incursions have forced retreats from 
of human 
uniqueness one after another seemingly impregnable stronghold of human exclusiveness. 
Successively science has driven men from the centre of the universe, de- 
manded their acknowledgement of familial bonds with animals, deprived 
them of vital spirit and free will, and finally obliged them to contend 
with machines for their very character, intelligence. To protagonists- 
of the belief in men's extra-natural pre-rogatives, art, and its connexions 
with imagination and creativity, intuition and the emotions, has seemed 
the last of those activities and accomplishments hitherto arrogated to 
the human preserve, not yet compelled to surrender its distinctively human 
character. It has appeared to offer the exclusively human faculties a 
last defensible position against the offensive of hostile science. 'The 
, weakness of the advocate of inexplicable creativity', Minsky (1958) says, 
'lies in the unsupported conviction that after all machines have been 
examined some items will still remain on the list' of 'creative perfor- 
mances'. (p. 6) Art is looked to as one of the last possible sources of 
this view's needed support. 
4. 
SECTION 1 SCIENTIFIC AND ARTISTIC REALITY 
0.1.0 Science and art were not always so opposed. Earlier in the scientific 
age, in 1711, Pope could speak of them almost as if they had been synony- 
mous: 
Science 'One science only will one genius fit: 
and art So vast is art, so narrow human wit. ' 
(An Essay on Criticism, lns. 60 & 61) 
Similar attitudes characterized the Enlightenment. '... the genius of 
the arts can have no guide other than the torch of reason' Jacques Louis 
David wrote in 1793 (Honour, 1968). But by 1959 the two enterprizes had 
become The Two Cultures: 'Literary intellectuals at one pole - at the 
other scientists ... Between the two a gulf of mutual incomprehension - 
sometimes ... hostility and dislike, but most of all lack of understand- 
ing' (Snow, 1971, p. 15). 
0.1.1 The advent of ? analytical machines' quickly gave shape to two sets of 
views. One was proposed by Lady Lovelace: 
'The Analytical Engine has no pretensions whatever to originate any- 
thing. It can do whatever we 1iow how to order it to perform. It 
Analysis can follow analysis; but it has no power of antici ati any analy- 
v. orig- tical relations or truths. ' (Bowden, 1957, P"398 
inating 
These often-quoted words might still stand as an acceptable basis for an 
ennunciation of the idea of an 'effective procedure', provided the word 
'originate' were properly understood. But Lady Lovelace's aim is to 
stress the limits of machines' capacities, not the extent of their powere. 
Her evaluation depends on the distinction it draws between analysis on 
the one hand and the ability to originate on the other. This distinction 
corresponds to the difference, already mentioned, that is commonly made 
between intelligence, and imagination and the emotions. In this form it 
is a view that provides a nucleus fora formulation of the evident oppo- 
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Bition between science and art, and between their respective proponents, 
one that often shows, especially among scientists, considerable ambi- 
valence. 
0.1.2 Medawar (1972) distinguishes a kind of internal consistency as a minimum 
requirement for any 'structure of imaginative thought' (p. 32), whether 
scientific or literary, which only the scientific extends to the more 
Science's rigorous constraint that calls for a 'correspondence with reality' (p. 29). 
moral 
attitudes 'All scientific theories ... are expected to conform to reality, to be 
and ambi- 
valence empirically true. ' But in imaginative thought there is to relaxation of 
to art 
this condition, or a failure to enforce it' (p. 33). A moralizing tone, 
revealing a vein of puritanism pervades Medawar's strictures on literature, 
irritation at its waywardnesf- and attitudinizing. At times his concern 
is literature itself, at others the 'literary syndrome in science', whose 
'distLiguishing narks' are: 
'First ... an open or implied claim to a higher insight than can be 
achieved by laboratory scientists or historians or philologists, or 
by philosophers of the traditional English kind, an insight which 
soars beyond the busy little world of test tubes and graphs and mea- 
suring instruments, or indeed of facts. Second, there is a combina- 
tion of high imaginativeness with a relaxation of cr a failure to en- 
force the critical process, so that the critical and inventive facul- 
ties no longer work together synergistically, but tend if ?. nythirg to 
compete; and with this goes a whispering compaign about the importance 
to be attached to validation or justification and even, in extreme 
cases, now beyond remedy, against rational thought. Third (a, nd this 
is what gives the syndrome a literary rather than a metaphysical 
character) is the style in which the high truths of the imagination 
are made known, a style which (among many other disfigurements) de- 
liberately exploits the voluptuary and rhetorical uses of obscurity, " 
a style which at first intrigues and dazzles, but in the end bewilders 
and disgusts. ' (p. 37) 
Medawar may reserve his disgust for the abuses of literature, but it is 
difficult for him to avoid his steam scalding the wider literary world 
as well. The object of quoting so lengthily is to capture the tone of 
the invective with which science meets its detractors. Yet overall 
6. 
Medawax's attitude is ambivalent. It is, he admits, 'mainly a love of 
science that prompted me to speak as I have done', though tit could equally* 
well have been a love of literature'. (p. 38) 
0.1.3.0 Other upholders of science are less discriminating than Medawar in their 
disparagements, with their views frequently acquiring the character of a 
fully-fledged moral crusade. Such a spirit animates Plato for example 
Some att- to banish art from his Republic, on the ground that, as mere imitation 
itudes to 
art and (cf. Lady Lovelace's complaint about machines), it offers 'no knowledge 
science: 
Plato of value' (Lindsay, 1954, P"305) on the subjects it imitates, unlike 
philosophy, whose aim is to reveal truth by a process just the reverse 
of imitation, that of stripping away what lies between sensation and 
" reality. Not that this is to be taken as detracting from art. On the 
contrary, art is to be prohibited precisely because of its 'magic charm', 
which gives it such a profound capacity to mislead and is the reason why, 
like a wicked seducer, 'poetry is not to be taken seriously'. (p. 312) 
0.1.3.1 Distance from Plato both in time and interest does not reflect in the 
views about art and science that Freud held, which in important respects, 
are strikingly like Plato's. Freud acknowledges a persistent and con- 
Freud- tinuing indebtedness to literature, resorting to it often before clinical 
evidence. Psychoanalysts are only repeating scientifically what writers 
have always said. Yet, paradbxically, such praise of writers' and artists' 
insights turns to dismissiveness when serious questions come up. 'Art 
does not seek to be anything else but an illusion ... it never dares to 
make an attack on the realm of reality' (Freud, 1933, p. 205). boy-_ 
ment of works of art is simply 'satisfaction through fantasy' (Freud, 
1966, p. 80); literature merely an intermediate stage of the mind on the 
6 
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route to rationality. (Freud, 1966a) 
0.1.3.2 Even allowing art - once again, especially literature -a degree of 
answerability to reality, poetic truth remains no more than a second best 
for science's defenders. To Von Mises (1951) for example, 'What the poet 
Positivism reports ... are experiences about vital interrelations between observable 
phenomena' (p. 294). Nevertheless. poetic truth is only to be turned to 
where science proves the laggard. 
'In areas of life that are not sufficiently explored by science, poetry 
expresses, by means of linguistic forms that have been created for 
that special purpose, experiences that are present in the consciousness 
of the poet, in the form of moods, feelings or inspirations, with tho 
aim of communicating these states of consciousness to the reader or 
listener. ' (p. 300) 
0.1.4 The other side of the argument, that of art's advocates, often goes a 
long way towards vindicating attacks on it. Jefferson (cited by Bowden, 
1957) for example takes up the argument. against machines where Lady 
Machines Lovelace has left it: 
and men: 
a view 'Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because 
from the of thoughts or emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, 
arts could we agree that machine equals brain - that is, not only write 
it but know that it had written it. No mechanism could feel (and not 
merely artifically signal, an easy contrivance) pleasure at its 
success, grief when its valves fuse, be warmmed by flattery, be made 
miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed 
when it cannot get what it wants. ' (Bowden, 1957, P. 320) 
Jefferson's tone is dogmatio, -his concern ostentatiously with human pre- 
rogatives, as if this alone endowed him with a moral superiority suffic- 
ient in itself to obviate any need for rational argument. Commenting on the 
passage, Bowden recalls Turing's (1956) question as to how one would know 
what the machine felt, other. than from the evidence of what it produced. 
But from Jefferson's lofty viewpoint, arguing at all concedes too much to 
his opponents' barrenness. He prefers deliberately to leave his assertions 
S. 
unsupported, ignoring such trivia as vulnerability to mere scientific 
attack. 
0.1.5 Yet implied by Jefferson's words is the same claim for art that is made 
for science, that it is in some quite distinctive way concerned with 
reality. Vehemence and indignation is common to both sides, the indigna- 
Artistic tion of each at the presumption*of the other in claiming . to deal with 
reality 
reality at all, accompanied by the vehement assertion of the unique en- 
titlement to do so itself. Scientific reality is based on measurement 
and abstraction; its aims are discovering regularities, generalization 
and formalization. Artistic reality is concerned with human experience, 
with what Beckett (1910) likens to Suffering, which he contrasts with 
Habit. 
'The fundamental duty of Habit ... consists in a perpetual adjustment 
and re-adjustment of our organic sensibility to the conditions of its 
worlds. Suffering represents the omission of that duty, whether 
through negligence or inefficiency, and boredom its adequate perfor- 
mance. The pendulum oscillates between these two terms: Suffering - 
that opens*a window on the real and is the main condition of the art- 
istic experience, and Boredom - with its host of top-hatted and 
hygienic ministers, Boredom that must be considered the most toler- 
able because the most durable of human evils. ' (p. 28) 
Beckett's definition of Habit agrees nicely with descriptions of the re- 
gulating function of the brain such as those advanced by Sommerhof (1950) 
or Ashby (1965,1967). Little of what Beckett says about the omission 
of Habit's, duty opening 'a window on the world' should disturb anyone 
who defines regulation as a means of absorbing variety. It is in this 
enterprize in the physical world, and somewhat less in the mental that 
science has shown itself so successfully as technology's hand-maiden, 
errecting barriers of growing impenetrability between human sensibility 
and the 'condition of its worlds'. If, as Beckett suggests art's purpose 
is to bring about the destruction of this regulating shock-absorber and 
9" 
0.2.0 
its conniving science to reveal the 'reality' of undiminished variety 
and undamped disturbance, the hostility between science and art is more 
readily understandable. It is due to a conflict of aims. Habit, un- 
selfconsciously forging heuristics for finding paths to stability and 
equilibrium, to resting states whose attainment signals an end. to further 
search, easily comes to be associated with science, which has so much 
abetted Habit's imitator, technology. And it is easy to see how one 
attracted to the negligence or inefficiency that leads to the omission 
of the duty of Habit, might come to find science not merely an inadequate 
way to represent reality but, like Habit itself, stupefying. Like the 
advocates of science, those of art argue from their own premises, almost 
in seeming-invitation of their adversaries' insults and assaults. But 
in time the 'old terms move from within technical discussions to the out- 
side, taking successively the fo'mns of chapter headings, book titles, 
and names of professions' (Minsky, 1972, p. 4). It becomes harder to main- 
tain arguments like Jefferson's, as technical advances steadily undermine 
their substance, though Beckett's words are-less vulnerable. For Beckett 
expresses as much a preference of taste as an argument of advocacy, and 
probably comes closer to saying what determines a choice of sides between 
art and science than tendentious disagreements about whose wares are best. 
SECTION 2A TASTE FOR ART OR SCIENCE 
A preference for artistic reality does not of itself necessitate On 
in- 
sistence on special human prerogatives or the incorporeality of mim, 
though such beliefs are often its associates. To one seeking the Id3la 
or reality that art offers, the efforts of science may easily apPeox 
in- 
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Artistic relevant or worse. The relatively restricted pre-occupations of tradi- 
reality not 
dependent tional science; scientific aims such as measurement, abstraction, forma- 
on human 
uniqueness lization, which have nourished the prejudice that makes 'hard? science 
seem inherently more scientific that 'soft', and both more than 'social', 
contribute to this sense among the artistic of science's emptiness. And 
by contrast fills out the arguments in favour of human uniqueness with 
an illusory substance that inclines artistic judgement towards them, not 
because it finds them necessary, but primarily because they satisfy axt- 
istic prejudice through their claims to a concern with human qualities. 
(N. 0.4) 
0.2.1 Scientific reality on the other hand allows no leanings one way or the 
other. It commits its adherents against dualistic principles. Cyber- 
netics, particularly the study of artificial intelligence, has furnished 
Science specific arguments to show the sufficiency of the physical world alone 
committed 
against to account for the existence of mind. Craik (1943) provides a detailed 
dualism 
justification for 'physical explanations' as being those that cover 'the 
most facts by the fewest postulates and leaves the fewest anomalies out- 
standing, (p. 49). McCulloch (1965) made it his self-appointed life's 
work to delineate the 'Embodiments of Mind' by showing at least the theo- 
retical possibility of making physical components that reproduce its 
attributes. The classical expositions both of Turing (1950) and Ashby 
(1965) have demonstrated the theoretical adequacy of physical machinery 
for capturing mind-like qualities. And pattern-recognition, problem- 
solving, inductive and heuristic programming, together with all the other 
enterprizes of artificial intelligence have been at least primitive prac- 
tical demonstrations of the theory. 
0.2.2.0 But the question why the notion of dualism should occur at all, or where 
U. 
the sense of mind-body separation springs from, which is intuitively so 
strongly felt and richly represented in thought and language, has attracted 
Men's less attention than its refutation, even among psychologists. What basis 
models of 
the world is there for the claim for the existence of uniquely human qualities? What 
and of 
themselves leads to the belief in any quality at all of this mystic order, able to 
evade natural laws? Minsky (1965) offers an hypothesis to account for this 
division in terms of men's self-models. He uses the term 'model' in the 
sense of a ternary relation: 'To an observer B an object A* is a model 
of an object A to the extent that B can use A* to answer questions that 
interest him about A' (p. 45). We precis Minsky's argument as follows: 
taking ourselves the role of B. we attribute the ability of a man M to 
answer questions about the world W to some 'internal mechanism Wý- inside 
of M'. Questions about 'things in the world' may be answered by reference 
to W*, in ways such as those suggested by Craik, consisting of machinery 
doing symbolic calculation with analogue characteristics. But questions 
about the 'nature of the world' are really cVlestions, not about W, but 
about W*. If W* includes a model M* of M, it follows that M* can contain 
a model W** of W*; and, at the next step, Wem- may contain a model M 
of M*. On the definition Minsky proposes of a model, this must be the 
case if M is to answer 'general' questions about himself. M* answers 
questions about himself like how tall he is, but very broad questions 
about his nature, 'what kind of a thing he is, etc, ' require descriptive 
statements by M about Mme, when answers are possible at all. Minsky 
notes the inadequacy of his intuitive description of 'model'. Difficul- 
ties arise for instance immediately one questions the internal relation- 
ships of the substructures it postulates. For example there is a sense 
in which W** 'contains' W*, since W* must include an interprative mech- 
seism that refers to it. In another more usual sense W* contains W. 
IC 
'An, adequate analysis will need much more advanced ideas about symbol 
representations of information-processing structures'. 
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0.2.2.1 But Minsky's concern is to indicate how the dimorphism of our world models 
results in notions of dualism. This, he suggests, is due to the 'distinctly 
bipartite structure' of these models 
Dimorphism 'One part is concerned with matters of mechanical, geometrical, physical 
of world character. The other part is associated with things like goals, mean- 
models ings, social matters and the like. This division of W* carries through 
the representations of many things in W-, especially to M itself. 
Hence, a man's model of himself is bipartite, one part concerning his 
body as a physical object and the other accounting for his social and 
psychological experience. ' (p. 46)' 
The mans belief that he has a mind as well as a body is the conventional 
way he has of expressing' this to himself. The reason for the structural 
divisions in our models are probably connected, according to Minsky, with 
the heuristic value they have for us, a value which, he indicates, should 
be thought of. in terms of the stratification of computer programs into 
different levels, in which there may be executive programs, sub-routines 
and the like. 
'When intelligent machines are constructed, we should not be surprised 
to find them as confused and stubborn as men on their convictions 
about mind-matter, consciousness, free will and the like. For all 
such questions are pointed at explaining the complicated interactions 
between parts of the self-model. A man or a machine's strength of 
conviction about such things tells us nothing about the world, or 
about, the man, except what it tells us about his model of himself. ' 
(p"43) 
0.2.3 The particular value of this hypothesis of Minsky's lies in the help it 
gives towards drawing together into a single thread the several loose 
ends of conflicting claims and conjectures advanced in the futherance of 
The value the different interests we have mentioned so far. These conjectures 
of"Minskyy's 
hypothesis . have taken the form of a number of antinomies, between reason and imagina- 
tion, body and mind, scientific. and artistic reality, all running to some 
extent parallel with one another. The hypothesis suggests that the anti- 
nomies reflect a valuable world modelling heuristic, which calls for a' 
division of models into mutually referring parts, corresponding roughly 
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with distinguishable aspects of the world, broadly the material and the 
organizational. If the hypothesis were correct and the use of some kind 
of stratifying heuristic were the case, it would be as much part of 
reality as anything else, and its existence would therefore go some way 
toward resolving the conflicting claims of science and art, each to being 
reality's sole representative. On the one hand, according to the hypo- 
thesis, an insistence on the oneness of the world would result in science 
and the scientific reality that puts this oneness emong its chief pre- 
mises; on the other, a concern with what is distinctively human and to 
do with human experience would be synonymous to a concern with the human 
self-model, and so easily lead to art and artistic reality, which, 
because it centres on what M models, emphasizies M*)'s qualities, namely 
the organizational rather than the material aspects of the world. 
0.2.4 Only relatively recently have things like-go slop meanings and social 
matters become the concern of science at all. Psychology in its psycho- 
analytic avatar has, it is true, retained its early interest in litera- 
Cybernetics ture and has also aroused considerable literary interest in itself. But 
enables 
science and 'mod' science is disinclined to take at all seriously the claims of 
art to 
share 'raw psychoanalysis to be a science at all. Behaviourism, on the other hand, 
material' 
and those branches of psychology that have made special efforts to imi- 
tate the 'hard' sciences, largely by deliberately restricting their scope 
to domains accessible to science's traditional tools, are barren places 
to search for representations of the richness of human experience. And 
art, aesthetic pleasure, 'resensualization' as Moles (1966) calls it, 
'is proper to a psychology other than behaviourism' (p. 167). Cybernetics 
though is uniquely equipped to deal with richness, ' while easily satisfy- 
ingdemands for scientific hardness. Its growth has been largly synony- 
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mous with the advance of concern with machine intelligence and its rami- 
fications. Thus for the first time only recently has it become possible 
for science and art to share a common 'raw material' and so open a new 
field for investigation, in which the 'two cultures' may hopefully prove 
mtiitually illuminating. 
SECTION 3 PROBLEMS FOR AN ART THEORY 
0.3.0" A satisfactory art theory should aim at resolving conflicts that result 
in artistic claims on truth and reality contending for precedence against 
the claims of other nodes of expression, without destroying by reconcilia- 
Aims of tion the distinctiveness of the different modes or their centres of inter- 
an art 
theory est. It would almost certainly be impossible to distinguish art from 
science by assessing, if it were possible, the different amounts of in- 
tellectual, and imaginative energy that needed to be expended in the pur- 
suit of each, even supposing these faculties were separable. It is there- 
fore correspondingly futile to look for characterizing features in art 
that rely on such distinctions. Ideally one would hope to find a common 
set of criteria for judging both scientific and artistic work, as well as 
other kinds of human expression, at least for 'deep letiel' evaluations, 
such as those that might begin from the common starting point of the rant 
material say. More superficially one would like to suggest answers to 
some of the more traditional questions of art theory. 
0.3.1.0 Osborne (1972) gives a brief outline of art theory's recent history. 
Recent art 
Currently, theories of art, in the sense of complete, self-contained sys- 
theories terns, are out of favour. 
0.3.1.1 Osborne (195 2) himself, whose concern is'principally within the narrower 
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Necessary 
and suffi- 
cient con- 
ditions 
0.3.1.2 
'Family 
resemblance 
groupst 
framework of aesthetics, following earlier writers such as Collingwood 
(1963), suggested the need for a set of necessary and sufficient condi- 
tions for deciding whether or not a thing was a work of art. Bis-conten- 
tion was repudiated on the grounds that variety among possible candidates 
made agreement of conditions too unlikely to warrant the effort of the . 
search. 
An approach to the problem of defining a 'work of art' offered as an alter- 
native to Osbornes, appealed to the idea of 'family resemblance groups?. 
This concept due to Wittgenstein (1966), is of an assemblage in which 
each item has some resemblance to some other item, but in which no pro- 
perty is common to all members of the group. Such a group lacks natural 
boundaries other than those implied by the word 'family', so that 'work 
of art' becomes an 'open' concept. On this basis however it is possible 
to conceive of almost any assemblage being linked, by a chain of suitably 
chosen resemblances, to any other, leaving the problem of finding defin- 
ing criteria unresolved. 
0.3.1.3 Functional definitions have been proposed, which distinguish WOAs by what 
I 
they do: express, inform, evoke, asiase, puzzle, advertize, exhort, etc. 
The objection to this approach is that it prescribes in advance of a de- 
Functional finition what does what. Defending such Idefinitionst against this objec- 
definitions 
tion, Ost. rne points out that they are the more acceptable because they 
may be taken as mnemonic devices for 'shorthand summaries of conclusions 
reached after protracted enquiry' (p. 20). 
0.3.1.4 A definition of a kind related to the 'functional' one makes a WOA simply 
an artefact, though one primarily intended for 'aesthetic consideration'. 
Osborne calls this. a 'formula definition'. Little results from the change 
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'Formur, in approach that it entails beyond a shift of emphasis from the WOA to 
definition' 
the question as to what constitutes aesthetic consideration. 
0.3.1.5 In answer to this question it is suggested that the material for such 
consideration is 'aesthetic properties?, as distinct from 'non-aesthetic'. 
Aesthetic properties are known by acquaintance and are not to be inferred 
'Aesthetic from the presence of non-aesthetic properties. They are analagous to 
properties' 
Moles's concept of 'aesthetic information', as distinct from semantic and 
other categories of information. Osborne lists 'descriptive ! tertiary" 
or Gestalt properties ("dainty", "dumpy", "'gawky"); "emotional" qualities 
(the serenity of the landscape, the gaiety of the music, the sombre 
colours of a picture); emotive or evocative qualities ("moving", "stimula- 
ting", "depressing"); structural properties ("well or ill balanced", "form- 
less"); a class of properties which are not, but which are dependent upon, 
structural properties (the difference between "pretentious" and "unassum- 
ing", "eloquent" and "bombastic", "grandeur" and "grandiosity", etc. )' 
(p. 9). The difficulty with this definition is that most of the qualities 
suggested are ubiquitots and the presence of such 'tertiary' properties is 
therefore insufficient for defining a WOA. 
0.3.1.6 The notion of aesthetic consideration raises questions, on the one rand 
as to what are the objects of aesthetic attention, the grounds of aesthetic 
judgement, and the differences between aesthetic and other sorts of appr- 
Further aisal. Or, more broadly, what is aesthetic experience, or experience gen- 
questions 
for art erally for that matter, and what distinguishes aesthetic experience from theory 
other sorts. On the other hand, questions arise concerning aesthetic con- 
sideration and WOAs: Is art revelatory and what is the connexion between 
revelatory and aesthetic qualities? Is there such a thing as an 'imaginary 
reality', obeying only its own rules of internal consistency? (of. Medawar, 
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0.1.2) What is the relationship between revelatory reality, imaginary 
reality and 'creativity'? 
0.3.2 Implicit in these questions is the notion of a WOA in relation to an 
audience. Indeed any attempt to understand the concept WOA in isolation 
is almost certain to prove vacuous, (although theoretically the audience 
WOAs need number no-one besides the artist himself). Explicitly acimowledging 
an audience raises questions relating. to the interpretation aid 'meaning' 
of WOAs, the relationship of art to truth or reality (0.2); and this 
leads to still further questions, especially those regarding the artist's 
intention, what it is, how it is manifested, and what its relevance is 
in aesthetic and other judgements to the WOA. 
0.3.3 The word 'art' has itself been used differertly at different periods, 
and a number of varying meanings have persisted side by side to the pre- 
sent. Thus for example the word may denote a set of skills, as in 'the 
Meaning of art of government' or 'the art of war', or intuitiveness, as in 'the art 
the word 
'art' of politics', inviting contrast with military or political science. 
(Fowler (1926) asks: 'the art of self-defence, and the boxer's s. fciercee - 
are they the same or different? ') Or the word may appear on its own, 
often indicating some lind of general concern with the attainment of the 
beautiful. Even within this relatively restricted meaning it occurs in 
several different senses, often without explicit distinctions being made 
between them. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, 'The most 
usual modern sense of art, when it is used without any qualification, is 
'The application of skill to the arts of imitation and design, Painting, 
Engraving, Sch, Architecture; the cultivation of those in its princ- 
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iples, practice, and results; the skilful production of the beautiful in 
visible forms. ' Commonly the subject matter that the word denotes within 
this usage is often even wider, comprehending besides visible forms aes- 
thetics (0.3.1) and the artistic or 'creative' process itself, and so, by 
the extension this implies, literature, music, and the performing arts, 
as well as painting, sculpture, and the like. Unless otherwise indicated, 
in what follows the word will be understood to have this broad sense. 
Notice that, within this meaning, reference may be to (1) the artist's 
output; (2) WOAs, a subclass of this, "selected according to certain more 
or less explicit criteria; (3) the topic whose subject matter includes 
artists, WOAs9 and the criteria of artistic judgement; (4) the abstract 
quality of WOAs that distinguishes them from other objects. 
SECTION 4 EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES FOR AN ARR' THEORY 
0.4.0 Clearly a firm prescriptive definition of art is lacking. Moreover it 
has eluded protracted search. Often when problems of definition prove 
intractable it is because the questions they raise are meaningless, un- 
Cybernetics answerable or at least improperly formulated, or because an adequate 
provides 
methodolody analytical apparatus is lacking. In the case of art, to these diffi- 
for study 
of art culties, we might add, as we have suggested (0.0.1), an actual interest 
in vagueness, or at any rate a resistance to approaches that might lead 
to precision. Intimations so far suggest that, uniquely in science, 
cybernetics may be sufficiently rich in helpful formulations to support 
hypotheses for dealing with art's and its associated problems. Particul- 
arly in the use it makes of the concept of 'effective procedures', cyber- 
netics appears also to offer an appropriate methodology. 
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0.4.1 An example, in a realm associated with art, of the use of such a method 
is the approach of Newell, Shaw & Simon (1958) to the problem of 'creative 
thinking'. Following reasoning like Turing's (1950), that a machine which 
Effective could counterfeit human intelligence could claim to share it, they set out 
procedures 
for the to make a computer imitate human creativity. 
study of 
'creativity' ' ... we would have a satisfactory theory of creative thought if we 
could design and build-some mechanisms that could think creatively 
(exhibit behaviour just like that of a human carrying on creative 
activity), and if we could state the general principles on which the 
mechanisms were built and operated. ' (p. 2) 
They offer a description of 'creative thinking' depending partly on behav- 
iour and partly on kinds of problems. Thinking is to be classified as 
'creative' according as these take the forms they do when associated with 
creative thinking in humans. Such a restrictive approach precludes any 
chance of finding a more general, non-human-based way of defining creative 
thinking - analagous say to a definition of intelligence not linked to 
purely human capacities. A relaxation of the imitative restrictiveness 
of the approach of Newell & others leads to a wider approach, such as that 
implied by a remark of Minsky & Papert (1972): ' ... if a theory of 
Vision is to be taken seriously, one should be able to use it to make a 
Seeing Machine! ' (paragraph 1.0). For our purposes, reversing this argu- 
ment, we should say that the ability to make and described an art machine 
would enable the development of an art theory powerful enough to remove 
many of the difficulties experienced hitherto. 
0.4.2 But such a strategy presents a seemingly inescapable difficulty. For the 
chief problem one hopes to overcome by building an art machine, that of 
defining art, immediately presents a barrier to ones building it. Lack- 
Problem of ing any agreed definition or prescriptive formula for what art is, it is 
defining 
the task not possible to say in general what an art machine ought to do; how would 
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0.5.0 
An art 
machine 
must make 
products 
intention- 
ally 
one know for example whether or not such a machine were working properly? 
Nor would it help to follow the Turing and Newell & others restrictive app- 
roach, by calling for the machine to imitate a human artist, since con- 
ceivably almost any output might be judged by some observer (participant 
in an 'interrogation game', for instance) as a work of art emanating from 
a human artist; though the converse, an output not taken to be a work of 
art, would obviously not, on that account, necessarily be judged to be a 
machine's rather than a human's. In other words, artists are not bound 
to produce only works of art, and judgements as to whether or not some 
object is a work of art, irrespective of how it was produced, depend 
finally upon the judge's decision alone. No object can enjoy more than 
the likelihoadof a given judge classifying it one way or another. At 
least theoretically and possibly also in practice, no work, can rely on 
the favour of every judge, while on the other hand practically awn object 
might be classified as a work of art by someone. 
+ 
SECTION 5 AN ART MACHINE 
As opinions about whether different object are works of art will differ 
from observer to observer, we should at least require that an art machine 
itself judged that its own products, more or less at any rate, met art's 
demands. This would necessitate its having some 'idea' of what it 'wanted' 
to achieve, which is to say, an intention of producing a work of art. In 
other words, although one might accept an art machine that did not always - 
or possibly even ever - produce what qualified in one's own judgement as 
a WOA, one would insist as a minimum demand, that the machine produced its 
object 'on purpose'. 
+ Among possible illustrations of this are the celebrated 'ready-males' of Marcel Duchamp, everyday, usually mass-produced, objects, arbitrarily displayed as aesth- 
etically significant structures. 
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0.5.1 To do this the machine would itself need the capability of playing the 
part of observer, in order to be able to assess what it produced. The 
criteria it applied in reaching its own evaluations would determine how 
Machine far they agreed with judgements of other observers, but would not them- 
needs self- 
observing selves be of vital importance in the construction of the machine. It 
facility 
follows that the machine would require, in addition to the facility that 
set its output, a facility for observing judging it - feedback, en- 
abling a control to fit output to intention. The machine. sketched would 
therefore need at least the ability to entertain an intention, set an out- 
put, and then evaluate output against intention. One way of representing 
this process might be as a set of ordered triplets giving intention, out- 
put and evaluation. For, in general, one might expect modifications to 
occur to the intention too, as the product took shape. A convergent 
series of 'differences' between intention and product would ensure that 
the machine stopped, having produced, according to its own judgement at 
-any rate, a WOA. Divergence or oscillation of differences would result 
in failures. 
SECTION 6 DEFINITION OF ART 
0.6.0 Such an outline of minimum requirements for an art machine still says 
nothing about the problem of defining art. Answers to questions 
about what art is such as an art machine might be able to provide would 
Human have to hinge on what it produced. Discussion of this will form the sub- 
connota- 
tions for ject of Part I of what follows, while Part II will seek criteria for 
art 
avoided narrowing the class of its products generally, to those classifiable as 
art. Restrictions of generality will be avoided as far as possible. In 
22. 
particular, the meaning of 'art' will not be confined to denoting only 
what is accessible to humans. There may be systems, 'humans among them, 
for which a machine's output is not interpretable or even observable, as 
for example in the case of direct communication between two machines. 
Even if such communications were made observable by third systems, by pro- 
vision of appropriate facilities, they would still remain uninterpretable, 
at least in the form in which they were intended, unless the third system's 
coding procedures were matched to the other two. In view of this and the. 
common practical inconsistencies of evaluation of WOAs, it will be nee-' 
essary at the outset to look for criteria such as will permit more stable 
results in WOAs' classification. 
0.6.1 Making such wide generality an intial aim might seem greatly to diminish 
any hope of success. But there is still some reason for optimism. For 
it is widely accepted that such things as WOAs exist, and there is even 
Art machine a measure of agreement about some examples of them. So, proceeding by 
to be an 
author degrees, it may be possible to arrive eventually at a design for a machine 
with the desired properties. We shall begin by considering a general pro- 
cess, gor which as far as possible we shall derive the properties con- 
sidered essential or desirable for an art machine. At the outset, the 
machine is left undefined. We regard it simply as an entity with as yet 
no ]mown attributes, save that it should be an 'author'. 
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PART I 
AUTHORSHIP 
The argument that follows depends neither on the introduction that pre- 
cedes it nor on the notes that follow. It divides into two parts. The 
first deals with authorship and the second with its products. Both parts 
propose their subjects in an abstract, general way, which restrictions 
gradually narrow and make more concrete. For the most part these restric- 
tions are shown to follow as consequences of the characteristics inhering 
in the kinds of systems being considered, though there is no hesitation 
about introducing arbitrary limits where they are needed to achieve 
empirical plausibility. Such limits may be viewed as temporary supports 
to shore up theoretical weaknesses that the test of empirical reality has 
revealed. Applications of conclusions in the less abstract, more familiar 
world of art, together with certain other empirical considerations are 
held out of this, the main body of argument, and developed separately 
in the notes. 
Part I begins by defining a rudimentary, abstract, productive procedure 
and goes on to determine some of the principal characteristics it will 
require if it is to furnish a basis upon which to build an art machine. 
The argw. ant begins with a definition of authorship and proceeds by un- 
covering its. qualities in some detail, to reveal the minimal requirements 
that they will impose upon any system wishing to incorporate them. Broad- 
ly the course of argument moves towards discovering a purposeful process 
that depends on an ability to extract order from the surroundings in which 
it occurs, and to transmit this order to its products. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PRODUCING AND CLASSIFYING 
SECTION 0 THE RELATIVITY OF CRITERIA 
1.0.0 No pre-conceptions at the outset restrict an art machine to resemble any 
familiar object, and its products may naturally share its exoticism. It 
would beg the question to insist that, as its defining characteristic, it 
No univer- produce WOAs, since one of the objects of making the machine is to define 
sal crit- 
eria what a WOA is. Expecting WOAs from the machine would imply a belief in 
what is often called the universality of art, the notion that WOAs, how- 
ever unusual, share some recognizable defining attribute. On the face 
of it no theoretical ground justifies any such idea, so the initial pro- 
blem is to find criteria for deciding what if anything that an art machine 
might produce could be classified as a WOA - at least as far as the 
machine is concerned. In the context this is the weakest demand it is 
possible to make. But abandoning notions of art's universality, while 
it has the virtue of directing enquiry away from areas that have proved 
fairly barren in the past, raises new difficulties by introducing problems 
about the relation between WOAs and their audiences, the relativity of 
art's criteria. 
1.0.1 The chapter begins by outlining a paradigm for a productive process AW 
with a controller A and product W, and then goes on to consider the further 
requirements for distinguishing those We that are WOAs from the rest. As 
WOA and in general AW is taken to be non-human, the usual criteria for classify- 
audience 
ing WOAs do not apply, since W may not be interpretable by humans. Never- 
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theless, as we wish to know whether the process is producing WOAs, accord- 
ing at least to its own interpretation, we must seek other criteria. This 
turns out to be possible if we assume the role of meta-observers, observ- 
ing, not W, but the relation between W and its observers. If this rela- 
tion has characteristics in common with relations known to be between 
observers and WOAs, then we classify W as a WOA; if notnot. It is shown 
that every day usage easily blurs the distinction between observers and 
meta-observers and that this leads to ambiguities, which sharpening the 
distinction helps resolve. 
SECTION 1 THE PRODUCTIVE PROCESS 
1.1.0 The Oxford English Dictionary defines an author as an 'originator (of a 
Dictionary 
definition condition of things, event, etc. )'. What kind of system will have the 
of 'author' 
properties necessary to satisfy this definition? 
1.1.1 Consider an abstract process AW, consisting of a set of procedures A say, 
executed in a processor, and coupled to a transducer M, with outputs that 
act on an environment E, in such a way as to cause some, alteration, call 
Paradigm it J, in E. The process and its environment together make up a universe 
for a pro- 
ductive U. (Figure 1.1.1) 
process 
U 
E 
A M H/ 
Figure 1.1.1 
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Let AW serve as a naive paradigm for a controlled, productive activity 
in which A is the controller that produces W. If A were not the controller 
we should not refer to W as its product; and if W were not A's product we 
should not call A controller of AW. By definition then, A is a controller 
if and only if W is its product. Conversely, W is A's product if and only 
if A controls AW. What this definition entails for A we shall see in due 
course (2.1). 
1.1.2 If A is an autonomous, - lacking inputs - dynamic entity, W will reflect 
A's output states. 
+ In particular, suppose A and E are determinate 
systems and, following the form of Ashby's (1962) formulation, suppose A 
W is a has the set of internal states ZA say, and E has the set of internal 
mapping of 
A states ZE, then A is defined as the mapping of ZA into Z A. # under some 
into ZE function a say, and E as the mapping of the product set V% 
under the mapping e say, where UE is the set of Ets input states. In so 
far as A's outputs VA detexhine UE, the operation of AW will have the 
effect of mapping A into E, ard, to that extent W will represent a mapping 
of'A. The advantages of this kind of representation will be obvious. It 
at once satisfies the requirements that intuition demands as a minimal 
basis for a machine that is to produce what may ultimately be made art, 
namely the need for a process with a product, while it also is able to 
furnish a vehicle for the analytical tools that are available, such as 
those based on set theory and logic, in the way for instance that Ashby 
(1967) expounds. 
+ At this stage we disregard M, which is equivalent to assuming one-to-one corres- 
pondence between A's outputs and M113. It will become evident as we go on that M's 
role in the artistic process is secondary. But, as was seen in 0.5.1 and will 
appear in more detail subsequently, the past M plays in practice is in modifying 
artistic goals. Its imperfections are therefore an intrinsic part of finished WOAs. 
,,; 
w 
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1.1.3 In general the relationship between A, M and W in such cases is well 
understood and is too broad to be of particular-interest for the pre- 
sent purpose. What is wanted is to uncover whatever may be of peculiar 
Need for importance to the artistic process, Beyond delineating these minimal 
an observer 
structural requirements therefore, we shall seek ways of understanding 
more about the characteristics of the entities involved. The situation 
becomes more interesting if we introduce a further element, an observer 
0, into the paradigm for AW. (Figure 1.1.3) 
U 
Figure 1.1.3 
Notice that now, instead of ourselves having 0's role as in the previous 
formulation, we are one step further removed. We are free to look, not 
merely at W. AW's product, but also at the relationship between W and. 0. 
This, according to Moles (1966), 'is philosophically necessary' if we are 
to be able to make statements about W's artistic qualities or, in Moles's 
terminology, about the 'aesthetic', distinguished from the 'semantic' 
information that W carries. 'In addition to the normal source-receptor 
channel, the observer who examines the signals received from the source 
ft 
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constitues an auxilliary channel. This observer, considering the signals 
discrete and free from noise, describes them in a universally'intelligible 
meta-language' (p. 130). We shall show that such a meta-observer is a 
necessary part of any satisfactory definition of WOA. 
SECTION 2 THE OBSERVER 
1.2.0 What are the observer's characteristics, and what new characteristics 
does its presence induce in AW? We may take 0 to be an entity of the same 
kind as A, M and E, namely a determinate, dynamic system with internal. 
Evaluation states Z0, receiving inputs from E- but not from A. since initially we 
of W be- 
longs to 0 suppose that A may be unobservable by 0- and in particular from W. 
Clearly in general not all the We AW produces will be WOAs, and it is 
therefore necessary to find ways of distinguishing those that are from 
those that art not. Some procedure is needed for judging W and some 
entity to execute the procedure. Since - at this point at any rate -A 
is autommous, - has no input - it cannot assume this role. Neither can 
W, since it cannot make decisions about itself - in the sense of being 
truly self-organizing (see 2.4.3). It'follows that 0 must have the judge's 
role. 
11 
1.2.1 It may seem that making 0 W's observer should alone have been enough to 
0 and W imply this. But notice that what this argument shows is the sufficiency 
are nec- 
essary of W and 0 for 'producing' a WOA. Anticipating chapter 8 where 0 is shown 
and suff- 
icient to be a necessary feature of an AW that is to produce Ws of any kind, it 
elements 
for WOA follows that 0 and W togather furnish the necessary and sufficient elements 
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for defining a WOA0 
1.2.2 The reason for Ots importance is that 'the real world gives the subset 
of what is; the product space represents the uncertainty of the observer'. 
(Ashby, 1962, p. 262) The product space will therefore depend on the part- 
Reason for icular observer concerned, and different product spaces due to different 
0's import- 
ance observers may record the same actual events of the physical world. What 
0 observes and so how he evaluates W depends upon the constraints that 
the communication between W and 0 implies. His observation will there- 
fore have the form of a relation between W and 0. Consequently the pro- 
perties of the constraint and resulting judgement of W by 0 will depend 
both on W and 0. Because judgement of W cannot be made except in this 
way, any . theory as to what makes Wa WOA will have to be concerned with 
properties that inhere, not simply in W but. in the relation between W and 
0. 
1.2.3 This arguments consequences may be moss readily grasped when applied to 
intelligence, where it admits to the possible existence of intelligent 
systems in which the exercize of this faculty may be quite unlike and in- 
Generalized recognizable to other intelligent systems, ourselves fo-- instance. 'There 
concept of 
intelli- is no difficulty in principle in developing synthetic organisms as complex 
genre 
and as intelligent as we please' (Ashby, 1962, p. 268), as long as we 
understand. that their intelligence will reflect an adaptation to 'keeping. 
their own essential variables within limits, (p. 268) in their own envir- 
onments, without implying a wider applicability of the adaptation to any 
other environments or variables. Pask (1959) observes that we will recog- 
+ Chapter 8 will incorporate 0 as part of A. 
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nize such possibly unfamiliar forms of intelligence, if and only if there' 
is a field of activity common to them and ourselves. If for instance I 
say that 'a chimpanzee has "grasped a concept", it is because I can imagine 
myself having learned from experience in somewhat the same way' (p. 881). 
But, in the absence of this common 'region of knowledge or ... region of 
connected and tentatively confirmed hypotheses' (p. 884), we shall have 
to rely on observations of the relation between the organism and its en- 
vironment. Specifically for example, suppose, as Sommerhof (1969) sugg- 
ests, we set about defining intelligence by means of analyzing the funda- 
mental functions of the brain as they occur throughout the animal king- 
dom, those of adapting, regulating, co-ordinating and integrating, in 
terms of 'directive correlations and hierarchies thereof' (p. 200), with 
the object of using the equations that these mathematical definitions 
yield, as criteria for discovering brain-like mechanisms, then the defini- 
tion of intelligence we arrive at will have assumed the existence of a 
meta-observer to derive and use the criteria. Broadly, the meta-observer 
must infer that the organism's behaviour reflects intelligence, from the 
similiarity he recognizes between the relation of this organism's be- 
haviour to its environment, and the relation previously classified as 
intelligent by him, between other organisms and their environments. 
1.2.4 Our. present object is to find ways of classifying We and WOAs that do 
not exclude a rp iori any possible W or 0. It follows from the two pre- 
ceding paragraphs that the criteria for achieving this will be concerned 
Classify- with the relation between W and 0 and not simply with W itself. Such 
ing WAS 
criteria will have to be employed by a meta-observer, call it a. Ö will 
then be able to come to the decision, +0 judges that W is a WOA', from 
an observation of the relationship between W and 0 alone, without needing 
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1.3.0 
Knowledge 
by acquain- 
tance and 
by descrip- 
tion 
to apply or even to know the procedures that have led 0 to a decision 
about W. 
SECTION 3 THE META-OBSERVER 
The distinction between statements by 0 and those by a is not always 
clear however. The reason for confusion is connected with the correspond- 
ence that exists between these two categories of statements and the dis- 
tinction that philosophy makes respectively between knowledge by acquain- 
tance and knowledge by description; the former being knowledge that exists 
by direct awareness, without the need for the intercession of inference 
or the knowledge of truths; and the latter knowledge that is not directly 
apprehended. Russell (1948) relates the distinction to what he calls 
'egocentric particulars'. In his formulation of the distinction, these 
are objects trat we 1Qiow by experience. Suppose one of these is an object 
a. Other objects we know by their relationships to these experienced 
objects. Suppose b is (known somehow to be) the only object to which a 
has a known relation R. b is not an object of our experience, but biow- 
ing that it is the object to which a has the relation It, we can give it 
the name 'b' say. 
'It then becomes easy to forget that b is unknown to you although you 
may laww multitudes of true sentences about b. But in fact, to speak 
correctly, you do not know sentences about b; you know sentences in 
which the name 'b'is replaced by the phrase 'the object to which a has 
relation R". (p. 103) 
What we know about the object to which a has the relation R may be ex- 
pressed. in sentences verbally identical with sentences about the actual 
object of b. But being able to describe these sentences or even knowing 
up to a point whether they are true of false, we still 'do not know the 
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sentences themselves' (p. 103). 'For in fact ... everything except myself 
is ... only known to me by description, not by acquaintance. And the de- 
scription has to be in terms of my own experience' (pp. 103.104). 0 knows 
W by acquaintance. 0 knows W_by description. But 0 readily assumes 0's 
role, and statements made in the two different capacities are confused as 
Russell's object b is confused with its name. 
1.3.1 0's ability to make judgements about the relationship between W and 0 leads 
naturally to the extension of the concept of a WOA, by disengaging the 
judge from the role of audience. + The extension is achieved by means of 
Definition analogy. 'An analogy relation is a relation between relations described, 
of WOA by 
analogy in extension, as a morphism (for example, a one-to-one correspondence or 
isomorphism or a homo morphism)' (Pask, 1974, p. 2601 Minsky & Papert (1972) 
explain analogies in terias of descriptions. Suppose 01 and 02 are observers 
of W1 and W2 respectively; and suppose 0 observes and, from his observations, 
makes descriptions D1 and D2 respecive]y of the two relationships between Ol 
and W1 and between 02 and W2. If 6 blows (no matter how) that W1 is a WOA 
in Ors interpretation, he will lolow that Dl describes the relation between 
a WOA and its audience. If he then notes a similarity between D2and D1 it 
may lead him to suppose that WZ is a WOA in 02Is interpretation. 
W1 is*WOA 
01 for 01. 
D1 is 0's 
description 
of the re- 
lation be- 
ween 01 and 
W. 
J. 
0 compe. res D1 
and D2 and finds 
them similar 
62; 
Therefore 0 con- 
cludes that W2 is 
02 D2 is 0's de- 
scription of 
the relation 
between 02 
and W2 
WOA for 02 
Figure 1.3.1 
+ The word 'audience' is used throughout to denote whom- (or what- ) ever enjoys or 
appreciates a WOA, whether strictly in the role of audience, as in a theatre or con- 
cert hail for example, or more widely as readers, viewers of paintings and the like. 
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1.3.2 Thus the same system S, in the role of 0 might classify behaviour as in- 
telligent which in O's role it would not necessarily classify similarly. 
This might be for instance because the behaviour was quite unfamiliar to 
Conflicting 0 and therefore not open to its direct (by acquaintance) classification. 
judgements 
of 0 and 6 Applied to art, we might imagine two widely differing kinds of entity, 01 
1.3.3 
Confusion 
of the 
roles of 0 
and 6 
and 02 observing the same W. 01 might classify W as a WOA while 02 did 
not. Such a situation might come about if for instance 01 were an intell- 
igent being that had evolved in the ocean deeps and 02 were a human, or in 
less bizarre circumstances. Yet by assuming the role of 02,02 would be 
able to recognize the relationship between W and 01 as a relationship be- 
tween a WOA and its audience, and thereby recognize that 01 interpreted W 
as a WOA. (N. 1.0) 
In effect, procedures for 0 and procedures, for b may not differ greatly. 
One might regard them as overlapping subsets of the total set of procedures 
of the system concerned. Because of this, the distinction between the two 
different kinds of evaluation of W, those emanating respectively from 0 and 
0, is not always sharply maintained. A single entity alternates easily 
between the two sets of procedures that the respective judgements entail, 
assuming 0's role at one moment and 0's the next, without necessarily dis- 
tinguishing between judgements reached in each of its distinct capacities. 
The faculty, frequently encountered, for an entity to act as a meta-observer 
of itself for instance, by commenting on its own evaluations and how or why 
it has reached them, adds to the confusion of the roles. Presumably a 
man's M* model of himself (0.2.2.0), which answers questions about what 
kind of thing he is, must be furnished to some extent by meta-observations. 
Part II deals with the question of what are 0's criteria in the first place 
for labelling relationships between W and 0. But notice here that'the 
criteria need not at all depend upon 0's ability to assume the role of 0. 
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All that is required for deciding in individual cases whether a given 0 
interprets a given W as a WOA is the existence of some criterion. The 
relative generality of what criteria b adopts will determine how frequently 
this will occur. So the criteria for classifying relationships between W 
and 0 will be of critical importance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
STRUCTURE, PURPOSE AND EXPLANATION 
SECTION 0 STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE 
2.0.0 The argument of this chapter is complicated and difficult for a reason 
that is partly the chapter's subject, insufficiently evolved explanatory 
apparatus. The literature on the vaxious topics that the chapter com- 
Parallel prises does not in general deal centrally with the intimate relationship 
growth of 
structure between structure and purpose. A number of authors give secondary con- 
and purpose 
sideration to the connection in the context of other questions which are 
their specifice concern. Of those the chapter cites, Lofgren (1972) 
comes closest to showing direct interest in the relationship in his form- 
ulation of explication and self-reproduction. Partly this is because the 
investigation of other topics has logically commanded priority, partly 
because of the topic's inherent difficulty. Yet purpose and structure 
develop side by side. A complicated interdependence brings purpose out 
of structure and still wider structure out of purpose. As structure be- 
comes more complex, so purpose grow3 more important. 1! hat begins as the 
more or less 'mechanical' growth of crystals and the stereospecific pro- 
duction of the more complex molecules that they build, has become an ac- 
tive 'teleonomic' - Monod's (1974) word+ - performance in the still more 
complexly structured bacteria into which the crystals form. The reason 
for undertaking here what others may have judged as inauspicious or un- 
interesting is the belief that a fuller appreciation or the qualities 
commonly associated with the notion of intelligence demands a closer under- 
+ ... we shall define the essential teleonomic project [a project is a goal, -viewed 
within the context of some wider structure of interdependent goals] as consisting of the transmission from generation to generation of the invariance content characteristic 
of the species. All structures, performancep and activities contributing to the sequence 
of the essential project will hence be called teleonomic .' (Nionod, p. 24) 
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standing of the relationship between purpose and structure, or more spec- 
ifically for the present context, of the structural requirements of a 
purposeful productive process. 
2.0.1 There are three main sections to the argument. The first concerns the 
properties of a controller: the minima]. requirements; the need to be able 
to draw distinctions and the consequent need for a motive. This leads to 
Explain- the conclusion that a controller must be purposeful. Goals and purposes 
ing order 
are defined, without recourse to notions of feedback, and this is shown 
to be justified. In the second part, the argument sets out to define W. 
W is part of E and therefore must be distinguished from the rest of E. 
The problem of achieving this raises questions of order, in the sense of 
pattern, or form. There is a review of various approaches to the defini- 
tion and measurement of order, with discussion of their similar'_ties and 
differences. The problem arises of the meaning of randomness, and there 
is discussion of order in relation to the conservation of information. 
The final part of the argument deals with the problem of explaining order, 
once it has been detected. It is shown that explanations of order must 
be made in terms of other (corresponding) order. Certain views are dis- 
cussed concerning the nature of explanation. Further discussion raises 
questions of order's antecedents, and shows that the explanation of order 
is bound to appeal to notions of purpose, and that indeed the existence 
of order will be taken to presuppose the existence of purpose. It appears 
that the order that is discovered will depend on the character of the 
observer who makes the discovery. As the observer takes the order dis- 
covered to be the outcome of purpose, he will postulate an agent to whom 
the purpose belongs. It is. argualthat a purposeful entity is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for the explanation of order. 
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SECTION 1 GOALS AND PURPOSES 
2.1.0 Let A be a controller in so far as it determines W, that is, by 1.1.1, in 
so far as it produces W. In other words, allow the possibility of degrees 
of control. To be a controller, A must be able to make imperative state- 
A maps ments of the kind, 'Do X', 'Let Y', and so on, or produce outputs equiva- 
into E 
lent in their effect. So A must include procedures capable of producing 
changes in E corresponding to such statements. It follows that when A 
acts as a controller it maps some of its internal states into E, namely 
those states corresponding to those of its control commands that are sat- 
isfactorily obeyed. 
2.1.1 Thus A must be able to call names, such as 'Xe, tY' and Slo on. Adapting 
Spencer-Brow-n's (1969) argument, given in his definition of distinction; 
the name A calls indicates a value; the value is of a content; the con- 
Controller tent is indicated by drawing a distinction; there can be no distinction 
needs a 
motive without a motive; thus, to call a name A needs a motive. But to be a 
controller A needs to be able to call a name. It follows that to be a 
controller A must have a motive. Conversely, if A has no motive, then A 
cannot draw a distinction; without a distinction there can be no content 
seen to differ in value from any other content, and therefore there can 
be no value; so the name A calls can indicate neither content nor value, 
which is to say, cannot be a name; and it follows that A cannot include 
procedures capable of producing changes in E corresponding to them. Thus 
A may be a*controller if and only if it has a motive. 
2.1.2 By definition A is a controller and therefore, by the conclusion of the 
previous paragraph, must have a motive. Let A's output state at any 
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given moment be the command it gives, and let this state correspond to its 
Motives motive. As AW is defined as a process and must therefore be regarded as 
and 
goals 'on-going', our concern is with its behaviour over some succession of 
moments, a time interval, T say. We therefore consider a succession of 
outputs of A over T and say that, if there is some internal state z of E 
that remains invariant under input from A over T, A's motive is invariant 
over T. We call z A's goal during T, defined as acting to keep (some 
part of) E in a state z during T. For the present purpose, A may legiti- 
mately be taken as part of E. 
+ It follows that the invariant state z- 
the goal-state - may thus itself be an internal state of A, zA say. If 
this is the case, A's output will be seen to alter the state of 
its surroundings appropriately for keeping some part of its internal state 
invariant. In every case, it is only by discovering some invariant state 
that any goal-state may be identified. 
2.1.3 More generally, if there is a subset VA of the set of all the output 
states VA of A, such that E's internal states remain confined to some 
subset ZE* of their total set ZE of internal states of E as long as A's 
Purposes output states are confined to the subset VA , we shall say that A is pur- 
poseful over that set of outputs and define its purpose in terms of ZE*. 
More succinctly we interpret ZA E ZAa ZE e ZE to mean that A has the 
purpose ZE* provided at least some of the elements of E in ZEA' receive 
inputs from A: + It follows that, unless A's internal states are observable, 
+ Strictly,, to avoid problems of self-observation, it is necessary to partition A into 
a part that entertains and executes the purpose and a part whose internal state is 
kept invariant. An appropriate partitioning is likely to prove complicated since, as 
in the case of the models, and models of models of Minsky's formnalation (0.2.2.0), the 
interdependence of the elements of the partition is not clear-cut. Nevertheless, it 
seems justifiable to ignore these difficulties here, as there is an obvious sense 'In 
which an entity (organism) may be seen to be seeking to. maintain an invariant internal 
state, Homeostasis denotes just this activity. 
++ Put differently, we should say A had caused'7. E*. This formulation i. IustratesHume"s 
objections to notions of causation. 
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the existence of purpose will have to be inferred. Informally, we call 
a purpose any goal of a system that remains unchanged under alterations 
of the system's internal state. As a rough guide, we may take a goal to 
be the aim of a tactic in a strategy whose object is the purpose. It 
follows from this definition that in general A's purpose will include 
more than one goal and will be defined over a set of internal states 
Z* E Zg say, and a set of states of the system upon or within which it 
exercises its purpose, 7j* E Zý say. 
2.1.4 This definition deliberately makes no'appeal to notions of regulation or 
feedback, because this enables it to avoid constraints on A- such as, 
for instance, the need for it to have an input, which the existence of 
Justifica- feedback would entail - before they have been shown to be necessary. 
tion of 
proposed This does not reduce the definition's plausibility or usefulness however, 
definition 
nor lec. id it to violate any of the demands of the commoner kinds of de- 
finition, such as that presented as a list of requirements by fir & 
Verlach (1965) for example. + In fact it is equivalent to Ashby's (1964) 
likening of goal-seeking behaviour to the maintenance of a stable equil- 
ibrium, only seen from the point of view of the observer of the entity 
that maintains the equilibrium rather than of the entity itself, and 
with the qualification that we must exclude equilibrium-seeking-behaviour 
of a pure. Ly 'mechanical' kind, such as for example that exhibited by a 
simple pendulum. The distinghishing characteristic of true goal-seeking 
behaviour, as Sommerhof (1969) makes explicit, is that it places no re- 
+ Xlir & Malach list the following characteristics of a goal-seeking system: 
11. System S, which features goal-seeking behaviour. 
2. A goal to which the system is directed by its behaviour. 
3. A control element which directs the system towards its goal. 
4. A representation of the goal in the control element. 
5. Disturbing elements which hinder System S from obtaining its goal 
6. A connection between the goal and the control element of System S. ' (p. 272) 
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strictions on the initial states of its variables, while in the pendulum 
these'initial conditions are dependently linked: the acceleration. depends 
on the displacement and arbitrary combinations of these variables is im- 
possible. As a definition the one proposed here has the virtue of being 
based upon what Ackoff & Emery (1972) call 'the common properties of pro- 
duction (which) enable us to define the concepts of function, foal-seeking, 
and. purpose with all the rigor of the concepts used in the physical 
sciences, and yet retain the core of meaning these terms-have gained over 
the ages' (p. 15). It is consonant with Sommerhof's concept of 'directive 
correlation'. (Sommerhof, 1969", p. ]. 74) 
2.1.5 The proposed definition presupposes an ordered, multi-goal-seeking system. 
In this it conforms to the definition of Ackoff & Emery in which a purpose- 
ful system 'selects goals as well as the means by which to pursue them' 
Purpose is . 
(p. 31). Though it does not follow these authors into making this the basis 
not 'will' 
for attributing twill' as the characteristic peculiar to such a system. 
For the assumption on which this would depend, namely that selecting goals 
demands mechanisms basically dissimilar to those required for selecting 
the individual responses called for by goal-seeking, does not appear suff- 
iciently justified. + Our view also dictates avoiding the distinction 
similar to that of Acuff & Emery, that Sommerhof (1969) draws between 
'goal-directed' behaviour, which he takes to be 'objective', and 'purposive' 
behaviour which in his terms involves conscious striving (p. 154) and is 
therefore 'subjective'. For this latter kind of behaviour we reserve the 
name 'intentional' defined as 'consciously purposive'. 
2.1.6 Because it says nothing about Vg or ZÄ , our definition may convey little 
+ cf. The operation of systems such as Winograd's (1972) natural language system (6.3) for example support this contention. 
41. 
of the quality of purpose as it is commonly understood to reveal itself 
in 'purposeful behaviour', for instance the quality that Sommerhof (1969) 
Purposeful calls a 'primary characteristic of all obviously living systems' (p. 150). 
behaviour 
But the definition has no difficulty accommodating such characteristics. 
Sommerhof suggests that purpose has a hierarchical structure 'in which 
the goals of the various part-activities (or activities of its parts) are 
inter-related and integrated'(p. 150). He distinguishes 'transient'. and 
'proximate' goals for each part-activity, arranged in hierarchies of-sub- 
servience to 'less transient and less proximate' goals of the activity as 
a whole, which in turn is subservient to behaviour patterns, and so on. 
Intermediary goals may be concerned with attaining or maintaining condi- 
tions suitable for other activities, and the various activities may all 
be connected in mutual ; nterdependence. + Such a view we may interpret 
as an assertion about the structure of A's output, VA*. Thus, frequently 
it will be A's purpose to bring some part of E's internal state within 
certain limits, rather than simply keep it invariant. In the. terms of 
our definitica, this state of affairs, of aiming to bring a system 
within certain specified confines at some time in the future, corresponds 
to a purpose of maintaining invariant the movement towards the desired 
state. There is no difference in principle between holding either a 
static or a dynamic state of Ets in;, -ariant. The difference is practical. 
Normally, purposes connected with changing states entail setting up sequ- 
ences of sub-goals to be executed-in turn, en rout so to speak to the 
main goals. 4+ 
2.1.7 If A's purpose concerns its own internal state, it may appear to an ob- 
+ Chapter 7 formalizes a notion of purpose similar to Sommerhofs. 
++ The two kinds of purpose, those associated with keeping some fixed state invariant 
and those with keeping some dynamic state invariant, correspond as aims to the 
two kinds of regulation that Conant (1969) distinguishes as 'point regulation' and 
ITa+h roanlat_cn1 iR 'Z Q 
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observer to be altering its goals with respect to E. This is likely to 
occur whenever its internal state varies outside the set of constraints 
Ultra- that the purpose defines. This kind of purposeful behaviour characterizes 
stability 
a primary the homeostat. Without the invariance that homeostatic performance pro- 
purpose 
vides, the development of purposeful structures of any kind would be im- 
possible, since there would be no way of 'preserving the effects of chance' 
(Mond, p. 32). A's survival is super-ordinate to all other purposes A may 
have, it is the 'lynch-pin' of A's motivation (George, 1970, p. 142) since 
it is a pre-condition for its achieving any other purpose whatever. A 
system giving preference to purposes other than the ones that combat 
threats to its survival will be extinguished with a probability approach- 
ing unity with time's progression. Evidently therefore, naturally occurr- 
ing purposeful systems isust incorporate mechanisms for over-riding other 
goal-directed behaviour in favour of survival goals whenever appropriate. 
The ultra-stability of Ashby's (1965) homeostat describes at is necessary 
for just such a performance. An ultra-stable system receiving an input 
that threatera to force any of its variables outside the limits that mark 
the boundaries of its viability, will automatically change the parameters 
governing its transfer function, and ccntinue changing them until it 
either fails finally or finds a new transfer function that keeps its 
variables within the required limits. 
SECTION 2 DISCERNING PURPOSE 
2.2.0 Let A be motivated to realize some fixed goal g say. According to our 
definition, some internal state z of part of E will remain unchanged over 
that succession of outputs VA* of A that correspond to the realization of 
g. As W is the trace that 0 observes A to make in E (by 1.1.2), we may 
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What suppose that W represents a product corresponding to A's purpose - or 
makes W 
appear to purposes - up to the time when 0 makes its observation. As 0 can observe 
reflect 
purpose only E in which it can distinguish the product W of AW, one may ask under 
what conditions 0 will suppose that W is the product of a purposeful pro- 
cess. 
2.2.1 Supposing that 0 can observe W implies that it can distinguish W from the 
rest of E, we ask to what extent its ability to do this depends upon its 
own characteristics and to what extent on Wis. First we may notice that 
Distingu- if E consists of distinguishable elemente, 0 will need the ability to 
ishing W 
distinguish constraints between them if it is to perceive objects in E, 
in particular W. W is a 'things or 'object' (or ? event') with spatial or 
temporal extension. 'The essence of ... a "thing", a unity, rather than 
a collection of independent parts corresponds to the presence os .. * con- 
straint, (Ashby, 1964, p. 131). Various ways are available for measuring 
such constraints, such as for instance the mean auto-correlation function 
computed across some apace or interval as, F(r) _h (z)f(z +r)dz or Y(r) = 
J(t)r(t +r )dt, where r and r represent the space and interval respect- 
ively in which the message develops. But such devices provide only the 
crudest kind of measure, as we shall see when we come to examine porcep- 
trons and the like, and it seems unjustifiable to claim as moles does 
that 'the sensation of form is the perception of auto-correlation' (p. 88). 
What is important is that W presents itself as a form or pattern relative 
to E. 
2.2.2 It follows that the notion of a 'things is necessarily vague, since it 
+ Minsky (1972) notes that when something moves we attribute the movement either to 
a physical force or a purpose, seldom both. 
44. 
depends upon what constraints 0 identifies, which in turn depends upon 
which constraints are important to it in terms of its goals. 
+ No 'thing' 
W distin- can be strictly independent of its surroundings, since this would imply 
guished 
depends that it was a closed system which would make it unobservable. 'Things' 
on 0's 
purpose are merely relatively independent. We may picture objects as consisting 
of clusters of constraints, or regions of relatively high 'connectedness' 
between unitary elements, provided we assume that all elements in an ob- 
servable world are connected, at least via one another - that'is we 
picture some kind of net-work of inter-connections. This is why what 
makes an entity a thing must remain partly arbitrary, which is to say, 
subjective. Though generally, in practice, as we shall see shortly (3.3) 
the arbitrariness does not present too great difficulties. 
SECTION 3 ORDER 
2.3.0 There is an obvious relationship between the notions of constraint. and 
order in a system. Von Poerster (1960) interprets Shannon's definition 
of 'redundancy' in such a way as to provide a measure of order; Ashby 
Concept of (1972) relates constraint, order and variety; Lofgren (1967,1969,1972) 
order 
associates order with the existence of descriptions, 'which consist of pro- 
grammes shorter than the sequences they generate. (These descriptions, 
as we shall see, he equates in turn with explanations; learning, explic- 
ability and theories, with various kinds of 'order extraction'. ) Fopper 
Von 
. 
(1959), Von Foerster and Lofgren (1967) agree that it is desirable for Foerster 
any measure of order to reflect the relative connotations of the term as 
+ 'Noise can be defined only on the basis of intent' (Moles, p. 100), and therefore com- 
plementarily the signal that stands out against the noise as background. Moles 
notes too (p. 77) that numbers of fforms* co-exist which have high or significant 
auto-correlations in their own domain though null correlations with one another. 
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it is commonly used. Among these is the notion that order may vary from 
absolute order on the one hard to absolute disorder on the other. Von 
Foerster interprets Shannon's definition of redundancy to make it furnish 
such a measure. In the formula 
R-1-$ 
in which 
H is 'the ratio of the entropy H of an information source to 
m 
the maximum value it could have while still restricted to the same symbols' 
(p. 37), R may be taken as the desired measure. It will vary from zero, for 
H equal to m (maximum entropy), to 1 when H is zero, that is when the posi- 
tion of one element of the system is sufficient to determine the positions 
Von Mises of all the others. Löfgren (1967) formalizes Von i-uses' axiom of randomness, 
cited by Popper, in terms of a universal Turing machine. The axiom of rand- 
omnecs is sometimes called 'the principle of the excluded gambling system'. 
It postulates that among the classes of sequences of events capable of in- 
definite extension - tosses of an indestructible coin, for example, - those 
that are random would be such :s to make it impossible for a gaoler to 
find any system of betting on their individual outcomes such as would im- 
prove his chances of winning. ILöfgren (1967) uses a formalized concept of 
description as a basis for rigorous formulations of 'intuitive noticns' of 
Solomonoff order and randomness. According to Solomonoff (1964) we say that IS is a 
description of T with respect to machine MI, if M1(S) = T1, where S is the 
Löfgren input string to the machine and T its output string. Lofgren's definitions 
of order and randomness derive from this definition. They axe respectively 
' ... there is aU such that for any two equally long patterns Z and 
possesses more order than r if and only if s(t, II) < s(ý', U). ' 
' ... there is aU such that for any two equally long patterns t and 
possesses more randomness than r if and only if s tu) > s(Z, II). ' (p. 
165) 
where ü is a univeral Turing machine that may generate the sequencest 
and 'from different starting tapes, such starting tapes being known as 
the ü-forms of these sequences, and where S(E, U) in the shortest U-form 
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of Z, and s(r, u) of r. 
+ 
2.3.1 But none of these definitions indicates any effective general test for re- 
gularity; or, a fortiori, how to find s such that we may be sure that there 
is no s* say, such that s* < s, not even how to loiow s when we have found 
Tests for it. 'Thus our tests of randomness are never tests which exclude the pre- 
regularity 
Bence of all regularity' (Popper, p. 359). So all we can do is apply succ- 
essive tests for specific regularities though never imowing when or whether 
all regularities have been revealed. We have a criterion of success in our 
search, namely a contracted description - ü-form] - but our goal, the short- 
est description)is specifically what is not known. Thus failure to reveal 
regularities after a number of tests does not mean that some regularity 
will not emerge when the next test is applied. Indeed, in an arbitrarily 
long sequence, we should perha; s expect to find at least some =; gularity, 
since 'No arbitrary long randomized sequence can be generated effectively' 
(Lofgren, 1969). On the face of it this conclusion of Lofgren's appears 
to conflict with Popper's assertion that 'we can develop a theory which 
allows us actually to construct ideal types of disorder' (p. 359). But, 
by a 'type' of disorder Popper means one defined as the failure to dis- 
cover by testing some 'specific regularities'. In agreement with Lofgren, 
Popper concedes that 'there are no tests for presence or absence of re- 
gularity in general' (p. 359). So the observer remains bound by the 
limitations of the specific tests for regularity that he applies, the 
success of which, registered as the discovery of regularities, he denotes 
by phrases such as the 'discovery of order', 'the recognition of pattern' 
or 'form', and the like. 
+s is thus totally random since by definition there is no s* say, such that a* < s. 
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2.3.2 The considerations of the preceding paragraph imply that order and dis- 
order (randomness) are both relative terms, and may be regarded as predi- 
cates assigned according to the results of the application of particular 
Order is tests. In so far as such tests must necessarily be conceived by some 
relative 
to 0 observer, we may take the concepts to apply relative to an observer. 
'By saying that a factor is random, I do not refer to what the factor 
is in itself, but to the relation it has with the main system. Thus 
the successive digits of it are as determinate as any numbers can be, 
yet a block of a thousand of them might serve quite well as random 
numbers for agricultural experiments, not because they are random but 
because they are uncorrelated with the peculiarities of a particular 
set of plots. ' (Ashby, 1964, p. 259) 
Notice that this view does not contradict Popper's injunction against the 
temptation to attribute randomness to lack of knowledge as to the order 
prevailing, if any order does prevail. If anything it clarifies his ob- 
jection. Advancing this clarification further, Ashby (1964) points out 
that the observer of the output of a machine dependent upon an input of 
'random numbers' will see the machine as determinate or indeterminate 
according, respectively, to whether he is aware or not of the numbers in- 
put. Consistent with what was said in 2.2.2, that what order is distin- 
guished will depend upon the observer that distinguishes it, this implies 
that Lofgren's definition of order (2.3.0) must also be interpreted rela- 
tive to an observer. If Ashby's notion of randomness is to be taken as 
equivalent to Lofglen's it follows that the magnitude of the correlation, 
in Ashby's case must be proportional to the ratio of the length of the U- 
form to teat of the sequence generated in Lofgren's. We achieve this 
result by the following interpretation: in Ashby's case we interpret the 
agricultural experiment as the 'observer' and the successive digits Of 7r 
as the sequence observed. Lofgren's use standardizes the observer as a 
universal Turing machine. The tape required to 'convert' some given Tur- 
ing machine into a universal one describes the particular Turing machine 
in question. Lofgren's case thus becomes equivalent to Ashby's, if we 
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substitute in Lofgren's definition of order a particular Turing machine 
for the universal one. 
2.3.3 The relation between observer and order observed is the reason why, in 
practice, as we remarked in 2.2.1, little difficulty generally results 
from the evident arbitrariness with which 'things' are delineated and dis- 
Individ- tingiished from one another; it is because the things distinguished in the 
uals and 
environ- first place are distinguished as a result of correlations between them and 
ments 
the observer that distinguishes them. Which is a manner of saying that 
individuals evolve in ways appropriate to their environments. Fogel, Owens 
& Walsh (1966) have 'evolved' machines in specific simplified environments 
(6.6). They conclude from their experiments that 'each living creature 
may be viewed as a tentative model of some significant aspects of its en- 
vironment' (p. 111). More generally one might put it that every entity of 
the kind able to maintain equilibria within the limits necessary to ensure 
its survival under conditions of a range of disturbances, - entities show- 
ing in some degree the characteristic that we have defined as intelligence - 
is a description of those aspects of its environment that have given rise 
to the disturbances that make up its history; and that the quality of the 
description might be defied as having been good enough for the entity's 
survival so far. It follows from this as a corollary that individuals 
evolving in similar environments are likely broadly to share some at least 
of their form-discerning propensities, thereby restricting the arbitrari- 
ness of the discernment of order referred to in 2-. 2.1, at any rate among 
the inhabitants of the same world. In general it is only changes in re- 
solution level that lead to difficulties in delineating things (7.2.3), 
and this we should expect as such changes are equivalent to altering an 
entity's environment. 
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SECTION 4 CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS 
2.4.0 Having distinguished W from the rest of E, suppose 0 now attempts to 
account in some way for W's existence, to explain how W came into being 
say, to provide what is called a 'causal explanation' of W. A priori 
Accounting there are no restrictions on what O. might postulate. For instance, 0 
for W's 
existence might assert that W had come into existence of its own accord, out of 
nothing. An objection to such an explanation might be that it was 'sub- 
jective' and not communicable to or understandable by anyone at all, pro- 
bably not even the individual making it. To be communicable in the sense 
of being understandable, an explanation would have to be able to win wider 
approval. 0 would have to be able to sustain it against criticism (Craik). 
Ashby (1962) points out that communication implies constraint; an event 
at A is communicated to B if. its occurrence at A limits subsequent poss- 
ibilities at B. Extending this idea to the notion of explanation, we 
might say that an explanation were communicable - more properly, under- 
standable - in proportion as stating it limited the range of possibilities 
flowing from the explanation. For instance, the unqualified statement 
'There is WI conveys almost nothing about W. Like a description, an under- 
standable explanation E of W restricts the kind of thing. W might be. The 
question is, How? Obviously explanation and description must be related. 
They have in common the adducing of consequent from antecedent conditions. 
Thus, according to Popper (1959) 
'To give a causal explanation of an event means to deduce a statement 
which describes it, using as premises of the deduction one or more 
universal laws, together with certain singular statements, the initial 
conditions. ' (p. 59) 
In Lofgren's (1972) terms a relatively effective explanation 'is effective 
in relation to... an interrogator in the same sense as a program is effec- 
tive in relation to a computer. It permits the interrogator to check (like 
a computer) every step in the chain of arguments, (pp. 343-4). Formally 
this view, with its overtones of Desc ates' Method, expresses an hypothesis 
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which tcaxnot itself be proved because the meaning of "effectively under- 
standable" is only intuitively understood' (p. 345). Lofgren gives formal 
expression to the hypothesis as 
'EXPLANATION HYPOTHESIS I. If an explanation E is effectively under- 
standable (relatively effective), then it is understandable in terms 
of the rules (explanation arguments) and axioms (postulates) which 
constitute an r-formal theory J, such that E is a p-explanation in 
'01 (Lofgren, 1972, P"345)"+ 
Newell & others (1958) extend the detail of this view, distinguishing 
'specification by state description' from 'specification by process des- 
cription' (p. 30) and illustrate the distinction with a number of examples. 
We may either, they assert, write down an explanation in logic or stipulate 
the operations on the axioms (the proof) that will produce it. This dis- 
tinction that these authors draw is equivalent to Spencer Brown's distinc- 
tion between 'injunction' and 'description': a musical score is a set of 
injunctions to a performer which, if he follows them, will cause him to 
produce the sounds that are thc"musical composition. 
2.4.1 But 0 faces an immediate difficulty, because of all the explanations he 
may offer, few are likely to be theorems in formal theories. Fortunately 
though, this difficulty is not necessarily insurmountable. For suppose, 
Making for example, O's explanation were a statement in a natural language, it 
explanations 
effective might still be made effective in Lofgren's sense. Many probably most, 
relatively effective explanations must have begun as natural language 
statements, from which embryonic existence they gradually acquired their 
more rigorous form. The question is how this formative process was accomp- 
+ 'A sequence E is a p-explanation in 1 (relative to i) if E is a proof sequence in 'Y 
and is r-formal. ' (Lofgren, 1972, P"344) 
'A formal theory is a set A of wffs, called the axioms of 1, together with a set 
of predicates, the rules of inference of"ZT. When R(Y, xý ,x,..., X) is a rule 
of inference of 'j, the wff Y is said to be a consequence ofihe wffs , XL, ..., Xn in'r by R. I (p. 399) 
'A formal theory dis r-formal if 'lhas a recursive set of axioms and a finite set 
of recursive rules of inference. ' (p. 396) 
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2.4.2 
Deter- 
minacy .n 
explana- 
tions 
lished. Is there an effective procedure for it? Von Mises offers the 
concept of connectibility. 
'We call a group of words (sentences and sequences of sentences) 
"connectible" if they are compatible with a system of statements 
which, it is assumed., regulate the se o anguage - connectible 
ie., with respect to this system. ' (p. 73) 
The 'place of linguistic rules' is taken by 'the totality of sentences, 
in which a given sentence is 'embedded' (p. 76). The similarity between 
this concept and that of a 'formal theory' is obvious. Where two sent- 
ences are not connectible with one another, this must be because they be- 
long to separate systems which need to be in some way 'joined' together 
to form a single system, if they are to be made connectible. But Von 
Mises does not say what makes two groups of words tconnectible' with one 
another in the first place. Within Lofgren's framework one would 'join' 
two expressions by deriving them from the same rules and axioms. 
Explanz. tions of Lofgren's kind are determinate. Within Lofren's frame- 
work an explanation would win wider approval or be sustained against crit- 
icism (Craik's requirements, mentioned in 2.4.0) if new sets of rules and 
axioms could be found that generated both the criticism and the explanation 
that it criticized. Thus if an explanation were not effectively under- 
standable it might nevertheless be partially, and be made more, understand- 
able, by making it sharper while at the same time broadening its basis. 
Which is 6o say by (1) increasing the explanation's restrictiveness through 
restating it in such a way as to impose narrower limits on the range of 
possibilities flowing from it (that is by inareasinig its determinacy), (2) 
incorporating in it, so to speak, criticisms made of it, (including the 
elimination of inconsistencies and contradictions, either by dropping 
elements of the explanation, or, where this proved impossible, by means of 
finding new axioms and rules from which to generate it). But notice that 
no effective procedure exists for carrying out this process, because, by 
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2.2.1, no effective procedure exists for finding regularities, and it is 
precisely upon the discovery of regularities that (1) and (2) depend. 
For even if we were to postulate that some statement of O's was a wff in 
some formal theory unknown to us, joining together numbers of separate 
wffs from separate theories would require finding some regularity of patt- 
ern such as would permit the separate wffs to be derived from common rules 
and axioms. 
* 
2.4.3 Thus, if 0 asserted that W had come into existence of its own accord (2.4.0), 
we might argue for example that, to have done so, it would have needed to be 
self-organizing in the strict sense of arriving at its organization - being 
Unsatis- the thing it is - without interaction with its environment. We might fur- 
factory 
explana- nish a proof that this was impossible by recalling Von Foerster's (1960) 
tions 
argument to demonstrate that the existence of such a strictly self-organiz- 
ing system. would violate the Second Law of Thermodynamics. + Or we might 
point to a similar conclusion that Ashby (1962) reaches from consideration 
of the properties of machines, without appealing to laws deriving from 
other theories. 
++ (N. 2.3) 
+ Monod describes the growth of Escherichia cola in a suitably prepared medium, con- 
'sisting of a few milligrams of sugar and certain mineral salts in a millilitre of 
water. Thirty-sic hours is sufficient to permit the growth of several thousand 
million bacteria. 40% of the sugar will have been converted into cellular consti- 
tuents, the rest, oxidized into carbon dioxide and water. If the experiment is 
carried out in a calorimeter, the entropy of the whole system (bacteria plus medium) 
will be found to have incrsased slightly more than is predicted by the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics. 'Thus while the extremely complex system represented by the 
bacterial cell has not only been conserved but hab multiplied several thousand million 
times, the thermodynamic debt corresponding to the operation has been duly paid'. (p. 29) 
++ Ashby distinguishes two kinds of self-organization. The first, which he characterizes 
simply as 'self-connecting', may come into existence of its own accord, but will show 
no properties that relate to (correlate with) any other system (and therefore, in 
particular, any observer), and will thus always appear to be random (by 3.2); that is 
not organized, and so a fortiori not self-organized in-the strict, non-ineracting 
sense. In the second kind of self-organization, the observer of the self-organizing 
system distinguishes 'good' organization from 'bad'. 'Good' organization of a system 
is that which is in some way appropriate to (correlated with) some second system. As 
this appropriateness could only coma about by changes affecting the functional relation-i 
Ms between the states of the first system (the one that appears to be self-organza- shi 
they could not at the same time depend on those states. Thus they would have to 
depend on the states of the second system. Organization would therefore occur as the 
result of this second system and would thus not be self-organization in the sense 
described. 
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2.4.4 If 0's choice of what he asserted as his explanation - namely that W. had 
come into existence of its own accord out of nothing - were dictated by a 
desire to be understood as widely as possible, he would have to choose 
Communic- that set of rules and axioms from which he could generate explanations of 
ability of 
C's explan- the largest possible number of things and events. For it is this set that 
ation 
would have the greatest chance of' encompassing the explanations of other 
Os within its own terms, of making its own explanations connectible with 
other explanations. Thus, faced with an objection to its explanation of 
W that was rooted in thermodynamic theory, 0 would be obliged by 2.4.2 
either, (1) to provide a new explanation of W, understandable within the 
terms - axioms and rules - of a theory that might accommodate the theory 
of thermodynamics also, or (2) to hold to its assertion in disregard of 
criticism of it, or (3) to abandon its assertion of W's spontaneous crea- 
tionand concede that W must b. ve come about as a result of some other, 
previously existing system. Alternative(l), if 0 can achieve it, is the 
equiva_ent of O's finding a meta-language to accommodate its own explana- 
tion and criticisms of it. It may be however that 0's own language is in- 
sufficient even to understand the criticisms of it, which are themaelveä 
meta-linguistic for 0. If 0 opts for (2) in the face of objections, it 
may be for this reason. But if it is not, that is if 0 can understand 
the meta-language of the objections to its explanation and still disre- 
ards them, we should say explanation was not 0's aim. For what 0 said 
would offer none of the qualities of explanation that we have. supposed to 
be desirable, and this would contradict the assumption with which we 
started, namely that 0 wished to be understood. It follows therefore that 
0 will either have to find a single explanation to encompass simultaneously 
thermodynamic theory and the notion of spontaneous creation, or postu- 
late some entity antecedent to W as W's cansal explanation. 
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SECTION 5 CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS AND EFFECTIVE EXPLANATIONS 
, 
2.5.0 Let us take it then that 0 supposes W has been brought about be the action 
- of'A. A suitable A would have to be the controller of some process AW 
that mapped A into E in the form of W, and by the conclusions of section 2, 
Antecedents this process AW would have to be purposeful, with its purpose inhering in 
A. In other- words, 0's assumption would be equivalent to supposing that W 
were the obsbrvable trace of the operation of certain stable processes, and 
therefore, by the definition of purposeful (2.1.3), that it must represent 
the realization of the purpose or purposes inhering in them. 
2.5.1 A definition of'Lofgren's provides a formal basis for describing O's con- 
cept. " 
'An object A is productive in a surroung-ing S if A causes S to produce 
another entity B, symbolized A -> ýdS -->. 
B and read as follows: the 
Productive- configuration (output state) of A farces S to produce B. Here d can 
ness be considered a description of B relative to S. ' (Lofgren, 1972, p. 358)+ 
We recall from 2: 3.0 the formal concept of description as a Programme that 
computes; that is as equivalent to the tape expression S (the description) 
from which a machine M will compute (describe) a sequence T. Interpreting 
this definition in terms of the previous paragraph it turns out, as we 
should wish, that it corresponds to the paradigm for a productive procedure 
adopted earlier (1.1.0). B may be taken as equivalent to the W0 distin- 
guishes, d to the purpose of which W appears to 0 to be the realization, 
and A to the entity A in which 0 supposes the purpose inheres. 
2.5.2 So if 0 seeks a causal explanation of W, that is an explanation by means 
of an. antecedent, then 0 will interpret W as definingthe antecedent's pur- 
+ Notice that-A's relation to S corresponds to the 'interaction! between what reproduces itself and the surrounding in which this occurs, by which Ash'gy (1962a) characteri:, eü the process of self-reproduction. 
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pose. As the purpose will in turn determine how 0 defines the antecedent's 
Causal characteristics, it follows that 0 will define A according to the w it 
explana- 
tions distinguishes. In the broadest sense therefore, the way 0 defines A will 
depend on 0's capacity for finding descriptions for E. This is because 
W is part of E and therefore 0's descriptions for E will determine what 
We it discerns. In general, at best, the W0 distinguishes will only 
partially accord with We distinguished by other Os or the W distinguished 
by the A that produces it (cf. 1.2.2). In particular O's resolving power 
(7.2.3) and variety - temporal and spatial - will be determinants of the 
forms it distinguishes, that is its descriptions of W. and these descrip- 
tions may be unrecognizable as W to other Os. For instance if W were 
some random sequence of numbers, 0's description of it might consist of 
the mean of that part of the sequence it had observed. Such a descrip- 
tion would provide a sufficient rule for 0 to produce another sequence WW 
say, with the same mean as W, }lough possibly having no element the same 
as W. For 0, W and W* might be indistinguishable, though another observer 
01 say, with a different description of W, based perhaps on W's specific 
elements, might discern no likeness between them. 
2.5.3 Thus going back to 2.4.0. if 0 distinguishes a form and wishes to give it 
an effectively understandable causal explanation, his explanation will, 
have to postulate a purpose that the form defines, Moreover it will have 
Existence to postulate an agent as the producer of thD form and attribute the pur- 
of W pre- 
supposes pose to the agent. The identity of the agent will thus have to be con- 
purposeful 
agents sonnt with the form 0 distinguishes and will therefore depend on 0's 
capacity for distinguishing for--so that is of finding descriptions of E. 
In other words, the fora 0 distinguishes will depend on 0's characteristics. 
a 
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SECTION 6 PLAUSIBILITY OF EXPLANATION (N. 2.4. ) 
2.6.0 In general 0 will be unable plausibly to explain or account for W's 
existence. Which is to say its account will not be effectively under- 
standable. Generally 0's explanations are likely to be arbitrary, leng- 
Lack of -thy and complex, identifying somewhat tenatively, if at all, not some 
unitary 
antecedent unitary system or 'entity' as W's antecedent, but numbers of more or 
for W 
less independent entities, none of which may be even individually plaus- 
ible but merely the best 0 can do. The plausibility or otherwise of O's 
explanations will depend in the main upon their 'determinacy!. We shall 
call 0's explanatory entities (the antecedents of W that 0 postulates 
because it cannot find a single one) determinate, if and only if, from the 
same initial conditions, they always lead to the production of the same W. 
Antecedents that behaved in an indeterminate way, sometimes leading to 
one and sometimes to another consequence, would be considered unsatis- 
factory. e 
2.6.1 Thus for example if 0 were human and W were a stone, asked to account for 
the existence of the stone, 0 might be unable to attempt any account. 
Persistent interrogation might elicit from him a catalogue of antecedent 
Multipli-. conditions and events, including possible references to wind, water, 
city of 
antecedents plant growth, bacterial activity, temperature changes, movements of the 
implies 
disorder earth's crust, gallactic upheavals and so on, in a sideways- and backlrrard- 
stretching net. The net might extend as fas as 0 were able to conceive, 
in some more or less arbitrary, subjective way, of more or less suitable 
antecedent entities; namely those characterized by the possession of such 
equilibria C-, oals or, in their more complex form, purposes) as appeared 
+ In this sense it may be misleading to speak of 'entities?, A, or their purposes at 
all, since the concept of an entity depends upon the notion of an underlying unity. For consistency howeve; until we are better able to distinguish what constitutes such 
a-unity, we shall retain these terms. - 
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to him might have led to the emergence of those objects that he wished 
the entities to 'explain'. But even supposing each element of 0's ex- 
planation were determinate. in the sense described, simply the number of 
elements would quickly make his explanation a difficult or impossible 
predictor to handle, unless he furnished with it information on the re- 
lations between its elements, the constraints binding them; that is, un- 
less he in effect reduced the number of independent elements in his ex-- 
planation, by joining them together to make larger and fewer independent 
elements - by Lofgren's definition in 3.0, found more order. 
2.6.2 But for 0, the constraints that make the stone a 'thing' (2.2.1) are not 
such as enable him to point to some unified order that they reflect. (By 
2.4.4 and 2.5.0) 0 attributes the arbitrariness of his explanation to the 
Disordered thing he explains, so that, from his failure to account for it plausibly, 
explanation 
reflects on the stone acquires an 'accidental' quality for him. It appears to him no 
what it ex- 
plains more than the fortuitous accretioncf numbers of. purposes diffused throu- 
out a productive system that consists of numbers of separate, in the sense 
of more or less independent and unconnected elements, which has come about 
largely for reasons simply of their chance coalescence. We suggest in 
2.7.1 that the reason for 0's impression is connected with the amount of 
'work' this kind of explanation leaves to him, compared with more 'satis- 
factory' explanations. Such an impression would show an intuitive appre- 
ciation of Occam's razor, 'an interpretation of which is that the more 
"simple" or "economical" of several hypotheses is the more likely' (Solomonoff, 
p. 3), so that conversly the less economical more complicated explanation '" 
would come to seem more fortuitous. Solomonoff goes on to explicate the 
concepts of 'simplicity' and 'economy' by means of Turing machines, the 
'simpler' of two hypotheses being the one with the shorter 'description', 
as defined in 2.3.0. Thus, as we concluded in the previous paragraph, 
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the simpler description is also the more ordered. 
2.6.3 Because 0 fails to provide constraints binding the antecedent entities it 
postulates for W, these entities cannot provide the determinacy required 
of an explanation (3.6.0). There is little about 0's explanation that 
Length of fits it to this particular stone; it would do, it seems, equally well for 
explanation 
and use- almost any stone. Moreover this vagueness is likely to grow roughly in- 
fulness 
versely with the explanation's 'usefulness' (shortness, relative simplicity), 
at least in relation to the particular stone in question. Conversely the 
more specifically 0 attempts to make his explanation refer to this parti- 
cular stone, the lengthier, more complex and 'useless' it is likely to 
become. 
2.6.4 In important respects, as we have said, the difficulties with 0's explana- 
tion depend upon the antecedent entities he chooses for it. Though it is 
not necessarily the case that choice of more rigorously definable antece- 
Explanation dents would alone be sufficient to arrive at a shorter, simpler or more. 
and ante- 
cedents' specific explanation. An account of the stone made in terms of rigorously 
relation- 
ships expressed chemical and physical laws for example would not necessarily do 
so, because, in fitting such explanations to this particular stone, they 
would become unmanageably long Even if the entities 0 postulated were all 
well-defined and behaved in a well-defined way, in their respective envir- 
onments, objections to O's explanation would be bound to persist, because 
they result from the stone's apparently - to 0- 'accidental' nature; 
that is from 0's inability to detect regularities in it such as would enable 
him to furnish a unified explanation. To meet the objections, 0 would, 
need to find a shorter and at once less vague way to account For the stone. 
The degree of his success would correspond exactly with a reduction of 
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the stone's evidently accidental quality. That is the discovery of some 
single system or entity as the stone's antecedent, by furnishing a set of 
constraints - namely those that make the single entity single - that 
might be mapped onto the stone, would reduce the stone's apparently acci- 
dental quality. 
SECTION 7 DESCRIPTION AND MLANATION (N. 2.5) 
2.7.0 While it is true that 0's inability to account properly for W's existence 
makes W appear to have an accidental quality, it is trite too that any 
regularity that 0 distinguishes in W identifies as an entity any ant- 
Regulari- ecedent that 0 may postulate to account for it. In this respect Ors 
ties in A 
reflected accounting for the stone's existence closely resembles his description of 
in W 
it as (by 2.4.0 and 2-5-d we should expect. Were 0 able to discern re- 
gularities in the stone's appearance such as would enable him to identify 
this particular stone, he would be able to attribute the regularities to 
the outcome of a purpose and the purpose to some antecedent entity. That 
is, he would be able to suppose that the regularities of his description 
existed as the result of some pre-existing regularity, such as the equili- 
brial state of a pre-existing, purposeful entity. So the more concise 0's 
description of the stone, the more concise (and therefore less accidental- 
seeminth his explanation of it. This would be the case even if, initially 
at any rate, 0 had characterized the entity he postulated simply as an 
'entity A such that it produces WI. That is simply as some pre-existing 
coherence, -reflecting a coherence he had discovered in W. 
2.7.1 If, apart from W, 0 identified a dynamic entity A, whose purpose (set of 
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equilibrial states observed as output) correlated with IT, then 0 would 
use A to 'explain' W's existence. So for example the products of reprod- 
Correla- uction or 'self-reproduction', the off-spring of biological species say 
tion as 
explanation do not have the accidental quality of the stone; though compared with a 
stone, accounting for a member of a biological species, other than by 
pointing to its parents, would probably require an even longer and more 
complex explanation. What makes the difference between the two explana- 
tions is not that 0 has a more precise idea of the connexion between the 
biological offspring and. its parents than between wind, water, &c., and 
the stone. It is that, in the case of the biological offspring, identi- 
fiable entities (the parents) exist, into which the offspring map, appar- 
ently with little residue, while no equivalent mapping is available for 
the stone. Such entities, - the parents - being true (coherent) entities, 
may themselves be thought of as determinate systems whose internal work- 
ings 0 is at liberty to ignore, since they occur independently of him. * 
While the-'entity' with, water, &c., into which he maps the stone, being 
an arbitrary collection of separate elements, requires that 0 should as 
it were operate it himself by defining the elements' relationships. 
2.7.2 It appears that we are here concerned with the accumulation of purposes 
such as enables them to be transmitted or realized as a body. What the 
purposes are or how they are transmitted is of secondary importance. An 
Correla- example of an entity able to 'accumulate' purpose in this sense is pro- 
tion by 
evolution vided by Fogel & others. These authors have 'evolved' machines to perform 
'particular operations in certain well-defined environments. One such 
machine for instance is required'to predict the next input state of an 
environment whose input states consist of a'cyclically repeated string 
of randomly distributed zeros and ones. Simplified, their method is to 
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begin with some arbitrary machine (finite automaton), (1) let it run for 
a time, (2) measure its performance, using a measure based on the number 
of its outputs, zero or one, that are the same as the next input, (3) 
'mutate' it, by making some random alteration in its internal or output 
states, and repeat steps (1) and (2). If the new machine performs better 
than the old one, producing more outputs the same as the next input than 
the old one did, it is retained. Otherwise, (4) the old machine is re- 
stored and a new mutation tried. Steps (1) to (4) are repeated until im- 
provement in performance ceases, by which time the machine may perfectly 
predict its environment . If this occurs the machine's and its environ- 
ment's outputs will be identical. At least they are likely to be very 
similar. The machine is then itself a perfect or very close description 
of its environment, one that in general is more concise than a simple 
enumeration of the environment's output states would be. 
+ 
2.7.3 Taken alone, the outputs of the machine are precisely as random as the 
string of random numbers it has been evolved to predict. To 0 they appear 
'accidental', the products of chance, like the outputs of the environment. 
Discovery But if 0 notices the correlation between the two sets of outputs, it is 
of A -W 
correla- likely to postulate a casual link between them. Irrespective of any 
tion pro- 
vides 0's postulated causal link with its environment however, the machine is likely 
explanation 
to be supposed purposeful, simply because the alternative explanation, 
that the observed correlation between its outputs and the environments 
came about by chance, in unacceptable. And this will be because 0's in- 
+ 'My hypothesis is ... that thought models or parallels reality - that its essential feature is not 'mind', the 'self' 'sense-data' nor propositions but symbolism, and 
that this symbolism is largly of the same kind as that which is familiar to us in 
mechanical devices which aid thought and calculation'. (Craik, p. 57) 
In practice any causal link actually postulated is likely to depend upon temporal 
arrangements. For example, in the present case, A would probably see the machine 
evolved to predict its environment's outputs as if it controlled them. 
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tuitive definition of purpose matches the more rigorous one proposed in 
2.1.2. Notice that the machine's evolution has come about as a response 
to the environment as a whole, particularly its cyclic character, not to 
its individual outputs. But this does not affect 0's deeper assumption, 
namely that the correlation observed did not occur by chance but on pur- 
pose. It does not matter to 0 that he may be incapable of describing the 
machine beyond pointing to or naming it as the producer of the output ob- 
served. The machine itself might simply be a black box marked with a 
label or code number enabling 0 to identify it. It is always possible 
for 0 to find an explanation that appears satisfactory. Broadly speak- 
ing 0 either identifies an object or state of affairs by finding a des- 
cription of it, and thenpostulates a matching purpose of which the object 
is supposed to be the realization. Or 0 identifi.. a some purposeful entity 
which enables him to distinguish objects or states of affairs to which 
the entity's purpose is supposed to have given rise. + In either case, the 
description of the object and that of the purpose are morphisms of one 
another. 
2.7.4. Recapitulating O's procedure when it sets about account: ing for W's exis- 
tence: first it distinguishes W as an entity in E. What makes W an entity 
is the constraints existing between its parts. 0's distinguishing W 
Recapitu- depends u'on its discovering these constraints, which is equivalent to 0's 
lation of 
0'a pro- finding a description of W sufficient to enable it to name W or delineate 
cedure 
it in some way. To account for W's existence, 0 postulates some pre- 
existing, purposeful entity with which it supposes W stands in some kind 
of correspondence. The entity is equivalent to and may be an explana- 
+ We have noted by implication in 2.2.2 that the object or purposeful entity 0 dis- 
tinguishes will itself depend upon 0's purpose. 
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tion. Finding an entity suitable for this object, consists in finding 
one that incorporates a procedure whose operation on E will be sufficient 
to bring W into existence. Provided 0 is satisfied that the entity is 
determinate and that it does in fact bring W into existence, 0 may take 
the entity as, in this sense, sufficient to account for W's existence. 
SECTION 8 IMPROVING EXPLANATIONS 
2.8.0 As we have asserted, an account by 0 depending upon such an entity may be 
regarded as equivalent to an 'effectively understandable' explanation 
(2.4.0), in the sense that it may be characterized as a sequence generated 
0's acc- by an effective procedure, even though the effective procedure belongs to 
ount is 
relatively the entity and not to 0 itself. Such an explanation is (1) repeatable 
effective 
(determinate), (2) equivalent to the sequence that auniversal Turing 
machine would compute given the proper starting tape, namely one consist- 
ing of the axioms and rules of the appropriate r-formal theory. Moreover 
an effectively understandable explanation of W would be that part of any 
sequence, from its start up to and including the p-explanation of W, pro- 
vided that it was included in a finite segment of the total sequence. (If 
it were not, the explanation could not be effectively understandable, since 
each step requiring a non-zero time to be understood, the explanation 
would never come to an end. ) Thus there is an equivalence between the 
explanatory entity 0 postulates and an effectively understandable explana- 
tion, in the sense that, given the proper initial conditions (either the 
entity or the appropriate starting tape for the Turing machine), the end 
conditions (the required explanation) will come about (automatically) by 
the execution of a determinate procedure. Both kinds of explanation, 
Lofgrents and 0's, represent effective procedures. 
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2.8.1 But we have seen that a relatively effective explanation is not necess- 
arily effective for any particular given observer 0. The variety required 
for an effective explanation may exceed O's capacity as a channel (see 7.3.3). 
Extending and even if it does not, we have observed (2.6.0) that O's explanation is 
explanations 
unlikely in general to be effectively understandable. Now suppose 
6 is an 
explanation that is not effectively understandable, then, by Lofgren's 
Explanation Hypothesis I, it is not a p-explanation in an r-formal theory. 
Nevertheless (recalling 2.4.3), it may still contain 'parts' that are or 
could be made effectively understandable, each perhaps consisting of a sub- 
sequence generated by an effective procedure from the set of rules and 
axioms peculiar to that sub-sequence. (In the limiting case the sub- 
sequence might consist merely of individual elements. ) Such a 'partially' 
understandable explanation would become 'more understandable', in the sense 
in which we are using the term, if a new set of rules and axioms could be 
found from which it were possible to generate more than one of the sub- 
sequences. That is, if the number of sub-sequences could be reduced by 
joining sub-sequences together to form longer sub-sequences. + 
2.8.2 This indeed is in accordance with the way 0 is bound to proceed in order 
to increase the relative effectiveness of an explanation. For, recalling 
the example of the stone, we see that 0's procedure consists in naming 
antecedent entities, wind, water and so on, which we take to be equivalent 
to selecting, by their code numbers, appropriate starting tapes for a 
universal Turing machine for generating particular sequences, or of choos- 
ing finite automata, like those evolved by Fogel & oth3rs (2.6.4), such as 
have outputs of the kind required. And, supposing for the moment that we 
+ The idea that this formulation expresses occurs more or less equivalently in other 
formulation such as Beer's (1972) in which an explanation's increasing understand- 
ability corresponds to rising through a hierarchy of meta-languages. Compare also 
Von Mises' view on connectibility(2.4.1 ; or Schrod 'mechanisms' 
for producing order, 'The statistical mechanism which produces 
rs (1947 two 
order 
wo 
from disorder 
and the other one producing 'order from order'. 
sder 
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are justified in assuming this equivalence, we may regard 0's explana- 
tion as a collection of names arranged in a sequence with some degree 
of order relative to 0. In this case, the understandability of 0's ex- 
planation would increase as 0 discovered more order in the sequence, 
that is as 0 found entities capable of generating ever longer segments 
of the sequence. If our assumption is not justified, that is,. if the 
antecedent entities 0 names turn out to be inconsistent or indeterminate 
through being insufficiently specified, then (by 2.4.1) these shortcomings 
may be remedied, as we have shown. 
0 
66. 
CHAPTER 3 
AUTHORSHIP 
SECTION 0 AUTHORSHIP AND ORDER-EXTRACTION 
3.0.0 The previous chapter, together with the one preceding it complete the pre- 
liminaries to the definition of authorship. The definition adopted makes 
authorship transmit order but reserves the terms creative-authorship, for 
Levels of authorship that generates order, though with the qualification that genera- 
authorship 
tion of order is not an autonomous process, but occurs within a surrounding, 
in a manner similar to 'self-organizing'. The distinction between the two 
hinds of authorship provides a basis for answering questions like Minskgis 
(1972), when can one credit a machine with solving a problem and when must 
one credit its designer or programmer? f (p. 7) It has the advantage too 
that it permits emphasis of the gradual, evolutionary character of the 
'creative process'. 
3.0.1 The concept of order extraction and order-extraction work provides the 
_ basis 
for the definition of author. A purpose in A to produce W requires 
order in A. and the purpose makes A W's author; in so far as A has acquired 
Purpose the order that it passes on to W by its own order-extraction work, it is 
said to have created W and is called W's c-author. Definitions follow of 
partial authorship and there is discussion of the subjective nature of the 
definitions of the evolutionary character of author as defined. 
SECTION 1 APPROACH TO AUTHORSHIP 
S 
3.1.0 As the distinguishable 'thing' W represents a mapping of A into E- or of that 
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aspect of A that we may regard as the purpose that led to W's production*- 
we shall call A W's author. Although A will be embodied in some sort of 
Author and physical hardware, it is not the hardware itself, but its organization 
controller 
that is of interest to us. This is the reason why we defined A as a set 
of procedures (1". 1.0). Where A is a single coherent entity, our use of 
the term author will be seen to correspond to its normal dictionary mean- 
ing (1.0.3). A's coherence, as we showed in the previous chapter, will 
depend upon the coherence of the purpose that 0 discerns in W. If, as 
in the case of the stone in the preceding chapter, a human observer dis- 
cerns little coherence in the purpose realized in W, he will attribute 
authorship to a series of entities A1, A2, ... 
3.1.1 A number of simplifying assumptions have been made in arriving at this 
definition of author. First, it has been tacitly supposed that author- 
ship may be regarded as some kind of step-wise process whereby A is 
Assumptions activated and W emerges on an all-or-none basis, emitted as a single out- 
underlying 
controlled put. It will become clear from more detailed examination of the author- 
approach 
ship process (chapter 7) that this assumption is not necessary to the de- 
finition and has been made simply for the sake of initial simplicity. 
Later the restriction will be relaxed. Secondly, and consonantly with this 
assumption, we have treated A and W as if they were unitary entities. 
Moreover, although A's purpose has been distinguished from A itself, the 
matter has been left vague. Clearly we shall ultimately want to be able 
to discuss complex and complicated As and Wa. Later these simplifying 
assumptions will be justified and the constraints they imply relaxed, 
Without damaging the concepts concerning which they have been made. 
Thirdly, we have so far avoided all mention of how A exercises control 
during the production procedure that gives rise to W. Regulation and 
control is the subject of chapter 8. 
6e. 
SECTION 2 ORDER EXTRLCTION 
3.2.0 Implied by the proposed definition of authorship is the notion that what- 
ever results in the production of W may be regarded as the outcome of 
an accumulation in A, before W was produced, of the regularity that W 
'Learning reflects. That is as having been part of A's organization or structure. 
program- 
ing hypo- Now since A is an entity of some kind, possibly a loosely bound set of 
thesis' 
objects or events, it has some form of organization, which it must either 
have acquired or possessed when-it came into being. 
+ In the latter case, 
A itself may be thought of as aW produced by some previous A, to which 
similar remarks about its organization apply. Thus the purpose realized 
in W must have been either acquired by A or channelled through it, al- 
though the possibilities need not be mutually exclusive, and generally will 
occur together.. Lofgren distinguishes these two cases as form of order 
extraction. - 
'Learning-proms='n hypothesis. An object A can learn from a surrounding 
S if A can extract order (regularities) from S. The more order that 
" is extracted 
(the shorter the description of S produced by A), the'more 
genuine is the quality of learning. The amount of work done by the 
learning mechanism (the order-extraction mechanism) in A represents the 
amount of learning done by A and is hence a subjective measure. If A 
obtains the properties of S without any proper order-extraction work,. 
A is said not to have learned S but to have been programmed by S. 
(Löfgren, 1972, P"356) 
Notice that, according to this hypothesis, order-extraction work may be 
regarded as a necessary, though not a sufficient condition, for learning, 
as order extraction can occur without learning. A procedure capable of 
solving problems or recognizing patterns for example is not necessarily 
modified by the results it achieves, except at the instant when it reaches 
its solution or makes its recognition. 
'I 
+ In 2.4.3 we mentioned arguments to show the impossibility of self-organization. It 
follows therefore that if an-entity manifests any new organization it must have 
'acquired' it at least in the sense of having generated it as a response to changes 
in its surrounding that have affected it. 
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3.2.1 Within the terms of this hypothesis we may suppose that A's initial 
structure, when A 'came into being' as an entity, must itself have been 
the result of order-extraction work carried out by some entity, antece- 
Evolution- dent to A, At say. Similar observations apply to At and to its antecedents, 
ary nature 
of author- resulting in a backwards evolutionary chain, modified only by successive 
ship 
acquisitions of order, where these occur, of the entities that make it up. 
Corresponding to these different origins of A's structure, namely order- 
extraction work carried out by A (learning), or structure acquired by what, 
corresponding to the idea of an evolutionary process, we shall call 
'heredity', we shall distinguish two separate forms of authorship. In so 
far as the purpose to produce W existed in A fron the outset (by hered_. ty), 
or if A acquired the purpose without proper order-extraction work (by 
being programmed), then in either case we shall refer to A as the apparent' 
author of W. In so far as the purpose to produce W came into existence as 
the result of proper order-extraction work performed by A, we shall refer 
to A as W's creative author, written c-author. In general any particular 
W will be taken to be equivalent to the extent to which the purpose realized 
in W has originated in At by A's order-extraction work. 
3.2.2 Returning to the question of purpose, we may restate the definition of 
authorship as follows: given a purposeful process AW, an observer 0,. able 
to observe events in E but not in A, will attribute W to the creative- 
Definition authorship of A so- far and only so far as he judges that (1) W corres- 
of author 
and crea- ponds to the execution of a purpose entertained by A, and (2) the purpose 
tive author 
emanates from (has been generated as a result of acquisition by) A. We 
arrive at the definition of authorship by relaxing the second of these 
conditions. 
3.2.3.0 A number of further definitions follow. 
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3.2.3.1 A productive process AW will be called a creative process (c-process) if 
and only if the controller A is a c-author, in which case we shall denote 
c-process the process by c-AW. 
3.2.3.2 If A denotes a nimber, n, of distinct controllers Ai of W (ire. if A is 
made up of a number of separate entities A1, A2, ... , An), then these 
will share the authorship of W and will be called the partial authors (or 
partial 
authors partici c-authors as appropriate) of W. 
3.2.3.3 Correspondingly we call Wa c-W (or partial c-W) if and only if it is the 
partial 
c-process product of a c-process ( or partial c-process). 
SECTION 3 A, W AND TK ORDER EXTRACTION PROCESS 
3.3.0 These definitions all depend upon the subjective measure of order-extrac- 
tion work which has been made the basis of the definition of authorship. 
To chow that this subjectivity is no mere artefact of the definition but 
Authorship is inherent in the character of what is being defined, we recall that A, 
a sub jec: tive 
concept A's purpose and W am all defined by and therefore dependent upon the chara- 
cteristics of 0. (see for example 1.2.2 end 2.5.2). 
'Because any real 'machine' has an infinity of variables, from which 
different observers (with different aims) may reasonably make an 
infinity of different selections, there must first be given an ob- 
server (or experimenter); a SYSTEM is then defined as any set of 
variables that he selects from those available on the real 'machine'. 
It is thus a list, nominated by the observer, and is quite different 
in nature from the real 'machine'. ' (Ashby, 1965, p. 16) 
For machine' in this quotation we may read W. Our concern is not with 
'the real' W but with what we may regard as an abstraction of the observer's. 
3.3.1 Although the definitions proposed are subjective, they are embedded in 
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effective definitions of order and will be shown to provide a foundation 
for extending those principles such as hopefully will furnish a basis 
W may form upon which to build an art machine. We shall go about this by seeking to 
part of 
order-extr- show that W plays a patt in the process of A's order-extraction and is not 
action pro- 
cess merely the outcome of order-extraction work preceding its production. We 
shall begin by examining briefly various principles of order-extraction 
work. This is an extremely wide field covering practically the whole do- 
main of artificial intelligence and including those studies usually de- 
noted by the names 'problem-solving', 'pattern recognition', 'learning', 
'evolution', as well as 'creativity' and 'imagination'. We shall touch 
only those parts of the field relevant to indicating some of the princ; pal 
. forms of order extraction. We shall follow this review with a more de- 
tailed examination of purposes and show how order extraction works to pro- 
duce 'teleonomic' (2.0.0) entities and, how these transmit purposes. There- 
after we shall deal with the realization of purposes: control and regula- 
tion, and the constraints exercized on order extraction by the growing 
structures of the teleonomic entities and their environments. These last 
two topics, constraint and control, will lead naturally to questicns as 
to the kind of W that we should expect different kinds of teleonomic entity 
to produce. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PRINCIPLES OF ORDER EXTRACTION 
SECTION 0 ORDER AND ENTROPY 
4.0.0 This chapter aims at drawing together the concept of heuristics with the 
wider concept of order to which it belongs. What emerges is a conserva- 
tive view of order. Overshadowing the acquisition of order stands the 
A conser- Law of Requisity Variety; as a reminder of the work order extraction demands. 
vative 
approach Heuristics are slow and difficult to acquire and may lead to error. Match- 
ing the power that each new heuristic confers is a countervailing loss of 
flexibility. Without heuristics order. extraction is slow;. with them it 
may be rapid but ultimately disastrous. 
4.0.1 The chapter begins with a review of a number of definitions of the two 
concepts; algorithms and heuristics. Heuristics fill a role where algo- 
rithms are unavailable. Heuristics are aids to order axtraction, but vn- 
Speed and like algorithms, heuristics may not merely fail but actually lead to 
error 
error which would not have occurred if the heuristic had not been used. 
Especially in novel situations, there may be a trade-off between error 
and heuristic power, which may be thought of as analagous to statistical 
type I and type II errors. The power that heuristics confer on an order- 
extraction process is often wrongly attributed to the process's authorship 
rather than to the authorship of the system to which the heuristics are 
due. Heuristics' power and error risk both relate to the 'distance' from 
the goal at which the heuristics are applied, power increasing inversely 
and error risk directly with increasing 'distance'. The chapter ends with 
a 
'suggestion for measuring both heuristic power a& error risk. 
73. 
9 
4.1.0 
Principles 
of order 
extraction 
4.1.1 
Heuristics 
and 
algorithms 
4.1.2 
SECTION 1 HEURISTICS AND ALGORITHMS 
The object of setting out to discover the principles for building an art 
machine is to arrive at an effective theory of art. We have shown that 
there is a strong relationship between art and order; that order comes 
into being through a process of order-extraction; and, by 2.3.1, that 
there is no effective procedure for extracting order. In these unhelpful 
circumstances we are therefore led to examine the principles of order 
extraction, especially the use of heuristics, with the object of discover- 
ing necessary features that an art machine will have to incorporate. 
Heuristic methods are concerned with order extraction. They are often 
contrasted with algorithms. Minsky (1965) makes 'algorithm' synonymous 
with effective procedure (p. 105). Mir & Valach define the term as 'every 
precise instruction which uniquely determines the procedure leading from 
the initial information to the sought-for resulting information' (p. 145)- 
Beer uses algorithm to mean 'a comprehensive set of instructions for 
reaching a known goal' (p. 305). Defining heuristic is more difficult. A 
number of authors do without the term. Ashby (1964) avoids both algorithm. 
and heuristic, though his discussion of trial and error - what he prefers 
to call 'hunt and stick' - is essentially a treatment of heuristics. The 
'objective properties of getting success by trim and error are shown when 
a Markovian machine moves to a state of equilibrium' (p. 230). Such move- 
ment is 'homologous ... to movement by a determinate trajectory, for both 
are the movement of a machine to a state of equilibrium' (p. 231). Other 
general texts that do not mention heuristics are those of Eli= & Valach 
and Minsky (1972). 
Polya (1948) starts from the Oxford English Dictionar* definition of heur- 
74. 
istic as an adjective meaning 'serving to find-out'. He associates the 
notion with an absence of 'complete certainty'. Heuristics are 'provisional', 
the 'plausible guess' that precedes attainment of the 'final goal'. 'We 
The work- need heuristic reasoning when we construct a strict proof as we need scaff- 
ingof 
heuristics olding when we erect a building' (p. 102). This contrasting of provisional 
and strict procedures appears to imply a difference of function. The pro- 
visional procedure somehow gets one to the goal while the strict procedure 
justifies onets having got there. These functions are distinguished by 
Reichenbach (1968) as the 'context of discovery' and the 'context of just- 
ification' (p. 231). + According to Reichenbach, an example of what may be 
thought of as occurring might be as follows. Suppose one's heuristic were 
an analogy (1.3.1). Suppose T were a theorem in a formal theory, an elec- 
trical network theory say, for concreteness; and suppose one were faced 
with a problem in hydrodynamics. Then, if one noted an analogy between 
the network to which T applied and one's particular problem in hydrody- 
namics, it might be possible to use this heuristic (the analogy) as the 
basis for a 'plausible guess' at the solution to the problem in hydrody- 
namics. One might set up the hypothesis that the analogy one had noted 
between the two systems might be extrapolated to include the result T (in 
its-appropriate hydrodynamic form, call it Tiro), thus suggesting a solu- 
tion for the hydrodynamics problem. T however would not provide a 'strict 
proof' of Tiro. It would stand as a 'conclusion' that might then act as 
a statement of what was required to be proved, in a form that might itself 
indicate lines along which the proof. cou. ld possibly be expected to run. 
That is the analogy might act as a kind of goal-setting or problem formula- 
+ Reichenbach comments, 'the act of discovery escapes logical analysis; there are no logical rules in which a "discovery machine" could-be constructed that would take 
over the creative function of the genius' (p. 231). Five years later Newell & Simon (1956) reported on a Logic Theory Machine that proved theorems in Russell & White- 
head's Prircipia Mathematica. Chapter 6 will provide detailed examples of the use 
of heuristics in related machine enterprizes. 
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tion device. This argument and Polyars are clearly close to one another. 
+ 
(cf. also Newell & others (1958) fourth criterion for creativity, N. 3.2) 
4.1.3 Newell & others (1958) denote by heuristic 'any principle or device that 
contributes to the reduction in the average search to solution' (p. 22). 
The shift of emphasis away from questions of the validity of heuristics, 
Heuristics towards those touching their operation, reflects the authors' concern with 
and-machine 
operation the realization of effective procedures in the form of computer programs 
for actually solving proiklems. An heuristic for such a program is quite 
specifically a means of reducing the number of branches to be searched by 
some tree-searching procedure for instance. The hope would be to elimi- 
nate only those branches not leading t6 solutions, while leaving for search 
those others along which solutions might be found. Newell & others (1958) 
point out that this hope is not necessarily always possible to fulfil. 
For heuristics may eliminate fruitful as well as barren branches. 
SECTION 2 GOING OUT ON A LM 
4.2.0 It appears from this that 'error' may arise from two sources due to the 
use of heuristics, one which leads to the neglect of aspects of a problem 
where solutions are to be found, and another, which allows the retention 
Heuristics for investigation of aspects where no solutions exist. This suggests a 
as sources 
of error measure for the efficacy of heuristics, analagous to the familar statis- 
tical procedure for distinTaishing type I errors (barren branches left) 
from type II errors (pruning fruitful branches). That is we picture two 
+ Selfridge, in the discussion following a paper presented by McCarthy (1958), extends this point of view: the [Professor Bar-Hillel] made a remark that conclusions should 
not be drawn from false premises. In my experience those are the only conclusions that have ever been drawn' (p. 86). This sums up the basis of the idea that Popper (1963) advances, namely that scientific knowledge grows by means of"a series of conjectures and 
-refutations. Popper contends that a consequence of Hume's conclusions concerning causa- tion is to preclude any otý'. er view. This argument receives closer examination in Part II. 
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populations of branches, barren and fruitful. A priori there is no way 
of knowing to which population a given branch belongs. Heuristics may be 
regarded as tests for classifying branches. The better the heuristic the 
fewer 'wrong' classifications it will lead to. In the absence of an error- 
free heuristic, knowledge of the relative magnitudes of the type I and type 
II errors will clearly help in choosing the 'best' among a number of heuris- 
tics that may be available for a given task. Indeed such a choice might 
.,.. 
itself be heuristically systematized in order to optimize the balance of. 
the two kinds of error in such a way as to maximize problem solutions. 
Evidently then, a feature of heuristics, as distinct from algorithms, is 
that they give no assurance of reaching a particular goal. Indeed they may 
actually block progress towards a goal that would have been reached if 
another heuristic had been used or search had proceeded without the aid 
of heuristics, 'randomly'. 
+ Minsky (1958) makes the point explicitly. We 
... use the term heuristic in describing rules or principles which 
have not been shown to be universally correct but which often seem to 
be of help, even if they may also often fail. The term "heuristic pro- 
gram" is thus used in reference to the distinction between programs 
which are guaranteed to work (and are called "algorithms") and programs 
which are associated with what the programmer feels are good reasons to 
expect some success' (p. 36). 
SECTION 3 DISTINGUISHING ALGORITHMS AND HEURISTICS 
4.3.0 Beer appears to make a somewhat stronger claim for heuristics. Like 
Minsky, he contrasts heuristics and algorithms. A heuristic he defines 
+ Problems devised by early Gestalt psychologists, such as those for instance that were 
supposed to demonstrate 'insight' may be interpreted in these terms. Thus typical in- 
sight problems are of a kind that can only be solved when the subject recognizes that 
he is using a wrong heuristic. The problems devized are such as would be likely to 
call forth some habitually used heuristic that would not lead to a solution. The sub- 
ject would show 'insight' when he abandoned his wrong heuristic in favour of a better 
one. We shall show that this important feature of creativity corresponds to one of the 
criteria of creative thinking suggested by Newell & others (1958) (see N. 3.2). From 
this viewpoint, random procedures are likely to prove most creative, since they will be likely to achieve the most novel and unconventional solutions to problems, along with a high degree of wastage, (just as random choices in'the football pools are likely to win the biggest prizes). 
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as a 'set of instructions searching out an unknown goal by exploration, 
which continuously or repeatedly evaluates progress according to some 
Stronger known criterion' (p. 306). Or again, 'An heuristic specifies a method of 
claim for 
heuristics behaviig which will tend towards a goal which cannot be precisely speci- 
fied because we know what it is but not where it is' (p. 69). The 'basic 
trick' is to provide an'algorithm-determing an heurstic' (p. 71). So we 
end up with an algorithm. It is not immediately clear what the relation- 
ship is between the 'known goal' that Beer refers to in his definition of 
algorithm (4.1.0) and the 'known criterion' associated with the heuristic. 
Nor is it obvious how the algorithm's 'known goal' differs from the heur- 
istic's 'unknown goal'. The difficulty may become clearer by means of an 
example: a multiplication algorithm computes a product. Such an algorithm 
might be embodied in some kind of mechanical device, such as a Turing 
machine. Given the appropriate starting tape, including on it the multip- 
lier and the multiplicand, the machine would perform the desired computa- 
tion. It would exec-ate its procedures in a determinate way and to that 
extent its starting tape would determine its end tape (cf. N. 2.4). But 
beyond this, it could not be said to 'know' its goal. The machine's pro- 
grammer (the observer) might know (be able to state in his meta-languaga) 
that the machine's goal was to compute the product of two numbers printed 
on its starting tape; that is, might know what the machine 'aimed' to do, 
namely carry out a certain computation. But in general the programmer 
would not know what the product was going to be, any more than the machine 
would, unless he had previously performed the computation himself, using 
an algorithm isomorphic with the one given to the machine. The observation :. y 
that, in the case of an heuristic goal, 'we know what it is but not where 
it is', is not helpful in the present example. For the Turing machine 
will execute the multiplication algorithm without knowing its goals in any 
usual sense. Whereas the programmer who knows the goal (that is, what the 
goal is, namely to perform a multiplication with given multiplier and 
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multiplicand), will not necessarily know whether or not the machine has 
attained it, if he does no more than inspect the answer it reaches. 
4.3.1 What then are the characteristics of heuristics that distingttsh them from 
algorithms in Beer's terms? Let us look at an example that Beer provides: 
to climb a conical peak in a mist you could use the heuristic 'keep going 
Hill- up'. As long as a peak existed and was conical, such an instruction would 
climbing 
heuristics get one to it. 
+ Given a compass and a tape measure, one could plot one's 
path as one went, so that it would subsequently be possible to specify a 
path leading from one's particular starting point to the top, as an algo- 
rithm of the form: 'G oa distance d1 in a direction s change direction 
to s2 and travel a distance d2 T, &c. What then are the differences between 
the algorithm and the heuristic? The algorithm is sure while the heuristic 
is not: given a map of the area not showing the peak, the algorithm would 
+ Though even this instruction is not as straight forward as it looks. For it immediately 
gives rise to the question how to carry it out. An example of 0. Selfridge, cited by 
Minsky & Papert(1969) provides an instance of a 'good hill [conical] with a bad algo- 
rithm' (p. 179) for executing the heuristic that Beer suggests. 
A and B are lower 
than 0 
(Sketch reproduced 
from Minsky & 
Papert, 1969, p. 179 
The sharper the ridge, the more likely is it that a search of 'local' surrounding points 
by someone standing on it will fail to discover any point higher than the one he is on. 
In general the problem is even more complicated, since hills are not normally conical. 
'Success depends ... on the extent that the summit is not as globally defined as it migh 
appear. In cases where the hill has a complex form, with many local relative peaks, 
ridges, etc., hill-climbing procedures are not always advantageous. Indeed, in extreme 
cases, a random or systematic search might be better than a procedure that relentlessly climbs every little hillock' (ibid. p. 178). 
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enable one to plot the position of the peak, provided one could find 
the starting point to which the particular algorithm applied; not so 
the heuristic. To do the same by means of an heuristic would require 
a contour map of the mountain which would of course show the peak. The 
algorithm is a set of instructions for getting from some particular 
point on the mountainside to the summit; the heuristic is independent 
(in principle, if not in practice) of the starting point. Without 
either algorithm or heuristic though, one could still probably get to the 
top of the mountain by going on a series of 'random walks'. (The number 
might be extremely large, but might arbitrarily be made finite by treat- 
ing possible starting points, changes in direction, and so on, as dis- 
crete and finite in number, by the superimposition of some kind of grid 
say. ) But even on a random walk one would need to have a way of recog- 
nizing the top when one reached it; an altimeter say, and a rule for 
interpreting its readings. Such a rule however would be bound to over- 
lap 
" 
with the heuristic ? keep going up'. For the heuristic would have 
to include an instruction such as, 'Go to the "local", highest point; 
if it is the point you are at, stop. You are at the top. ' And the 
rule for interpreting the altimeter would have to be of a form such as, 
'Is the altimeter reading higher than it was before you made your last 
move? If not, go back to the point of your last move and stop. You 
are at the top. ' Thus 9 even an algorithm, one need not know the goal 
at all, (cf. 430) since blindly following the algorithm to the instruction 
'stop' will suffice to get one to it. While on the other hand, lacking 
an algorithm, one must have at least a definition of the goal sufficient 
to allow recognition of it. When Beer associates algorithms with known 
goals, the goal is only known in the meta-langvage of the algorithm's 
author. The known criterion (4.3.0) that he associates with the heuristic 
refers to the object-language of the heuristic's operator. 
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4.3.2 If one plotted in three dimensions a large number of random walks, some 
reaching the summit and some not, one might note that a common feature 
of paths that reached the peak was that they all kept going up. Clearly 
Heuristics it is by noting this common feature that one arrives at Beer's heuristic. 
from 
algorithms But the business of noting it is precisely what we have been calling 
order extraction. So the heuristic does not avoid order-extraction work. 
It represents its results. 
4.3.3 It appears therefore that including heuristics in an algorithm may assist 
in order-extraction work (such as is performed by the General Problem 
Solver of Newell, Shaw & Simon (1963) for instance) by providing the al- 
Heuristics gorithm with the benefits of the previous order-extraction work that has 
increase 
order- resulted in the discovery of the heuristics that it incorporates. And 
extraction 
power this furnishes the basis for a kind of heirarchical procedure by which, 
roughly speaking, the algorithm is enabled to proceed by ever larger 
steps. We may interpret this view in the terms used in the previous 
chapter, discussing order, to provide a stricter statement. (The present 
interpretation corresponds to the conclusion of 2.8) Accoring to this 
formulation we should say that an heuristic, in so far as it represented 
the results of order extraction, might be regarded as a description that 
was relatively shorter than what it described. In passing from the start- 
ing point to the goal therefore, the algorithm that incorporated the 
heuristic would need to pass through relatively fewer steps than would 
have been required in the heuristic's absence. This suggests lines along 
which one might attempt an effective definition of heuristics which would 
make them analogous to the partial explanations and partial descriptions 
of 2.7. 
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4.3.4 Solomonoff (1964) provides a formulation of inductive inference that 
suggests a basis for such a theoretical measure of heuristic 'power?. 
Solomonoff defines a 'probability, in the following way. Suppose we have 
Measurement a universal Turing machine M with a starting tape S that makes M generate 
of 
heuristic T, written M(S) = T. then we say that IS is a description of T with re- 
power 
spect of MI (p. 9). The probability that Solomonoff defines takes into 
account all the possible outputs of a universal Turing machine and all 
possible descriptions of each output, with the object of constructing a 
function for computing the 'probability' P (a, T, 15, ) that might be called 
' "the probability with respect to Ml, that he "string]a will follow 
the string] T 11 1 (p. 8). If we regard an heuristic as a description, 
which we hive argued is plausible, then P(a, T, M1) would be reduced for 
any machine using the heuristic, since the heuristic would limit the num- 
bers of descriptions of strings that the machine could cutput. The re- 
lative extent of this reduction might provide a basis for the measurement 
of the heuristic's 'power'. 
SECTION 4 MINIMAL HEU'. 1ISTICS AND AL®ONIC CONTROL 
4.4.0 Notice that, in any heuristic process, the heuristics used may derive 
from order-extracticn work that has occurred outside the process, like 
Beer's hill-climbing rule for instance. Or the process may provide its 
Authors and own heuristics by means of its own order-extraction work. For example, 
users of 
heuristics order extraction occurring within a problem-solving procedure might pro- 
duce partial solutions in the form of heuristics. These might then be 
incorporated within the procedure (possibly in a way laid down in advance) 
to modify and strengthen it. The distinction between these two possible 
origins of heuristics is not always strictly observed. Sometimes it appears 
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tacitly to be assumed that a procedure may as easily be detailed for de- 
veloping its own heuristics as furnished with them from the outset; even 
though, in the latter case, its heuristics may reflect the order-extrac- 
tion work carried out by very much more powerful systems, such as the 
human programmers of computers, for example. The failure to maintain a 
distinction between the two possible origins of heuristics occasionally 
leads to confusion as to the source of the power that heuristic procedures 
demonstrate, what is due to the system that has produced the heuristic 
being credited to the program that employs it. Such confusion fails to 
recognize that the problem of discovering heuristics is precisely the 
problem of extracting order. Many procedures that employ heuristics aim 
at order extraction (as for example all problem-solving procedures+). 
Finding heuristics to find heuristics evidently is one way of describing 
the study of order extraction! 
4.4.1 Once provided with appropriate descriptions, structures and other suit- 
able heuristic devices, their systematic use, by effective procedures 
into which they are incorporated, may greatly increase such procedures' 
Hidden power. But* order extraction itself, as we shall see in the following 
order- 
extraction chapter, is subject to severe restrictions. Thus Beer's 'algedonic' 
work 
loops make powerful control elements, though one should be careful to 
notice that their power may often conceal the extent of the order-extrac- 
tion work that has been needed to produce them. For example, it is mis- 
leading to suggest that the dog trainer, who trains his dog by means of 
rewards and punishments 'does not understand "how the dog works" ' (ibid. 
p. 78). Simply understanding what constitute rewards and punishments for 
+ These may be taken to include all situations as defined by Newell & others (1958) 
in which 'Given a set', P, of elements, the problem is to find a member of a sub- 
set, S, of P having specified properties' (p. 11); a wide class indeed. 
++ Procedures that 'reward' right moves and 'punish' wrong ones. 
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the dog implies 'understanding' of an important kind, not necessarily easy 
to-come by. It is easy to overlook how much is (correctly) assumed about 
what gives dogs pleasure and pain, by simple extension from self-knowledge. 
How much needed to be learned would be more obviously apparent if it were 
required to discover rewards and punishments for a complex system of quite 
unknown properties. Even among humans, whose properties are not quite 
unknown, the-discovery of algedonic principles is not necessarily always 
simple. 'Masochism', for example", has no immediately obvious explanation. 
A 'random' search procedure for algedonic loops in a system of comparable 
variety might easily demand computational power exceeding the limits cal- 
culated by Bremermann. 
+ 
4.4.2 It follows fron this argument that the power of algedonic systems may be 
less than it at first appears. When outputs emitted by one system alter 
the organization of other systems, without the first system's knowing what 
Meta- might act 'on them as rewards and punishments, by 1.1.1 the name 'controller' 
controllers 
does not apply to the first system, because the first system is unmotivated 
(being unable to distinguish the states of the system whose organization 
it is affecting). Only where one system demands and can distinguish in 
another changes of a particular kind or confined to a, particular class, 
does the name controller properly apply. And this requires that the first 
system should be able to control and hence communicate with the systems in 
which it wishes (entertains the purpose) to bring the changes about. 
Analagously with our observations about the goals of algorithms and heuris- 
tics (4.3.1), we notice that any outside agent that knows the control 
effects of some given system on another, may use the first system to con- 
trol the second, even though the agent. has no idea how or why the control 
+ Bremermann (1962) used quantal considerations to calculate an upper limit to the 
rate at which computation may be performed. The rate works out at 1042 bits per 
gram mass of computer per second. 
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procedure works. But he will at least have to know what it achieves, a 
state of affairs S say. Knowing this will be the same as knowing an heuris- 
tic for achieving S. The outside agent in this situation has the role of 
a meta-controller. 
SECTION 5 THE CONTROL LANGUAGE 
4.5.0 'Pleasure' and 'pain' may be taken to. be the two words of a necessary and. 
sufficient (binary) language in which to communicate minimal control 
cods. To learn (extract order), any search procedure must possess a 
Binary way of tknowing' when it has succeeded: it requires an answer, 'Yes' or 
control 
'No', to the question, 'Have I reached the goal? ' Without such knowledge 
learning is impossible since the procedure will never halt. To bring 
about, in the organization of two systems, changes such as to i, rodüce 
correspondences (or correlations - 2.3.2) between them - that is, to per- 
mit order extraction to occur - the two systems must be able to cammuni- 
cate. The minimal language that permits this is a mutually interpretable 
binary language. Ashby's 'good' and 'bad' forms of organization (2.4.3) 
are those forms respectively that the algedonic controller rewards and 
punishes. Both pairs of terms, pleasure and pain, good and bad, refer 
to the organization of one system altering in a way that tends to favour 
its survival in conditions of disturbance brought about by another system 
in relation to which the terms are defined. 
4.5. "1 Controls based on algedonic Principles are error-free. This is because 
algedonic control refers only to the goal of the procedure with which it 
is concerned; (that is, the two words of the language refer only to whether 
or rot the goal has been attained) and not to any earlier phases of the 
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Algedonic movement towards it. For this reason, heuristics of this kind, if they 
heuristics 
are error- may properly be called heuristics, cannot block possible goal paths, as 
free 
they might if they referred to choice points along the route to the goal 
(4.1.3). 
4.5.2 We see from this that the magnitude of the error that an heuristic may 
produce must be related to the phase of the goal-search procedure to 
which it refers. In a tree search procedure for example a tree might have 
Error-risk- k levels of branching and m branches at each branch point. Such a tree 
power trade- 
off would have 
m branch ends. If only one of these ends represented the goal, 
then the probability of reaching it by chance (random search) would be mk, 
assuming equi-probability of branch choice. An heuristic that eliminated 
M branches at the first branching would double this probability. But it 
would increase the size of the maximum possible type II error (4.2.0) by 
the same proportion. An heuristic that eliminated 2 branches at the second 
branching would eliminate only 
m -l paths overall. Such an heuristic - 2 
assuming it worked - would not so greatly increase the probability of 
reaching the goal as the first heuristic, but neither would it so greatly 
increase the risk of type II errors, because it would be eliminating far 
fewer paths. There is a trade-off between the efficiency of the heuristics 
- in speeding up goal attainment - and risk of error. In the limiting - 
algedonio - case no paths are eliminated, since in this case there are no 
further choices of paths to be made. 
4.5.3 Notice that in this algedonic case, the procedure accords with none of the 
cited definitions of heuristics. It differs in two respects from the 
notion described: (1) it is error-free; (2) it does not accelerate goal 
86. 
Fror-risk attainment. The operation of the algedonic procedure may possibly be better 
increases 
with corný_ understood from another point of view. One might regard the kind of 'heuris- 
rol voca- 
bulary tic' of this limiting case as a sufficient though possibly not a necessary 
condition for any kind of instruction. In this case we might let the two 
words of'the binary language be 'correct' and 'incorrect'. The schoolmaster 
who set his pupils problems and then restricted his teaching to marking 
ticks and crosses against their efforts to solve them might find that the 
pupils learned little. Yet undeniably the dog-trainer, who is unable to 
give his dogs any more positive instructions than the hypothetical school- 
master, does get them'to learn. He may increase his successes by dividing 
the dogs' tasks into numbers of phases; that is by sub-dividing the tasks 
and carefully watching the dogs' behaviour, a technique quite familiar from 
Skinnerian reinforcement schedules. In other words, he resorts to a re- 
pertoire of understanding that he has achieved and that now represents his 
own learning (acquired through his own order-extraction work). Moreover, 
though the algedonic language may be binary, it is not necessarily so. 
The dog-trainer is likely to employ rewards and punishments of different 
stengths; the schoolmaster to award answers marks instead of simply ticks 
and crosses. But notice that in general any increase in the vocabulary 
available for the algedonic language will have to be bought at the price of 
(1) an equal increase in the number of final states its user is able to 
distinguish in the system he wishes to control with it, and (2) his gaining 
sufficient understanding of that system to enable him to describe those 
end state' to it, in a way that it will be able to interpret correctly. 
Thus the effect of the controller's procedure for shortening the search is 
once again seen to (1) depend upon how much order their is in the heuristic's 
power, and (2) increase the possibility of error (by risking, in this case, 
wrong identification of some intermediate task state, or misinterpretation 
by the controlled system of the controlling system's language). + 
+A corollary to the conclusions of this paragraph suggests a basis for the resolution 
of differences between Skinnerian and opposed psychologists. It is evident that though 
the Skinnerian framework is a sufficient one for learning, it does not follow that it 
is all there is. If psychologists' endeavours had been restricted to homeostatic search 
it is doubtful whether Skinnerian psychoiogy would exist at all. 
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'SECTION 6 HEURISTICS AND HOMEOSTATIC PRINCIPLES 
4.6.0 'We should say what is a better and what a worse result, but the com- 
Puter has to determine a better strategy, a better control system than' 
we ourselves know. And of course it can do it. Because its algorithm, 
what it is programmed to do, specifies an heuristic. Alter the solu- 
tion you are now using a little bit, says the algorithm, and compare 
the outcome with the erstwhile outcome. If this is more profitable, or 
Heuristics cheaper, or whatever else we say, adopt it. Go on like this until any 
aid not variation you make leads to a worse result than you already have. Then 
replace hang on to this solution, until the situation changes: whereupon ou 
order may do better once again by producing a new variation' (Beer, P. 
M. 
extraction 
We have already drawn attention to the observations of Minsky & Papert 
(4.3.1) concerning the critical importance of local and global features 
in hill-climbing procedures, such as the one Beer describes above, and 
have commented (4.4.0) on the dangers of simply passing the buck of order 
extraction to a computer, in the name of suppressing variety. In the end, 
the order extraction required for effective modelling, description, ex- 
planation, theory development, &c., is inescapable, and the simple 'power' 
of computers is in itself a poor substitute for structure. In general we 
might regard purely homeostatic principles as laying down the minimal con- 
ditions necessary for two systems to become correlated, in Ashby's sense 
(2.3.2). But it is necessary to recognize that these principles are no 
more than minimal. The following chapter will show more clearly the way 
in which heuristics add to powers of order extraction. 
4.6.1 In practice the use of heuristics in 'heuristic programming' and the like 
appears to have been confined principally to the use of heuristics pro- 
vided 'from without', by some (human) agent, outside the procedure that 
Heuristics uses the heuristics. In general it seems that, while it is possible to 
easier to 
use than modify and improve such heuristics by the operation of the program or to find 
procedure that uses them, their innovation is more difficult. 
'One of the key heuristics that underlies physical intuition in dynamics 
is the notion that forces produce changes in velocity (rather than pro- 
ducing velocities). Evidence from which this idea might be derived is 
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4.6.2 
Complexity 
of 
heuristics 
available to anyone with eyes. Yet at least hundreds of man-years of 
search by highly intelligent men were required to'discover the idea, 
and even after it was enunciated by Galileo, another century of work 
was required before even the most intelligent scientists had cleared 
it of all obscurity and confusion' (Newell, Shaw & Simon, 1958, P"73)" 
To show how homeostatic principles may alone be sufficient to extract 
order gives little idea of how heuristics operate to enhance the power of 
order-extraction procedures. In the homeostatic case, the actual busi- 
ness of extracting order is left to 'self-organization', with little atten- 
tion paid to the formation of the heuristics that the homeostatic procedure 
may use. Homeostatic principles alone do not furnish a full account of 
how order extraction occurs. It is essential to show fully both how 
heuristics help and how they come into being in the first place. For, as. 
we have shown., finding heuristics and using them are part of the same 
broad order-extraction process. Minsky & Papert (1969) sum up some of the 
shortcomings of enquiries that fail to penetrate deeply enough into notions 
of 'self-organization' and the like. 
'A perusal of any typical collection of papers on "self-organizing" 
systems will provide a generous sample of discussions of "learning" 
and "adaptive" machines that lack even the degree of rigor and for- 
mal definition to be found in the literature on perceptrons. The 
proponents of these schemes seldom provide any analysis of the range 
of behaviour which can be learned nor do they show much awaremss of 
the price usually paid to make some kinds of learning easy. ' (p. 16) 
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CHAPTER 5 
LIMITS OF ORDER EXTRACTION 
SECTION 0 FURTHER QUESTIONS OF STRUCTURE 
5.0.0 This chapter takes up in more detail some of the general conclusions 
reached so far, with the object of arriving at a deeper understanding of 
where and in what form we shall encounter restrictions on the kind of art 
Limits of machine that might be constructed. We have suggested, in the previous 
creativity 
chapter, that the task is not hopeless, but that ve shall have to look 
for success of a more limited kind than we might have hoped for at the 
outset. Here we examine this idea with a view to discovering where we 
should expect the limits to fall; what kinds of questions we should ask 
about the rachine's capabilities; what in general will be the relative 
demands for time, power and structure and what are the prospects for meet- 
ing them. Above all we persist with questions as to the sources of struc- 
ture. The answers to these questions concern the scope and power to be 
creative that we may reasonably expect of any art machine we might be able 
to construct. 
5.0.1 The chapter begins : "y classifying various forms of order extraction, 
according to the time scales within which they proceed, and the degree of 
'definition of their goals. The classification is presented as a table of 
Features kinds of order extraction, from pattern recognition to biological evolu- 
of tele- 
onomic tion. Technical differences are discussed between parallel and serial 
systems 
processes before an examination of perceptrons as paradigms for parallel 
processes. Some of the conclusions of the investigations of Minsky & 
Papert (1969) are contrasted with earlier more optimistic forecasts for 
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perceptrons. Conclusions axe generalized to the wider field of order 
extraction, with reference to the Law-of Requisite Variety. It is. con- 
jectured. that order-extraction rate grows exponentially with order sxtr- 
acted and that the kinds of order extracted will laxgely determine the 
kinds of order that will be extracted. Finally it is suggested that the 
transmission of order leads to the development of teleonomic systems.. 
SECTION 1 THE CLASSIFICATION OF ORDER-EXTRACTION 
5.1.0 Pattern recognition,, learning, adaptation, problem solving, thinking, creat- 
ivity, development and evolution are among numbers of headings under which 
order extraction of various kinds has been studied. Computer science and 
Categories cybernetics both contribute an extensive literature in experiment and 
of order 
extraction theory. our particular concern is with the principles of order extraction, 
"what, kinds of order extraction may be distinguished, the minimum conditions 
that permit it, what facilitates it, the rates at which it occurs, what 
forms it may take. Broadly speaking cybernetics has studied order extr- 
action largely under three heads; as a perceptual problem, for the most 
part under the name 'pattern recognition'; as problem solving, which has 
included thinking, creativity and the like; and as evolution. Learning 
and adaptation have been treated, both as aspects of all the former studies, 
as well as'in their own right. Though learning entails order-extraction 
work, order extraction does not necessarily produce learning. A procedure 
for example that solves a problem or recognizes a pattern, though it may 
be said to have done order-extraction work (in the sense of 3.2.0), need 
not be in any way modified by the result it achieves. In the absence of 
some degree of retention, even temporary of the results of the pro- 
cedure, we should not call its performance learning. 
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5.1.1 No sharp divisions delineate the groupings mentioned. They differ more 
as to the aspects of order extraction they emphasize than in points of 
principle. Broadly, in practice, much of the difference between the 
Time various approaches is associated with the time. Thus in general, precep- 
scales 
tion, or at any rate recognition, occurs over short time intervals, and 
accordingly it is chiefly in the area of pattern recognition that relat- 
ively rapid parallel, as distinct from generally slower sequential, pro- 
cedures have been investigated. Problem solving (chess, theorem proving 
and the like) typically takes place over longer time intervals, which 
seem more 'naturally' to call for sequential searches aided by heuristics. 
Pattern recognition and problem solving may both occur without learning. 
Evolution on the other harm requires at least some kind of homeostatic 
adaptation (which, at its simplest, may not warrant the name learning - 
see 5.2.2). Evolution is normally associated with long durations and may 
enjoy little heuristic guidance initially at any rate, beyond what the. 
most primitive"of binary controls, survival and non-survival, provides. 
5.1.2 With these differences have become associated corresponding differences 
Kinds of 
goals and in the kinds or order with which the various approaches are concerned. 
their de- 
finition These relate to goal definition and the kinds of heuristics used. Pattern 
pattern recognition procedures tend to specify goals most fully. uh= (1966) refers 
recogni- 
tion to-pattern recognition as the 'problem of assigning a name to, or class- 
ifying the many different exemplars. of a particular class' (p. 2). In 
practice this has usually meant naming correctly various shapes or hand- 
written alpha-numeric characters say, projected on some sort of 'retina'. 
The goal's specificity - to name. the character or shape - arises partly 
as an artefact of the experimental situation. It is necessary for the ex- 
perimenter, in this case the meta-observer, to be able to say whether or 
not the procedure he is using - which is the observer - is making what he, 
.i 
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the meta-observer, decides is a correct classification of some given 
pattern. This means that the experimenter specifies in advance what the 
procedure (observer) is to recognize. (If the procedure identified a 
pattern that the experimenter could not identify, this would necessarily 
fall outside the domain of the experiment and receive no credit; that is 
the experimenter would put it down to mal function of the procedure. ) In 
problem problem-solving procedures the goals are generally less specific than in 
solving 
pattern recognition. While the pattern recognition experimenter provides 
the various 'exemplars of a particular class', the experimenter in pro- 
blem solving merely provides a class description according to which ex- 
emplars may be identified - criteria for logical proof provided to a 
theorem-proving programme for instance - allowing the procedure to pro- 
duce the exemplars themselves - in the form of particular proofs of a 
Evolution theorem, say. Evolutionary procedures are unique in requiring no goal at 
all as a necessary condition of their operation. Survival or non-survival 
will alone determine what order such procedures extract. Simple 'self- 
connecting' (2.4.3 is a sufficient operating principle for the procedure. 
Survival need not even be a goal.. It will emerge as one, because sur- 
vivors are likely to evolve procedures for retaining and protecting sur- 
vival mechanisms just as they evolve the mechanisms themselves. While 
goals, in this sense, are not necessary, evolutionary procedures do not 
preclude specific goals, as for example in the procedures of Fop, zl & 
others (2.6.4. We present the differences that we have outlined in this 
section as a table, which is offered. simply as a general indicator of 
differences whose numerous, readily-apparent inconsistencies show the in- 
adequacies of the arbitrary categories into which the study of order ex- 
traction has fallen. 
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SECTION 2 PARALLEL AND SERIAL PROCESSES 
5.2.0 Order extraction's formal treatment leaves many of its practical aspects 
concealed, though an important difference that it examines explicitly is 
that between serial and parallel processes. Parallel processes gather in- 
Time-cost formation on a wide class of events, taking the various separate 'pieces' 
trade-off 
of information independently. Order extraction that occurs -a decision 
taken, based on the 'evidence' of the gathered information say - may depend 
upon only a tiny fraction of the total information' that has been assembled. 
That is only a relatively extremely small part of the total information 
gathered may be used to determine the order extracted (the decision taken). 
The information not used for the decision is 'wasted'. The coat of gather- 
ing this wasted information is the price paid for being able to acquire 
order (reach some required decision) in a single step by the simultaneous 
assessment of the information gathered, rather than by the series of steps 
needed by a sequential procedure. 
'The total amount of computation may become vastly greater than that 
which would have to be carried out in a well-planned sequential pro- 
cess ... ribose decisions about what next to compute are conditional 
on the outcome of earlier computation. Thus the choice between parallel 
'and serial methods in any particular situation mast be based on balanc- 
ing the increased value of reducing the (total elapsed) time against the 
cost of the additional computation involved. ' (Minsky & Papert, 1969,. p. 17) 
5.2.1 Perceptron is the name given to a class of abstract machines that use para- 
llel procedures. They were first conceived as devices for pattern recogni- 
tion. 'Perceptrons make decisions - determine whether or not an event fits 
Perceptrons a certain "pattern" - by adding up evidence obtained from many small ex- 
periments. ' (ibid. p. 4) In an early paper on perceptrons, Rosenblatt (1959) 
makes it clear that the hope for these machines was 'that a properly de- 
signed perceptron will be capable of spontaneously forming meaningful class- 
ifications of the stimuli in its universe without being taught by an experi- 
menter' (p. 421) (Italics aided). That is perceptrons were conceived as 
94. 
promising to capture the properties of order, proceeding from a tabula 
rasa (of. 4.6.1 for example). Thus, although in practice the order that 
the perceptron is required to extract has been pre-determined by the ex-perimenter, 
real order-extraction work is nevertheless required of the per- 
ceptron, which itself must discover a pattern that it has not previously 
identified. 
5.2.2 Minsky & Papert offer the following paradigm and definition for a perceptron. 
'Let 4_ ipp, ... , 11ý be a family of predicates. We will say that 
ýY is linear with respect to4 
if there exists a number 0 and a set of numbers Q,, , a,, , ... va ip 
Paradigm 12 
l 
P. + ... +as 
(X)>B for a per- ýp such 
the *(X) =1 if and only if a sp1 (X) 
ceptron 
The number 0 is called the threshold and the as are called the coeffi- 
cients or wei ts. ... We usually write more compactly P(X) =1 if 
and only if E c(X)>61 (p. 10) 
'DEFINITION: A PERL PTRON is a device capable of computing all predicates 
which are lineatr in some given sett of partial predicates. ' (p. 12) 
It was hoped, at the outset of investigation of perceptron. 3, "that appropriate 
alteration of the weighta, achieved by feedback from the truth or falsity of 
computed predicates might provide the basis for a sufficient form of adapta- 
tion, to enable such devices to come to distinguish 'patterns'. Yet the 
promise seen in the first perceptron separability theorems remains unful- 
filled. Minsky & Papert write that 'ire is not yet any general theory 
of this topic' (p. 181). In particular, 'the problem of relating speeds of 
learning of perceptrons and other devices has been almost entirely neglected' 
(p. 181). They argue that perceptron learning should entail a better pro- 
cedure than simply the ability to find a separating predicate. A simple 
homeostat might achieve this with a finite number of errors. But 'it 
would be hard to justify the term "learning" for a machine that so relent- 
lessly ignores its experience' (p. 181). 
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-SECTION 3 THE COSTS OF ORDER EXTRACTION 
5.3.0 The broad conclusions reached by Minsky & Papert apply not only to percep- 
trons or pattern recognition, but to all systems capable of this kind of 
formal treatment. Ashby (1962) looked forward ten years earlier to the kind 
Shannon's of treatment Minsky & Papert undertake. He pointed out that 'there is no 
Tenth 
Theorem getting selection for nothing'. 'I suggest that when the full implications 
of Shannon's Tenth Theorem [Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety, (1964)] are 
grasped we shall be first sobered, and then helped, for we shall then be 
able to focus our activities on the problems that are properly realistic, 
and actually solvable' (p. 273). 
5.3.1 The observations of Minsky & Papert on 'The Seductive Aspects of Perceptrons' 
" aim in this regard 'to separate reality from wishful thinking': 
... it is easy to imagine a kind of automatic programming which people have been tempted to call learning: by attaching feedback devices to 
Perceptron the parameter controls they propose to "program" the machine by providing 
repertoire it with a sequence of input patterns and an "error signal" which will 
cause the coefficients to change in the right direction when the machine 
makes an inappropriate decision. The perceptron convergence theorems ... 
define conditions under which this procedure is guaranteed. to find, even- 
tually, a correct set of values. ' (p. 14) 
But we may not simply leave the matter there. These authors present the 
following formulation: if 4 is a set of partial predicates and L((D ) is 
the set of all predicates linear in c, then L(c) is the repertoire of the per- 
ceptron, the set of predicates it will compute when its coefficients ao and 
its threshold 0 range over all possible values. In practice L(4) is limited 
by the size ofc possible for some actual device, and this puts a limit on 
the repertoire of any (physically real) perceptron. 'The ease and uniformity 
of programming have been bought at a cost! We contend that the traditional 
investigators of perceptrons did not realistically measure this cost. ' (p. 15) 
'5.3.2 The authors list three 'crucial points' neglected by investigators: 
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(1) As a paradigm, L(O) tends to lose the 'geometric individuality of the 
patterns', because it leads to the treatment of classes of geometrical 
objects as classes of n-dimensional vectors («l, ... 9 an). There are, they 
Kinds of show, 'particular meaningful and intuitively simple predicates that belong 
informa- 
tion and to no partically realizable set' (p. 15). "OT' is an example of a 
rates of 
learning predicate that cannot be computed by a wide class of perceptrons. (CONNECTED 
is the name the authors give to a function that computes 'connectedness' - 
the property of being able to get from one part of a 'thing' to another by 
a path that lies wholly within the thing. ) Yet some analysis of connectedness 
is clearly important, if not actually a necessary condition, for defining 
'things' in physical space. (cf. Ashby, 2.2.1) As a more concrete example 
' ... we can construct, by special methods, a perceptron that could learn 
either to recognize squares or to recognize circles. But the same machine 
would probably not be able to learn the class of "circles or squares"! It 
certainly could not describe (hence learn to recognize) a relational compound 
like "a circle inside a square". ' (Minsky & Papert, 1972, paragraph 4.3)" 
(2) The authors find that the question of the information content of she 
parameters 0l, ... ,k has been neglected. There are examples, 'which we 
believe are typical rather than exceptional' (p. 15), of 'meaninglessly big' 
ratios of the smallest to the biggest of these coefficients. 'In some cases 
the information capacity needed to store fil, ... ,n is even greater than 
that needed to store the erhole class of figures defined by the pattern: ' (p. 15) 
(3) Time of convergence in a 'learning' process is a related area of neglect. 
As perceptrons are in practice finite state devices, it is always true that 
a correct setting of the 41, ... , 0u can be found, if one exists, by an ex- 
haustive or random procedure, simply by trying different combinations of 
settings until the right one turns up. The significant question is how 
quickly some given perceptron might arrive at the desired state, compared 
with one that used such a procedure. There are 'sets of some geometric 
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interest for which the convergence time can be shown to increase even 
faster than exponentially with the size of R' (p. 16), the retina. 
5.3.3 Broadly, we may take the conclusion that Minsky & Papert reach to be that 
'significant learning at a significant rate presupposes some significant 
prior structure' (p. 16). This conclusion might be taken as an extension 
'Prior of Ashby's dictum, 'There is no getting selection for nothings (5.3.0). Put 
structure' 
in the terms we have been using, we might give it the generalized interpre- 
tation: order extraction will be accelerated by making use of order already 
extracted. Which amounts to a conjecture that the amount of order extrac- 
tion is likely to grow according to some kind of exponential function of 
the amount of order extracted. This corresponds to the conclusions of the 
previous chapter about the use of heuristics - which may be regarded as 
equivalent to the prior structures to which Minsky & Papert refer. As these 
authors' conclusions are neither intuitive, nor of only a practical appli- 
cation (though practicality is always part of their concern), but rest 
upon detailed and rigorous analysis, they provide important support for the 
broad conclusions we have reached so far. Most significant in their analy- 
sis is the detailed indic-stions the theory suggests of the limits and bene- 
fits to be expected from structures of various kinds. 
5.3.4 These remarks on heuristics and prior structures imply certain conditions 
that will apply to the requirements of an art machine. We shall need to see 
. Likeness to it that the machine is able to supply itself with structure (cf. N. 4.0) between 
art and shall therefore have to be able to say how it is to be acquired and in 
machine and 
its maker what form. If we accept the conclusion of Minsky & Papert cited in the pre- 
vious paragraph, as well as our own conclusions in the foregoing chapters, 
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then to ask that structure be found by prior order-extraction work of the 
machine is precisely what we cannot do. We shall therefore ourselves have 
to 'invent' structures for the machine or select from those already avail- 
able to us. We may suppose, on the basis of the view of Minsky & Papert, 
that we shall be better at inventing structures than any unstructured 
machine, because of our ability to draw upon the structre we already incor- 
porate in'ourselves. We may suppose further that we are likely to remain 
better inventors for as long as our structure exceeds that evolved-by 
machines. + This means that it would be-likely to prove extremely diffi- 
cult if not impossible to evolve within the life-time of an experimenter, 
wholly novel structures, owing simply to an insufficiency of time and com- 
puting power. It follows that all the-structures we provide will necessarily 
reflect us to'some extent. This is no more than a re-interpretation of 
Lofgren's view (2.5.1) that the product of a productive process will bear a 
reesmblance to at least part of the productive element in the process;. or more 
I 
broadly, as we. agrued in chapter 2, that every purposeful process is part- 
ially self-reproductive. Even if we did succeed in building a machine to 
generate 'new' kinds of structures, we should probably be unable to dis- 
tinguish them, precisely because they would not be cast in our image and 
would therefore appear to us merely 'random' (cf. 2.3.2). By the Law of 
Requisite Variety, capacity as a selector cannot exceed capacity as a channel' 
of communication. In our terms this amounts to saying that what has to be 
riven (by programming) to a system as stucture, because neither the time nor 
the power are available for it to evolve for itself from scratch an equiva- 
lent structure, - measured in quantity of order-extraction work - may not be 
acquired by the system through its own efforts, except by an equivalent 
amount of order-extraction work. But, as it was the lack of time and power to 
:.. _ 
to do tire order-extraction wirk -L a1 ma ý to it the 
structure in the fist place, programming is unavoidable. 
+ If we take order as quivalent to structure, and adopt Lofgren'a definition of order, we 
might take, as an indication of the high degree of structuredness of humans (and other 
mammals), the ratio of the genetic variety that determines the individual to the variety 
represented by the individual's cells. 
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5.3.5 More precisely, suppose we have two order-extracting systems A1 and A2, and 
that both systems have. been provided with a structure S that represents a 
given quantity Q of order-extraction work. Al is then set to work extracting 
Equiva- order from a surrounding E. After performing a quantity Q' of order-extraction! 
lence of 1" 
acquiring work in this surrounding, Al has succeeded in adding to its structure S the 
and comm- 
unicating further structure S'. Suppose Al now attempts to communicate this newly- 
order 
extracted order to A2. On the assumption that Al has no more information re- 
garding A2 than it had of its surrounding E at the start of the experiment, 
then by the Law of Requisite Variety, communicating S' to A2 will require 
precisely the same order-extraction effort Q' as extracting S' in the first 
place. If A had lacked 's structure S, then would first have had to ,, 2 
provide it with this structure, since S' is based upon S, in the sense that 
A has used S in acquiring S', and because of the growth of order-extraction 
rate with order extracted, S or its equivalent is indispensible. If the 
reason for providing Al with the structure in the first place was to economize 
on Alts time and effort, then the same reason will apply to Alts 'passing on' 
S to A2. But if A. 1 cannot pass on S, then neither can it pass on St 
(cf. 1.2.4)` 
5.3.6 There is no particular reason why one should find this discouraging, unless 
because it-frustrates the wishful thinking that seeks an escape from the con- 
sequences of the Law of Requisity Variety. Evidently we should maintain a 
Advantages relatively conservative policy regarding order. For, even if it were true 
and disad- 
vantages of that the structures we had developed were far less powerful than they might 
teleonomy 
have been had we followed some other course, the Law of Requisite Variety 
bars the way against evolving wholly novel ones without difficulty. The problem 
is to balance the advantages of tenaciously sticking to an unsatisfactory 
heuristic against the disadvantages of the flexibility that can perhaps only 
be won by doing without the heuristics altogether. Chapter 2 argued that 
teleonomy resulted from structure. Here it appears that the overall tele- 
onorric purpose is bound to be the structure's reproduction of itself. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PRIOR STRUCTURE 
6.0.0 
Creativity 
and intell- 
igence 
SECTION 0 PHASES IN THE USE OF STRUCTURE 
The results that this chapter discusses axe at once encouraging and dis- 
appointing, though their achievement - or lack of it - furnishes no apparent 
basis for any clear-cut argument on progress: whether for instance Turing's 
(1950) prediction of successful machine mimicry of human intelligence by the 
turn of the century was over-optimistic or not. Turing's analysis failed to 
distinguish sheer 'size' of computers from structure, easily assuming that 
" human programmers would be able to guide the evolution of the structures re- 
quired. But if the rate of structure acquisition grows exponentially (cf. 533), 
as this chapter suggests, achievements like Winogradis program (6.3) 
are perhaps more hopeful. For while Winograd's robot is not half way to 
human intelligence it might be half way on some logarithmic scale. What 
. 
this chapter aims to show is the inseparability of the two sets of require- 
ments, those for an art machine and those for machine intelligence. Obvious 
as this may now appear, the link between artistic and intelligent capacities 
is neither always clear nor acknowledged. It may be that analysis of pattern- 
recognition procedures tends to emphäsize the intimacy of creativity and in- 
telligence, but this is no more than incidental to its showing the importance 
of structure to both. 
6.0.1 The chapter examines examples of 'prior structures', in particular descrip- 
tors developed for use in pattern recognition procedures. Brief descrip- 
tions are given of Guzman's SEE program (Minsky & Papert, 1972). Winston's 
Levels of progran (ibid. ) for concept formation, based on the SEE program provides 
structure 
an example of how structures may be, built up into higher level structures. 
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Finally Winograd's (1972) natural language program shows a way of im- 
parting structure acquired in one domain for use in another. There is dis- 
cussion of the trade-off between the power gained from using descriptors and 
flexibility for further development. 
SECTION 1 OBJECT IDENTIFICATION 
6.1.0 To-understand more precisely the nature and extent of its advantages and 
restrictiveness we shall briefly examine some examples of the use of prior 
structure. In the realm of pattern recognition, prior structures may take 
The use the form of descriptors. A patternrecognition procedure based on such 
of des- 
criptors structures recognizes a description of. a geometrical figure rather than the 
figure itself. For example in the SEE program the aim is to divide a 
three-dimensional scene into ? objects'. The objects for the purpose are 
. rectilinear blocks in two-dimensional projection. This program works at 
several distinct levels. The first level operates on the optical data, 
identifying certain optical features: regions, edges and vertices. As the 
program. is to use the vertices as its descriptors, it first identifies 
them andthen classifies them into types, the most important of which are* 
shown in figure 6.1.0.0. 
ARROW FORK TEE ELL TRAN 
Figure 6.1.0.0 
Now it uses these classified structures, interpreting them as evidence that 
indicates 'links' between regions, and thereby decides which regions should 
be'grouped together as belonging to the same objects - those for which there 
is the strongest evidence of linkage. In this example the programmer decides 
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both upon what descriptors shall be used and whatthey are supposed to in- 
dicate. They are not evolved or developed by the program. Thus the ARROW- 
type of vertex is to. be taken as resulting from an exterior corner of an 
object, where two of its plane surfaces form an edge. It is therefore to be 
regarded as evidence of a link between the two surfaces. A FORK-type vertex 
is to be taken as evidence for the meeting of three planes of a single object , 
and thus for links between them. These links may then receive abstract repre- 
sentation, as in figure 6.1.0.1 (iii). 
(i) 
ARROW 
(ii) 
FORK 
Figure 6.1.0.1 
(in) 
b 
Two evidential links; 
between each of threF 
surfaces a, b and c. 
At a further level, the program assesses its own descriptions. For example I 
groupings for which there appears to be strong evidence of-connections (re- 
gions grouped by more than one link) have single link connections severed 
(figure 6.1.0.2(11)). 
(i) 
Figure 6.1.0.2 
(ii) 
And there are other devices to assist correct identification. Figure 6.1.0.3 'j 
shows an example of a scene in which the program successfully separates all 
the objects 
Figure taken from 
Minsky & Papert (1972) 
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6.1.1 
'Progranmer 
seeks pro- 
gram's 
mimicry 
Errors still occur due to various causes, such as the coincidence of lines 
as'in cases like that depicted in figure 6.1.0.4(1) that may mask the sit- 
uation of (ii). 
(ff1I1 
_ 
(i) Figure 6,1.0.4 (ii) 
And errors of identification persist. Some at least of the difficulties ex- 
perienced by the program are similar to the difficulties that humans have, 
when faced with similar scenes. 
What is chiefly of interest here is not the details of the operation of the 
programs, . 
but the use that they make of the descriptors (structures) that 
the Irogrammer provides. Bruner, Goodnow & Austin (1956) suggested the opera- 
tion of similar kinds of procedures in human perception. They refer to des- 
criptors as 'configurational attributes'. Their remarks draw attention both 
to the way these configurational attributes provide evidence for perceptual 
decisions as well as to how they might lead to error. 'A bird has wings and 
bill and feathers and characteristic legs. But the whole ensemble of feathers 
is not necessary for making a correct identification of the creature as a 
bird. If it has wings and feathers, the bill and legs are highly predictable. ' 
(p. 47) (of. Moles's definition of symbols, 10.1.1) The program's descrip- 
tors are heuristics for the attainment of goals'defined by the programmer. 
Using such heuristics, the programmer is unlikely to be surprised by the pro- 
ram's results, for it is not to be expected that these will reveal anything 
previously hidden from him. This is precisely because any procedure using 
these heuristics will closely mimic the programmer's own behaviour, since the 
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heuristics are likely to resemble those he uses himself. It has been the 
object of the programmer to produce a program that will make of the world, 
or at least that-limited aspect of it to which it is. confßned, the same kind 
of sense as the programmer has already made of it. The programmer never in- 
tended the program as an instrument, of discovery of new visual images. 
SECTION 2 CONCEPT FORMATION 
6.2.0 Winston extends the devices of the S' program that'recognize objects, to 
provide a procedure that can identify assemblies of objects and simple con- 
structions. Winston's program builds up descriptions of complex assemblies 
Descrip- by adding to descriptions it already has. The descriptions the program 
tions of. 
assemblies uses are of classes of objects, not individuals. New classes come into exis- 
tence by means of enumerating the differences between the description of a 
new individual and some class into which it does not quite fit. The new class 
consists of the old class plus the (critical) differences. Thus description, 
and so also identification, of new classes has to, proceed to some extent step- 
wise or the program will end up with a complex set of relations that it is 
unable to use. 
6.2.1 As a form of learning Winston's technique represents a considerable departure 
from traditional 'adaptive' theories. His procedure uses the SEE program 
as a sub-process and is further equipped to recognize spatial relations, such 
Forming as contact and support, between the objects that'it uses the SEE program 
and gener- 
alizing a to identify. By means of these provisions it is possible to furnish it with 
concept 
descriptions of assemblies. Thus an assembly of three bricks, one supported 
by the other two might be presented as an example of an arch (figure 6.2.1.0(i 
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ARCH 
Figure 6.2.1.0 (i) 
The program then stores a description of the example, using the terms it 
has available such as tbrick', 'supported-by' and so on, in a form which may 
be represented by a network. 
supported-by kind-of 
{ 
Large circles represent particular 
physical objects, small circles 
other kinds of concepts, and labels 
on the arrows relations. 
Figure 6.2.1.0 (ii) 
Given another example (figure 6.2.1.1(1)) it is told that this is not an arch. 
NOT AN ARCH 
Figure 6.2.1.1 (i) 
It forms a description of the new, construction, compares it with the arch 
description, notes the differences (contact between the support bricks) and. 
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adds to its arch description that there should be no contact between its 
support bricks (figure 6.2.1.1 (ii)). 
contact -- 
must-not 
f 
kind-of 
ICK 
Figure 6.2.1.1 (ii) 
Further examples of arches and non-arches may be given, and the arch and 
non-arch descriptions modified accordingly. For instance the support bricks 
may be supporting an object drawn from a wider class than the class of 
bricks, the class of prisms say. Or. the supports themselves may be drawn 
from this wider class. Using these examples and its procedure for noting 
differences, the program 'generalizes' the description of its 'concept'. 
So that, starting with Guzman's descriptors and a few classifications of 
relative spatial relations, it can build up (learn) concepts that enable it 
to identify, first objects, then assemblies of'objects and then, using these 
new concepts, relative-spatial relations of these assemblies. Thus it will 
learn to identify a complicated scene such as figure 6.2.1.2 (i) or figure 
6.2.1.2 (ii) by means of the network of figure 6.2.1.3, as a row of arches, 
a good example of what Gagne' K1962) refers to as 'productive learning' (p. 355) 
ýýý ý ýý 
(i) (ii) 
Fi rmra ý, 717 
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left-of 
6.2.2 Like the SEE program, Winston's procedure relies for its capabilities upon 
descriptors provided for it by the programmer, both those that enable it to 
break scenes up'into objects - the Guzman vertices - and those that relate 
Determ- the objects spatially. Taking order extraction as an hierarchical process, 
inants of 
concept as Winston's-program does, we should conclude that the program's power 
formation: 
'blinker- 'derives from its use exclusively of-relatively 'high-level' concepts - its 
ing' effect 
descriptors. By the conclusions of the previous chapter, the fact that they 
are high-level implies that these descriptors must have been slow and diffi- 
cult for the programmer to have acquired in the first place, acquisition 
dating far back into evolutionary history. Notice that using these descrip- 
tors makes other 'kinds' of concepts literally inconceivable for the pro- 
cedure. It has already been intimated by the observations of Newell & others 
(4.6.1), how difficult new descriptions may be to digest; and the 'blinkering' 
effect that partly accounts for the difficulty is intensified by making use 
of the descriptors relatively early in the identification task, that is before 
much other order-extraction work has occurred. Evidently the power of the 
descriptors is bought at the cost of narrowing the set of attainable goals. 
(of. 4.5.1) Notice too that the concepts that the procedure acquires will 
depend upon the order in which the program encounters its examples, though 
Figure 6.2.1.3 
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not in an entirely inflexible way. The noting of differences between concepts 
must involve a procedure for comparing descriptions. If descriptions are held 
in the form of a_series of networks, then the description of the difference 
between two such networks will itself be a network in which each node might 
refer to a pair of nodes, one from each of the compared descriptions. Such 
comparisons would require conventions for deciding which nodes of the compared. 
descriptions-were to be matched and which matchings were to receive priority. 
And the conventions and priorities might themselves be subject to adjustment 
by the application of heuristic rules. In general, although what concepts 
are formed will depend upon the order in which modifications occur, flexib- 
ility will derive from the mode of operation-of the program. This is 
because the procedure operates by matching a description to an example, as an 
hypothesis, which is then whittled down into a plausible form by noting diff- 
erences. Flexibility will partly depend on whether hypotheses are relatively 
generous or tend to be conservative, that is whether descriptions are broad 
or narrow. 
SECTION 3 SUPPORTS FOR LANGUAGE STRUCTURE 
6.3.0 Going on from here, Winogard adds to the objects and their spatial relation- 
ships of Winston's program actions that may be performed upon them. The 
'blocks world' becomes a , micro-world able 
to provide a language-understand- 
The 'blocks ing system with a subject domain for discourse. To make the micro-world suit- 
worldI as a 
domain of able for this purpose, WinogrI provides it, besides objects, properties, 
discourse 
a class including relations - actions with goals, processes and simplified 
forms of concepts like space, time and purpose. 
'We can describe the process of understanding language as a conversion from 
a string of sounds or letters to an internal representation of "meaning". 
In order to do this, a language-understanding system must have some formal 
way to express its lrnwoledge of a subject, and must be able to represent 
" the "meaning" of a sentence in this formalism. The formalism must be struc- 
log. 
tured so the system can use its knowledge in conjunction with a problem- 
solving system to make deductions, accept new information, answer questions, 
and interpret commands. ' (Winograd, 1972, pp. 23-24) 
'In practical terms, we need a transducer that can work with a syntactic 
analyser, and produce data which is acceptable to a logical deductive 
'system. Given a syntactic parser with a grammar of English, and a deduc- 
tive system with a base knowledge about particular subjects, the role of 
semantics is to fill the gap between them. ' (p. 28) 
6.3.1 In Winograd's system meanings are mostly represented by programs- written in 
PLANNER (Hewitt, 1969), a language for proving theorems concerned with ac- 
tions 
"i 
and goals (of a robot), which is able to guide its proofs by heuristics 
Actions provided from the knowledge of the world in which the actions and goals occur. 
and 
meanings PLANNER sets up series of sub-goals to be carried out in a set order, to 
bring about an event. Thus, told to GRASP a block, the robot which performs 
the actions on the blocks (in this case, a simulated robot depicted together 
with its world on a CRT screen), may first have to GET-RID-OF a block it is 
already grasping. To do this it must FIND-SPACE in which to sat the block 
down. Having got rid of it, it may have to CLEARTOP of the block it has been 
instructed to grasp, by removing a block covering it. This may involve find- 
ing space to which to move this. covering block, and so on. The names in 
capitals represent PLANNER theorems. Each action which cannot be carried out 
causes the program to back up to a preceding theorem, until this process is 
exhausted, at which stage failure is reported. A series of actions consti- 
tutes an teventt which is remembered and which furnishes information about 
the past as well as reasons (explanation) for carrying out actions. Events 
are timed by a clock which starts at zero and is increased by one every time 
a motion occurs. A second kind of memory keeps track of the positions of 
objects as they are moved. 
6.3.2 The success and flexibility of Winograd's system results from the interposi- 
tion of its semantic system between the syntactic constructions and the PLAID;, 
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prograars that define the meanings of words and other constructions, so 
'Blocks that it can deduce from these, new procedures for the deductive system to 
world 
structure use in answering questions about obeying co.: -, F nds and acquiring new knowledge 
carried 
over into from and as a result of the dialogue. Since the dialogue is about the blocks 
language 
structure world, syntactic problems are usually soluble by reference to this world. It 
is the ability to make such reference that enables the program to avoid 
building an unwieldy, purely syntactical system to overcome all the diffi- 
culties and ambiguities of the syntax. In the terms formulated in the fore- 
-going chapters, the success of Winograd's system depends on the arrangement 
that succeeds in providing the syntax of the system with a richer source of 
order than is represented by syntactic rules-alone. Heuristics like the edges 
and vertices of the SEE programme, embody the results of considerable order- 
extraction work, which is absent from the quickly-growing systems of rules 
in language-understanding systems that rely purely on syntax. 
6.3.3 This' interpretation relies on the tlieoretical considerations so far developed 
and upon the supposition that the blocks world descriptors reflect large 
amounts of order-extraction work. Notice therefore that several independent 
Descrip- lines of empirical-evidence support this supposition. For instance human 
tors are 
'high- retinal function acts to increase the acuity with which ledges' are detected, 
level' 
structures while the SEE program provides edges as data. But anatomical and physio- 
logical features responsible for edge acuity in humans evolved over extremely 
long periods, though the SEE program almost wholly conceals the extent of 
the order-extraction effort that the period's length suggests. Other natur- 
ally occurring descriptors are also comparable with Gummants vertices, and 
also represent results of order-extraction work accomplished over long periods 
of evolution. The mechanisms of the frog's eye, identified by Lettvin, MaturanE 
McCulloch & Pitts (1965) suggest specific simply analytical features for de- 
tecting kinds of order important to the fog's survival, namely shapes related 
to food and to danger. Considerable evidence for similar kinds of mechanicms 
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in other species is collected in Sutherland & Mackintosh (1971). Gestalt 
psychology provides another line of empirical evidence of a kind suggesting 
that descriptors play an important part in 'recognition'. So does develop- 
mental psychology. A child's 'matchstick' drawing of a man is more intelli- 
gibly seen as a visual description than as an attempt at visual representation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
EXTENDING RECEIVED ORDER 
SECTION 0 THE ]MILIEU OF PURPOSE 
7.0.0 The examination of purposeful systems thus far has paid little attention to 
the surroundings in which they operate. In reality these surrouciings are 
all-important-. The milieu of a structured dynamic environment, filled with 
Purpose the activity of mutually competing and co-operating systems in continually 
and 
adaptation changing organization is not merely the backdrop to purposeful behaviour, but 
forms the fabric of purpose itself. We have observed (N. 3.0) that the crea- 
tive additions to organization that any structured system achieves are likely 
to be small in relation to the complexity of interconnections and constraints 
of the evolved, existing order into which such systems are 'born'. Ashby 
(1964) remarks that tthe organism can adapt just so far as the real world is 
constrained, and no further' (p. 132). So even its creative effort - its 
adaptation - merely reflects its world - and its ability to survivc in it. 
Commonly adaptation and survival, especially in varied circumstances, are 
taken to signify intelligence. But we have argued for the particular import- 
ance of that aspect of intelligence to do with extracting order from its 
surrounding3, what we have called creativity. This chapter seeks to step 
back from the structures that have been our concern, to see them in that 
wider coucext. 
7.0.1 Attention shifts away from structure, descriptors, heuristics, forms and 
the like, to the organization of goals and purposes. Goals and sub-goals 
Co- 
are discussed, particularly when sub-goals operate through purposeful systems. 
existence Mais raises questions of specifying goal-seeking systems. Problems of goal 
of 
purposes 'transmission' raise questions of coding and communication between systems. 
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Concepts of compatibility and redundancy and apparent compatibility and 
redundancy of specifications are defined and examined in the light'of notions 
of requisite variety. This leads to conclusions as to the limits to the 
possibilities of goal transmission, both absolute limits and those due to 
problems of interpretation. There is discussion of the relative limits 
between two systems in relation to the concept of fuzziness. The chapter 
then proceeds to apply its conclusions thus far. The object is to obtain 
a view of purposeful systems within the constraints of an active surrounding 
that restricts the possibilities of goal-generation and, thereby, of the 
capacity for c-authorship. Constraints are defined in terms of goal speci- 
fications. This enables the physical world and goal-seeking systems to ex- 
hibit their mutually dependent contributions towards forming a world for A. 
There is discussion of chains of goals, with the broad object of capturing 
the notion of, development, both past and future; and there is discussion of 
specification by injunction and description in relation to limits on origin- 
ality. 
SECTION 1 LINKED PDRPOS a ui SYSTEM 
7.1.0 In 2.1.2 we defined purpose in terms of a purposeful system A acting within 
(and as part of) a surrounding E. A's purpose was to maintain invariant 
come internal state of E- or part of E, possibly itself - by suitably vary- 
Coal ing its own output. In many instances, as we have mentioned, A's purpose 
hier- 
archies was to bring about some particular state in the future. We interpreted this, 
in accordance with our definition, as the maintaining invariant by A of the 
'movement' towards the desired state. We referred to A's description of the 
state as a concept, of A's. The generality of such abstractions, although pro- I 
viding clarity of definition, obscures the richness and complexity of the 
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detailed working of purposeful behaviour in complicated systems. In part- 
icular, it ignores the structures of A and E. Thus, for A to bring about 
some internal state ZE of E may entail its first bringing about zE and so on. 
Such ordering of goals and sub-goals may be expressed in terms of procedures 
such as PLANNER or given more general representation as 'knowledge structures' 
such as those of Gagne (1962,1964 for example), or other kinds of 'relational 
nets' such as Pask's 'entailment structures' (see for instance Pask, 1975)" 
We arrive at a concept of 'an integrated sequence of activities' (Sommerhof, r 
1969), which 'stands for a relation between these activities which enables us 
to attribute an individual goal to each, and at the same time an ultimate 
goal to the whole sequence' (p. 188). This concept leads directly to the 
further concept of 'hierarchies of directive correlations, integrated by a 
single ultimate'goal' (p. 189). Fogel & others note that complete goal speci- 
fication calls for a full statement of penalties and pay-offs for each point 
of time in the future, though in general, as we shall see (7.2.1.1), we shall 
be able to assume a limit to the number of future scenarios that a finite 
machine will be able to discriminate. The same reasoning permits the reduc- 
tion of possible histories of a machine to a finite number. (See for instance 
Minsky, 1972). These discriminable scenarios are the distinguishable states 
of the system. 
7.1.1 An extension of the use of sub-goals toward the attainment of an ultimate 
goal of particular importance to authorship as we have defined it, occurs 
when the sub-goal of a system itself involves other purposeful systems. In 
Goal this case A does not achieve the sub-goal 'directly', but instead specifies 
trans- 
mission to the intermediary purposeful system, call it A+, the goal which that system 
should aim for. The specifications that A provides take the form of instr- 
uctions that A issues, to be carried out by the intermediary system A+. If 
A's sub-goal is g(A) say, then A's problem is to provide A+ with an input state 
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such as will cause it to emit an output that will constitute the execution 
of g(A). 
7.1.2 We have defined A as a set of procedures and shall extend this definition 
to provide a definition of goals'in terms of sets and combinations of sets. 
Roughly speaking we shall regard the goals of a system as so many target 
Specifying areas, each defined by a set of specifications, with intersections' and 
a goal to $i 
a purpose- unions of such sets representing corresponding intersections and unions ofr 
ful system 
respective target areas. We shall suppose that specifications are compatible 
(see 7.1.3) and, to capture the sense of an hierarchy of specifications, 
monotonically narrowing the target area. We shall suppose further'that"redun- 
dant specifications (7.1.3) have been deleted. The sets we are left with 
will therefore form a monotonic sequence corresponding to a partially-ordered 
system, presented as a list. Pask's entailment structures are examples of 
such a system.. Notice that presenting such systems as hierarchies is to some 
extent arbitrary. Entailment structures for instance begin as closed 'rela- 
tional nets' in which certain nodes are selected as 'head' nodes and the 
nets pruned accordingly, to yield partially-ordered sets. If A is a set of 
procedures there must be among them subsets corresponding to each goal 
(including its sub-goals) that A may entertain. Suppose ý is the set of all 
such subsets. We shall call a subset GC- a specification of A's goal. A 
sequence of such specifications, i (i = It ..., k), say, defines a subset 
GI =i GiC 
ý. G' might be an insufficient specification of g, as would be 
the case if for example it left ambiguous what was required of A+ at some 
. point 
in the procedure it specified. We shall say, in such a case, that g 
is an under-specified goal of A.. But if GI is sufficient and. A+ is able to 
use it to set up its own goal state g(A+), to be the same as Ats sub-goal 
g(A), that is if W(A+) the realization of g(A+) and W(A) the realization of 
g(A) are identical, we shall call G' a full specification of A's goal and 
say that G is a fully-sepcified goal of A. 
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7.1.3 Suppose GI is such a full specification of g and G* is an additional speci- 
fication, such that G* 1 Gi for any i, then, together with G', G* defines a 
new set of specifications GTf G* = G" say. 
Compati- (1) If G" - %, we shall set that G* is -Properly incompatible with G'. This 
bility, 
incompa- will occur if for example G* represents an instruction that is mutually con- 
tibility 
and redun- tradictory with GI or if G" is ambiguous or incomplete as above (7.1.2). 
dancy 
(2) If G" /% and G" / G' represents a full specification of a new goal g(A). 
We call this -proper compatibility of G* with GO. 
(3) If G" = GI we shall say that G* is properly redundant with G', since the 
goal g(A) specified by G" cannot be distinguished by A from that specified 
by G'. + 
7.1.4.0 But as G' is a specification by A for the direction of A+, it must be inter- 
pretable by A+. Clearly this raises questions of requisite variety. Thus, 
given case (1) of the previous paragraph, A+ might interpret G* either as 
Apparent compatible or incompatible with G'. In the former case we shall say that 
compati- 
bility, G* is r. pparentl-r compatible with GI, with respect to A+. Similarly cases 
incompa- 
tibility (2) and (3) may give rise to interpretations that we should call respectively 
and redun- 
dancy apparent incompatibility or apparent redundancy. 
7.1.4.1 Examples of these various cases are as follows. Suppose GI could be mapped 
into a white plane surface to make a black pattern on the surface, and suppose 
this pattern were then to be mapped onto a regular grid of squares of given 
Illustra- fineness of 'grain' (corresponding to length of side of squares), according 
tions of 
definitions`J, to the rule that a square more than half covered by the pattern should by 
+ This definition is consistent with that of Shannon and Weaver (1949). For, if the 
redundancy R of an information source is given by R=1- H where H is the entropy 
m 
of the source and H is the maximum possible entropy it could have while restricted m 
to the same variables, and if we take A as the information source, and the set of 
instructions G' emanating from A. as the variable then by ý hypothesis, G will not 
alter the information carried by the source; that is H(G'fl G*) = H(G'). though, since G* / Gi (i = 1, ..., n), Hm will be increased. 
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made entirely black, otherwise entirely white. Such a 'retina' could repre- 
sent 2n different patterns, where n was the number of squares in the grid. 
(In fact each grid pattern would represent an infinity of 'real' patterns, 
since there are an infinity of ways of more than - or less than - half 
covering a square with a pattern. Figure 7.1.4 illustrates the various cases 
that arise. M. ý 
Gl 
CG* 
Gt G 
Case (1) 
Proper 
incompatibility 
Case (2) 
Proper 
compatibility 
G, nG* - fei 
EIEI I 
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grid GI and grid G* 
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boundary 
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Figure 7.1.4 
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Case (3) 
Proper 
redvndancy 
G* D GI 
-t - -p 
f 
Apparent 
redundancy 
G"/ýg G"/GI 
grid G* D grid G 
7.1.5 If (1) GI /O and (2) G* is either properly (apparently) incompatible or 
properly (apparently) redundant with GI for every G*C', then the goal g 
that G' specifies is (apparently) unique, since it cannot be specified in 
any other way. Thus the (apparent) redundancy of GI is zero. We call g 
a specific oal. 
+ 
+ cf. Löfgren's definition of order (2.3.0). The specifications of a specific goal are equivalent to the shortest starting, tape x from which aiuniversal Turing machine will ýVýM/+ýVV ". +V VYºVýwV " 
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SECTION 2 INTERPRETATION 
7.2.0 Clearly, as the figures of 7.1.4 suggest, difficulties arising out of what 
we have here called the interpretation of goal specifications or instructions 
are part of the whole field of pattern recognition and order extraction. The 
The con- grid examples show for instance that much that was said about perceptrons will 
text of 
goal apply literally here too. More broadly, the ability of A+ to interpret goal 
specifi- 
cation specifications provided by A will involve many of the questions discussed in 
connection with heuristics and order extraction generally. 
7.2.1.0 -The difficulties of what we might call goal transmission reveal problems of 
some depth, to which we referred in chapter 2 when dealing with questions 
relating to observers. Basically we are concerned with the effectiveness of 
'Real' goal specifications. What we have so far said tacitly assumes the existence 
goals aad 
actual of a &eal' set of goal specifications underlying, as it were, the specifica- 
goals 
" tions entertained by any given entity, (as we might assume some 'real' length 
'underlying' the approximations to it of actual measurements). We might 
approximate such a set of specifications using the grids of 7.1.5.1, by allow- , 
ing the grain of the-grid to become arbitrarily fine. But such a procedure 
would require giving an interpretation to the notice of a goal with an arbit- 
rarily long specification; one, that is, that took an arbitrarily long time 
to specify and which therefore could not be a goal at all, as the term is 
ordinarily used. 
7.2.1.1 Suppose for example an entity A were given the goal of partitioning the'set 
R of real numbers by means of a Dedekind Cut at a point y, into two sets L 
and U. It would appear that such a specification to A should be effective, 
Finite since it provides a procedure according to which, given any number xfR it 
machines 
would be possible for A to decide to which set, L or U. to assign it. But R 
is an infinite set and, in particular contains an infinity of members designate 
by more than some arbitrary number k of (say) decimal, digits. In particular., 
R contains an infinity of msmbara of this class whose first k digits are the 
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same and which differ only in digits following the kth. It follows that if 
y consists of k or more digits, it will take A an arbitrarily long-time to 
check any number having the first k digits the same as. y (assuming it takes 
some finite time to check each digit). If A were a Turing machine, it would 
require arbitrarily long tapes, or if it were represented by a grid, the 
grain would have to be arbitrarily fine. Turing (1937) uses an argument 
similar to this to show that, 'If we admitted an infinity of states of mind, 
some of them will be "arbitrarily close" and will be confused' (p. 250). 
Ats task becomes impossible when y is a non-computable number. In other 
words, in general A will find the goal specification for partitioning R non- 
effective. 'Reality', in this sense, is thus unknowable by any finite 
machine and approximations to knowing it depend on the machine's variety. 
7.2.2 What then does A understand by the instruction to partition R? In one sense 
one might argue to the effect that A has a 'belief' that it is possible to 
partition R. Such a belief need not have a merely intuitive basis. It might 
Variety be based upon a'p-explanation in an. - r-formal theory 
(2.3.2). However, such 
and 
'fuzziness' a p-explanation would itself depend ultimately on a set of axioms that re- 
mained unexplained (the 'final explanans .... without explanation' 
(Lofgren, 
1972, P"341)). 
+ It appears that the 'fuzziness' of instructions given to 
A, as A is able to interpret them, depends upon A's variety. We might put 
it that A's goal in the case of partitioning R, even A's notion of R, has 
the status of an hypothesis not of an experience, (chapter 10). It represents 
knowledge by description rather than knowledge by acquaintance. 
+ It follows from this that no entity exists that could effectively understand in the 
sense of 2.3.2) the 'perfect continence' on which Spencer-Brown bases his definition 
of the primary distinction. 
f' 
++ Zadeh (1965) defines a 'fuzzy set' A in X, where X is a collection of points {x}, by 
means of a characteristic function 1LA(x), which assigns a number in the interval [0,1] 
which represents the 'grade' of membership of x in A. The nearer the value of µ to 
unity, the higher the grade of membership of x in A, and conversely. We might relate 
the term 'fuzziness' as we have applied it in this paragraph to Zadeh's concept, by 
associating the value of Zadeh's characteristic funtion k with the fineness of the grain 
of the grid. In view of the argument of 7.2.1.1 the grid's fineness has a finite limit, 
so that in effect µ must fall in the semi-open interval [0,1), unless it is a measure 
applied by a meta-observer. 
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7.2.3 In general, if A specifies a goal for A+ in the form of an effective procedure, 
A+ will need variety at least as great as A's in order to be able to execute 
the procedure. Recalling the grids of 7.1.4, we might put it that the A+'s 
Resolving resolving power should be at least as great as A's. But sufficient variety 
power 
may not in itself provide a sufficient condition, since A+ will require also 
all those forms of orderedness (constraints on its variety: what we have dis- 
cussed under the headings heuristics, descriptors and the like) that A ex- 
hibits in specifying the goal in question. A lower variety in A+ or an 
absence in A+ of some form of orderedness such as is present in the goal spec- 
ifications from A, will lead A+ to judgements of compatibility, incompatibilitz 
or redundancy in these specifications, which are not evident to A. It follows 
from these arguments that the terms vro per and apparent as we have used them 
to denote kinds of goal specifications, are meaningful in effect only with re- 
spect to some given A. The implication of this is that the term 'apparent' as 
we have defined it, may only be used by an observer to describe his judgement 
of some particular operator executing a given set of goal specifications. 
When an observer in such a case uses the term 'apparent', it implies that the 
description 'proper' applies to the observer's own judgement of the same spec- 
ifications. Clearly it would not make sense for the observer to apply the 
word 'apparent' to himself, though having in mind an a^gument like the present 
one, he might do so as a meta-observer. 
SECTION 3 CODING AND COMMUNICATION 
7.3.0 These observations imply certain broad restrictions that would apply to making 
an art machine. We have shown reasons why it is necessary to furnish the 
machine with structure: heuristics, descriptors and such. They are that (1) 
significant learning, (order-extracting ability, on which depends the capacity 
A 
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The for c-authorship; ) at a significant rate pre-supposes some significant prior 
dilemna of 
providing structure (5.3.3); and, as 'There is no getting selection for nothing' (5.3.0), 
structure: 
recapitu- the cost in computing time and power of evolving the required structure from 
lation 
scratch would make such an evolution impractical; (2) even if the machine 
were able to evolve. a sufficient structure for itself, the likelihood is that 
the structure would be of a kind that*its observers would fail to distinguish 
As we have said (5.3.4), to be able to make art that its maker will recognize, 
an art machine will need to resemble him. This was previously shown to 
be the case in the domain of order extraction. Here the notion is extended to 
apply explicitly in the realm of purpose. This implies that the machine's 
maker will provide it with structure that resembles his own - including all 
the structure he has acquired by his own order-extraction work. He does this 
to permit communication between himself and the machine, and because he could 
not do otherwise, having no other structure to offer. Such structure will in 
turn restrict the kinds of goals that the machine will be able to generate and 
thus, in terms of our definition (3.2.2), its powers of c-authorship. How 
much scope for c-authorship may the machine enjoy? Too little structure pro- 
vided to the machine will render it incapable of significant results. The 
evolution of structure too unfamiliar, corresponding to too wide a scope as a 
c-author, will cause failure to recognize its products. Here is a dilemna for 
the machine's maker: unless he furnishes the machine with previously extracted 
order, its order-extracting ability will be limited; provided with all the i 
order its maker could give it will make it indistinguishable from him. Clearly 
the machine will have to be constructed along the lines of heuristic chess- 
playing programmes for instance, beginning with some simple device and adding 
structure to it. Chapter 12 looks forward to possible devices we might begin 
with. Here we note that before a machine could show significant creativity, 
it would probably need to incorporate most of its maker's (human) structure. 
The rest of this chapter is devoted to questions as to the kinds of limits 
that given structure will impose. As an art machine will be a purposeful 
system, we shall examine question3 of the relation of structure to goal-generat 
ing capacity, that is to c-authorship. 
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7.3.1 A's structure restricts its freedom to set goals. Its structure represents 
a diminution of its variety and therefore of its capacity to be a c-author. 
According to Ashby (1964) a constraint is a relation between two sets which 
Goals and limits the variety under one condition, making it less than under another. It 
constraints 
follows from this definition that a constraint on one system may be brought 
about by another system or systems. Thus we take it that A's structure that 
restricts its freedom, includes its goal structure as part of it. If a condi- 
tion C restricts the set of all possible goals of A, to some proper subset 
GCIP, we shall call Ca constraint on-. Thus the constraint C has the force 
of a goal specification, since it has the effect of making A include G among 
any set of goal specifications G' =i Gi, (i = 1, ..., n). It is a condition 
that restricts the goals that A may generate. We distinguish internal con- 
straints due to A's structure from external constraints resulting frcm struc- 
tures existing in A's surroundings. Among external constraints on A we disting 
guish those due to other purposeful systems from those arising out of non-pur- 
poseful elements. 
7.3.2 Suppose a purposeful system A suffers constraints due to another puxpcsaful 
system A*. Specifically, suppose A*W is a process in which A*ts goal is to 
operate on E to produce W(A*). Suppose further that this entails A*Is working 
Two pur- through the agency of A. Instead of itself operating directly on E, A* utilize; 
poseful 
systems in the operations of an intermediate process AW that in turn will operate on E 
series 
to produce W(A*). But A is itself a purposeful system and will therefore pro- 
duce W(A) as the realization of its own goal g(A). Thus A* must control A 
to make it produce W(A*). Controlling A represents A*? s sub-goal which we 
write gs(A*). The execution of gs(A*) results in the production of Ws(A*), 
where Ws(A*) has the properties which A* supposes necessary to exercize the 
required control of A in AW. That is, Ws(A*) constitutes a set of instructions 
provided by A* to A from which A* supposes A will derive specifications G(A) 
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of a goal g(A), whose execution will result in W(A) n W(A*). When A* aims 
to realize a goal in this way we shall call the aim A*Is intention. We may 
imagine a process AW such as we pictured in 1.1.0, consisting of a purposeful 
system A that operates through a transducer M. -M is the effector system 
through which A acts on its surrounding E to produce W. By extension, in the 
present case we may suppose that A* acts through M* to produce-W. For A*9 
M* includes the whole process AW, along with whatever other elements there 
are in its own effector system. (See figure 7.3.2) 
WB(A*) g* M 
13 
Figure 7.3.2 
We may picture this process extended. 
7.3.3 If, as in the last paragraph, W(A*) represents the realization of both g(A*) 
and g(. "_), that is if W(AS) = W(A), we shall say that A* controls A to produce 
w(A*). Moreover, insofar as A is purposeful, we shall suppose that it must 
Voluntary have 'consented' to A*'s control (or 'contracted' to be controlled by A* - of.. 
acceptance 
of control for instance Pask (1968), Pask & Scott (1973)). That is A must have entertained 
the goal of being controlled by A* (with respect to the production of W) as 
part of its goal specification g(A). In such a case, where A is a purposeful 
system controlled, as defined here, by another purposeful system A*, we shall 
say that .. is voluntarily controlled by A* if and only if the goal to accept 
A*'s goals exists as part of A's procedures. 
7.3.4 A"'s goal specifications for A may-take various forms. Supposing that A 
voluntarily accepts A*? s control, we'distinguish different degrees of con- 
Injuction sbraint on A that A* may exercize, beginning with (1) the most restrictive case 
and de- 
scription- in which A* controls A step-by-step, as a starting tape controls a Turing 
.ýý 
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machine. Following Spencer Brown (p. 78) we define such a state of affairs as 
representing control by injunction. If A proceeds according to A*'s injunc- 
tions, A* may direct A to any goal whatever (insofar as A and A* are able to 
communicate - see 7.4.0), regardless of whether or not A is capable of conceiv- 
ing of (generating) or-even entertaining (distinguishing) such a goal. (This tl 
definition of injunction corresponds to what we have up to now been calling 
description -a starting tape for a machine that makes it generate an end 
tape. The present departure from this usage aims simply to facilitate the 
analysis in this section. ) Relaxing the conditions of (1) results in (2) the 
case in which A* fully specifies A's goal, though not how to reach it, and we 
shall reserve the term 'description' for goal-setting of this kind. Here A 
must proceed according to a goal description offered by A*, the description 
itself representing the realization of A*'s sub-goal. We may regard these 
conditions as. providing a Problem-solving situation for A and, following Newell. 
(1962) for example, view the problem as a combinatorial one, involving the 
choice of a sequence of operations out of a set of possible sequences. In 
this comLinatorial case, AW will terminate only when A has chosen a sequence 
(assuming one exists) that leads to the production of W(A) = W(A*). Notice 
that, if A is successful, AW will terminate with the same result, irreepective 
of the sequence it has followed reaching it. In other words no evidence of 
A's control or part in the process of producing W(A) inheres in W(A) itself. 
Whatever A's role has been, it remains concealed; problem solving frequently 
leaves little or no observable trace to indicate how solutions have been 
reached, (which is the reason why experimental design in problem-solving 
psychology so often aims specifically at displaying the normally hidden as- 
pects of problem-solving processes). And the solutions themselves, the end 
products of the processes - the answer to a complicated calculation; a move 
on a chess board - mostly provide little or no evidence to an observer of any 
complex process preceding them. An observer inspecting W will attribute c- 
autYiorship to A*. Only an observer ignorant of A*+s instructions to A will 
attribute A c-authorship. 
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SECTION 4 COMMUNICATION BETWEEN PURPOSEFUL PROCESSES 
7.4.0 Clearly, in practice, there are limits to the kinds of goals that might be 
wholly specified by description. Specifically these limits depend upon what 
we have broadly referred to (5.3.0,5.3.4,7.3.3) as the 'communication' be- 
Imperfec- tween A* and A. In the language of information theory, this is what is some- 
tion of 
descrip- times called the transinformation between A* and A. or the average mutual 
tive 
control information or transmission between A* and A, which Conant shows is ? an essen- 
tial component of the regulatory process' (p. 336). Goals specified by descrip-'I 
tion (in the present sense) depend on a generative process 'within' A. which 
{ 
does not occur where specifications are by injunction. A's generative process 
is thus subjective to A and may therefore lead to production of the wrong W- 
in A*Is terms - namely, W(A) , W(A*). In more detail, A* is supposed to have 
two goals, a goal g(A*) that when executed leads to the production of W(A*), 
and a sub-goal g(A*) leading to the production of Ws(A*). Ws(A*) takes the 
form of a set of instructions to A from which A may derive the specifications 
G(A) o: ý g(A). Strictly, A*'s sub-goal gs is to cause A to generate its own g 
such that its execution will lead to the production of W(A*). Ws(A*) is no 
more the realization of gs(A*) than any W is the realization of g. It is 
simply the best A* can do given its own limitations due to M and additionally 
its possible ignorance of A's characteristics. 
7.4.1 Evidently it is unwarranted in practice to draw too sharp a dividing line 
between injunction and description. For goal specifications provided by A* 
to A (in the form of commands or instructions) are all injunctive, though not 
Autonomy necessarily complete. To execute A*ts instructions, A must 'interpret' and 
and 
authorship then act upon them. Only step-by-step instructions that need no interpreta- 
tion call for no goal-generation by A. This case is trivial since it entails 
A's voluntarily surrendering all its capacity for c-authorship to A*. Where 
A*Is control is less than absolute, A's interpretation and subsequent genera- 
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tive process consists in interpolating missing computational steps. A's 
interpretive role increases as A*Ia description becomes more fuzzy. In 
practice therefore the difference between injunctive and descriptive speci- 
fications depends upon the degree of autonomy that A* accords to A for real- 
izing the goals specified; and hence A's opportunities or potential to be a 
c-author. By definition (2.1.2). A*ts goal is to hold invariant some state, 
or movement towards some state, of E (or part of E). The specifications that 
A* provides to A stipulate what the state is, either all at once, or by means 
of continuing direction as A proceeds. A must then maintain the state or 
determine the path to it, possibly by itself setting up sequences of sub- 
goals .+ 
7.4.2 The correspondences respectively between injunction and description and 
algorithms and heuristics will be clear.. Thus for example a theorem-proving 
procedure might provide proof heuristics based on some proof criterion and a 
Algorithms facility for checking its results against the criterion. The criterion might 
and 
heuristics. be some general definition of proof, in terms say of well-formed formulae. 
But the procedure might equally get on without the heuristics, simply by com- 
bining axioms say, according to some algorithm for forming wffs, and checking 
after each step to see if the required proof had been accomplished, that is 
whether the newly formed wff was the required one. Similarly we might provide 
a hill-climbing procedure with a general concept of a peak, as say the highest. 
point in a region. Or we could give a particular definition of a particular 
peak, based upon route directions. Notice that the more general the defini- 
tion of a concept, the more widely different the procedures that may adopt 
it as a criterion, while the more narrowly it is defined, the more restricted 
its applications will be. In the limiting case for generality., A* need do no 
more than retain a veto over what A produces, thus ensuring that anything 
+In the following chapter we shall see that A* and A may be characterized respectively 
as what Ashby (1964) distinguishes as controller. and re ator. I 
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finally produced conforms to the realization of g(A*). This is the homeo- 
static procedure we examined in chapter 4, under the heading algedonic control., 
All the remarks made in that chapter on the relative advantages and limita- 
tions of heuristics and algorithms apply, mutatis mutandis, equally here. 
Notice that purely injunctive specifications are tied to particular processors. 
If the processor is a universal Turing machine, the starting tape will need 
to include instructions for producing the particular machine required to 
execute the programme. 
7.4.3 In practice A will sometimesprefer (find it easier) to use descriptive, in 
others injunctive specifications. To use Spencer-Brown's example, it is 
easier to describe a cake or a piece of music by means of the injunctions re- 
Injunctions spectively of a recipe or a musical score than in terms of. descriptions of 
and de- 
scriptions: taste or sound. Conversely, it might be easier to leave the solution of a 
choice in 
practice theorem to a suitably pro rammed computer than prove the theorem oneself. 
But 'the description is dependent upon and secondary to the set of injunctions 
having been obeyed first' (Spencer-Brown, p. 78). Once the cake recipe is 
known its name will be enough to describe it. In practice numbers of factors 
will dictate the choice between injunctive and descriptive control procedures. 
Generally Ac's instructions to A will be a mixture of both. A limiting con- 
sideration for A* is its ignorance of A's structure, which in general will 
differ from its own. + A* must compensate for its ignorance by the specificity 
of its instructions. Paradoxically,. by the conclusions of the previous para- 
graph, the more specific the instructions the more closely bound they will be 
to a particular processor. But the less A* knows of A the greater its uncer- 
tainty of its properties as a processor. So there is a point beyond which it 
does not pay A* to make its instructions more specific. In practice the pro- 
blew does not present itself simply as a straightforwerci one of coding, al- 
though it reduces to a coding problem if A* incorporates its knowledge of A 
+' If A* and A are identical then questions of control between them are- equivalent -to 
questions of their own internal control. 
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into its coding procedures. 
SECTION 5' CHAINS OF CONTROL 
7.5.0 In general we picture the two-stage process AKW envisaged in 7.3.2, in which 
A* produces Ws(A*) to provide A with a basis on which to select a set of spec- 
ifications G(A)G (A). To these, according to this formulation, A provides 
Co-author additionally, self-generated specifications, to obtain finally the specifica- 
tions GI(A) of g(A). We define such a case as a special case of partial c- 
authorship and call A co-author with A* of W, and write W as W(A*, A). In 
principle at any rate, the relative contributions of A* and A to W correspond 
to the degrees of order in W attributable respectively to the two entities. 
7.5.1 The two-stage process due to A* and A extends naturally to a multi-stage 
system, consisting of a sequence of processes Ai(W), (i = 1, ... 9 n), say. 
Each Ai generates g(Ai) and possibly one or more sub-goals, corresponding to 
Extended sub-processes of the sequence. We write gs (Ai) to denote the sub-goal. of 
authorship 3 
Ai who3e execution is intended to control A3. Ws (Ai) denotes the product of 
AiW when this goal is executed. This Z: consists of a set of instructions to 
Aj, which may include both injunctions such that they will lead AjW to produce 
W(Aor descriptions from which A, will be able to construct g(A whose 
execution will lead AjW to produce W(AJ), or both injunctions and descriptions. 
As a sub-goal W. (Ai) has as its ultimate object either, (1) W(Aj) = W(Ai), if 
AjW is the penultimate process or, more generally, (2) W(Aj) should form the 
basis for Ak say, to set specifications for G(Ak) (where k may but need not 
equal (j + 1)), to make g(Ak) and so on. 
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7.5.2 Ai intends (in the sense of 7.3.2) that the execution of gg(Ai) and g(Ai) 
should lead to the production of the same W. But as we have noted, this may 
not always occur. If Aals instructions to A3 are not effective, an. Ai is 
Goal speci- not able to use them as a basis upon which to form a fully specified goal 
fication 
and variety g(Aj ) (or sub-goal gs (A4)), or if A4Is variety is greater or less than 
Ails, or in the presence of noise, A3 may generate a goal different from the 
goal Ai intended it to generate. That is it may happen that the execution of 
gs(Ai) and g(AA) lead to the production of Wa (Ai) / W(Ai). + In general, if 
8 (Ai) D W(A3), then we should suppose that A. will regard g(Ai ) as under 
specified by A. While, if Ws 
3 
(Ai) c W(AS), we should suppose A3 's variety 
or power of resolution to be lower than Ails. Other coding discrepancies 
between Ai-and Ai, or the presence of noise might give rise to disjoint or 
overlapping W's. 
7.5.3 In general we need not suppose that the process AW will necessarily consist 
of a simple sequence of nested processes and sub-processes AW(A as we have 
pictured so far and that we might write as 
Goal nets gw = A, (AL(A3 ... (Aw (n)) ... w(A3))w(A2))W(Al) 
We need not suppose that one process occurs at a time, nor that any given 
sub-process AW(Ai) will occur only once, but we may picture sequences of 
nested loops of recurring processes in complex arrangements. But other forms 
of constraint, apart from those already considered, will play a part in deter- 
mining the structure of such arrangements. In cases where such processes 
have parallel components they may be reduced to sequential forms in the same 
way as information processes procedures. 
+W is an object or an event rather than a set of processes. Nevertheless we may describe it by means of a monotonically convergent sequence of sets, exactly as we descxibed 
goals. (7.1.2) 
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SECTION 6 DESIGNERS 
7.6.0 The controller Ai of AW's sub-processes have so far all been supposed to act 
voluntarily (7.3.3) under the control of superior processes and in the absence 
of competing goals within AW, or of their own. But this may not always be the 
Conflict- case. The individual A. s may entertain their own goals and sub-goals. More- 
ing goals 
in linked over, this may be so whether or not the Ais act voluntarily under the control 
processes 
of superior controllers. More strictly one may imagine qualified voluntariness 
in the sense of voluntary control being accepted only if it does not require 
actions that conflict with or prevent the pursuit of an independent goal. Pur- 
poseful processes and sub-processes with conflicting or mutually interfering 
goals, in which control is not voluntary, give rise to problems that are of 
more than tangential interest to our present object, since we are concerned 
with possible conflicts between the purposes of our art machine and its con- 
troller, and the orders of linked systems on which it may draw to augment its 
own structure. The voluntarily-controlled sub-processes of such compounds 
will art in a way that is the converse of that in which conflicting sub-pro- 
cesses act that do not accept voluntary control by superiors. That is such 
sub-processes will pursue their independent goals only if these goals do not 
require actions that conflict with the pursuit of the goal of the superior. 
A sub-process in this case will Nava to 'accommodate' its own purpose , 
to the 
superior purposes. Such accommodation will detract from the c-authorship 
of the sub-process in executing its own independent goal, insofar as it re- 
stricts tae goal. The superior processes whose goals it has had to accommodate 
will not be co-authors, according to our definition (7.4.3). 
7.6.1 Ashby (1972) shows the relative importance of constraint on A due to the con- 
flicting and other goals of other purposeful systems. He pictures a designer 
furnished with a set of instructions which may include instructions from goals 
differing from A's, but by which A is nevertheless bound. He represents the 
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Figure 7.6.1 
situation by a diagram: Figure 7.6.1 
Y1 
Y2 
Y 
n 
Ashby asks how much information processing by the designer is implied by his 
translation of the demands made upon Yýim into completed designs that he pro- 
duces such as meet these demands. He enquires how the least safe capacity 
(ibid. p. 90) in channel C is related to the capacity in the channel #= Z to 
y, that is what is the minimum capacity of channel C which will ensure that, 
whatever the actual situation between some given and Y, C's capacity will 
be sufficient to enable the translation to take place. The designer receives 
a message via the channel C in the form of demands X to produce Y. From a 
set of functions he selects F such that Y= F(Xý. F is the 'message sent'. 
Ashby notes that the number of functions from a domain of d elements to--a 
range of r elements is rd. If the numbers r and d are not small, d will be 
relatively far more important than r in increasing the number of functions 
and therefore the work required of the designer. 
7.6.2 This acts as a severe constraint on the capacity of any system for c-author- 
ship. For we may generalize this formulation to include in the 'demands on 
the designer' A, which constitute the constraint, instructions from other pur- 
poseful systems, either pursuing the same goals as A or different goals, or 
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Justifica- tdemands' not necessarily due to other purposeful systems at all, but merely tion for 
the defin- to the structure within which the designer operates. All such structure, ition of 
c-author whether it is the physical structure of the world, the structure of A's 
effector system or the structure of a problem domain, detracts from A's 
capacity to be a c-author. Thus the product of a problem in multiplication 
is fully determined by the rules of arithmetic, and one would not call a 
system that performed the multiplication the product's c-author. Evidently 
the extent to which A is 'free' to generate its own goals is severly restr- 
icted whatever form A may be given. 
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CHAPTER 8 
REGULATION AND CONTROL 
SECTION 0 THE PURPOSEFUL INDIVIDUAL 
8.0.0 Treatment of the subject of control and regulation has deliberately been left 
to this, the concluding chapter of Part I. The object of the delay has been 
to show as vividly as possible, not simply the necessity, but the sufficiency 
Controlled of a controlled productive process as a basis for our purpose of making an 
process 
necessary art machine. From the outset we have insisted on the necessity for AW to be 
and suffi- 
cient basis a controlled process, though we have avoided any mention hitherto of how A's 
for art 
machine control might be exercized. This avoidance has led to certain difficulties 
and anomalies which we shall shortly be able to remove. The first difficulty 
was to define purpose without appealing to control. This was an obvious pro- 
blem though we believe it was solved in a way that did not detract from the 
utility of the definition adopted: as we observed, control is an inferred 
aspect of purposefulness, at least for one observing it. In N. 3.1 we remarked 
on problems of interpretation of W, exacerbated by differences between A and 
0, as in chapters 0 and 1 we drew attention to the related problem of how to 
know a WOA. Here we shall show that A as a controller is also 0, and that the 
way the productive process proceeds is sufficient to ensure that A produces 
WOAs if that is his object. Moreover we shall infer that Os, other than A, 
must undo--take a productive process not unlike AW in order to apprehend and 
appreciate a WOA in the role of audience or critic. 
4p 
1 
8.0.1 The argument of this chapter bases itself on the formulations of Ashby (1964) 
and Conant. We begin by outlining a paradigm for regulation, which we apply 
by degrees to the process AW, examining the implications for A's structure at 
each step. Different varieties of regulation axe discussed, in particular 
fr- 
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Control of cause-controlled and error-controlled forms. The initial paradigm is ex- 
production 
tended to apply to a purposeful individual, and it is shown, by means of dia- 
grams of immediate effects, that a purposeful individual is homomorphic with 
a controlled procedure. It is found that a cause-controlled regulator needs 
a model of the world in which it operates and this implies a need for it to 
have an order-extraction facility so that it can acquire the model. A modi- 
fied paradigm for an art machine is suggested and its operation as a produc- 
tive process observed. 
SECTION 1 REGULATION, CONTROL AND PURPOSE 
8.1.0 We come at last to control. From the outset (1.0.3) we have defined A as a 
controller. As a purposeful system, A must be able to control its actions 
so that they serve its purposeb. In 2.1.2 we defined Ass purpose in terms of 
Ashby's invariance: an observer 0 that identified e, )me characteristic in A's output 
paradigm 
for goal- which remained invariant over a time interval T, supposed that the character- 
seeking 
istic represented the realization by A of a goal entertained by A over the 
interval. If the characteristic remained invariant under changes in A's in- 
put state, A was said to be purposeful. Thus, broadly speaking, A mast be. 
able to (1) set the goals it will pursue; (2) 'protect' whatever procedures 
correspond to those set goals from disturbances; (3) execute the goals. 
The procedures required by (2) and (3) are of a similar kind, but differ from 
the procedures required by (1). We shall show that these two kinds of pro- 
cedures, those of (2) and (3) and those of (1), correspond respectively to 
what Ashby (1964) distinguishes as regulation and control. He pictures them 
by means of a diagram of immediate affects as in figure 8.1.0, in which D 
represents a source of disturbance, Ca controller (goal setter in our ter- 
minplogy), R the regulator, T 'the hard external world, or those internal 
+The notion of the source of disturbance as an adversary of regulation is due to Conant (p. 334)" 
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matters that the would-be regulator has to take for granted' (p. 209), and 
E the set of 'outcomes'. R's job as regulator is to provide inputs for T 
such as will, when taken together with T's inputs from D, force T to emit E, 
such that E shows the required characteristics of invariance, - or such that 
certain values of E remain within some acceptable range. 
Figure 8.1.0 
8.1.1 We might re-arrange Ashby's diagram of immediate effects to represent A, 
within the terms of our definition, as in figure 8.1.1.0, in which D represents 
disturbances affecting T. 
Represen- 
tation of 
a purpose- 
ful indivi- 
dual 
Figure 8.1.1.0 
Such a representation would be incomplete, however, as it would provide only 
the goal-setting and execution systems, C and R respectively, without allow- 
ing for a system to protect against disturbance the goal that had been set. 
In our terms this system would be goal-seeking rather than purposeful. To 
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be purposeful, A must be able to maintain invariant that part of its own 
internal state that represents its goals. Thus it must include a regulat- 
ing system as part of itself. We might represent such a system as in 
figure 8.1.1.1 
Figure 8.1.1.1 
Here D represents inputs that A receives from its surroundings, internal and 
external; C acts as goal-setter by determining what ER will aim for; T 
refers specifically to the 'internal matters' mentioned in the previous para- 
graph and E is the representation of A's goal. Combining the representations 
of both these diagrams, 8.1.1.0 and 8.1.1.1, we obtain a full representation 
of A as a purposeful system, arriving at 8.1.1.2 
Figure 8.1.1.2 
Regrouping the elements of this figure, we get figure 8.1.1.3, which reduces 
to a homomorph of figure 8.1.0, the figure we started with. That is we have 
not departed from Ashby'3 formulation, which we might interpret as follows: 
_9 
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C sets A's goals, with or without specifications received from elsewhere. 
We-might say that C does A's order-extraction work, or is the creative or 
imaginative element in A; Dl represents disturbances affecting A; T1 re- 
presents the internal matters that Ashby mentions; El is A's representa- 
tion of its goal, and plays a role in A's effector system, which corres- 
ponds to C's role in A. Notice that C controls R2. R1 protects, as we 
have called it, the goal that C has set for A against the disturbances of 
D1; El may now be taken as A's goal representation and R2 as the regulation 
of A's effector system against disturbances D2 that act on it. T2 represents 
the external world and E2 represents W, the realization of A's goal. 
Figtre 8.1.1.3 
8.1.2 Notice that we might have achieved the requirements of a purposeful system 
more easily by a simple modification of the original, paradigm, figure 8.1.0, 
by allowing a channel of information between E and C, as in figure 8.1.2 
Purposeful 
system 
Figure 8.1.2 
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This system, by reviewing the success or failure of the regulation procedure 
it has determined may see to it that E remains appropriate. It is an ultra- 
stable system, in Ashby's (1965) sense, with C having the role of altering 
the parameters of the transducer R. If C operated on a step-function, this 
system would resemble Ashby's homeostat. However we have chosen to portray 
purposefulness in a form that emphasizes the complexity of the internal struc- 
ture of the system, and to illustrate the symmetry between the regulating 
mechanisms directed respectively at the internal world of the system and the 
external world which is the system's primary concern. 
SECTION' 2 TYPES OF REGULATION 
8.2.0 Ashby distinguishes three varieties of regulators, those characterized by the 
diagram of immediate effects of 8.2.0.0, which correspond to'the regulator 
part of the system of figure 8.1.1.3, and those systems that may be charac- 
Information terized as ii, figures 8.2.0.1 and 8.2.0.2, in which the information available 
from D to R 
to R concerning the disturbance D that R is required to block, is forced to 
take longer routes to R, passing respectively either through T or through 
both T and E. 
DTEtD j-7 TE C+ 
rR 
Figure 8.2.0.0 Figure 8.2.0.1 Figure 8.2.0.2 
The last type of system (figure 8.2.0.2) has-the 'basic form of the "error- 
controlled servo-mechanism" or "closed loop regulator", with its well-known 
feedback from E to RI (13hby, 2-964, p. 223)" The error-controlled regulator 
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'differs from that of the basic formulation [figure 8.2.0.0] only in that 
the information about D gets to R by the longer route 
aD 
-T E Rý i 
(p. 223). 
8.2.1 Conant gives the name 'cause-controller regulators' to regulators that re- 
ceive their information about D by the shortest route, directly from D. 
Figure 8.2.1 portrays Conant's representation of cause-controlled regulation. 
Cause- R utilises information from the source that affects S to determine appropriate 
controlled 
regulation regulatory action aimed at preventing S from affecting Z. D is a source of 
'primary disturbances' (p. 338), a sequence of activity that affects both S 
and R. Without R's regulation, D's activity would be transmitted through 
the channel S to Z. R must co-ordinate its own actions with S's so that the 
resultant outcome of their joint activity is invariant. That is so that the 
channel from D to Z which R and S form jointly has 'minimal information cap- 
acity' (p. 338). 
SiS 
SOURCE OF 
DISTURBANCES DZ 
F71 JR 
Figure 8.2.1 
Cause-controlled Regulation (Reproduced from Conant, p. 338) 
Conant goes on to show that the amount of regulation achieved by a cause- 
controlled regulator will be maximised if R is or behaves 'isomorphically or 
perhaps homomorphically with respect to S', in which case R will be a perms 
regulator. This constitutes 'information theoretic grounds for the observa- 
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tion that regulators are often isomorphs of what they are regulating' (of. 
2.7.2). Error-controlled regulators receive all their information about the 
errors they are required to regulate from the already-regulated signal. They 
therefore have more the role of what we might call error-attenuators, since 
their action relies on the survival of at least some error for its direction. 
Cause-controlled regulators are able to avoid the defect of being theoreti- 
cally never quite able to eliminate error, by relying purely on information 
coming directly from the source of disturbance, without the intercession of 
any external agent. Notice that a model of D alone does not provide R with 
sufficient information for its regulatory task. This is because R forms a 
joint channel with S and it is therefore S's outputs that R must 'neutralize'. 
Conant's formulation is equivalent to Ashby's of figure 8.2.0.0, with 
Conant'. s a corresponding to Ashby's T and Conant's Z to Ashby's E. 
8.2.2 For perfect regulation, R's and S's responses to D must reach their point of 
summation -' in figure 8.2.1 - simultaneously. That is, the time it takes 
for the information about the disturbance to reach the regulator and the re- 
Times of gulator's output to reach the point of summation must be the same as the 
regulatory 
responses time required for the disturbance to reach the point of summation, via the 
channel S. 
8.2.3 Furnished with a model of S, R mig1. t determine its outputs in some quite sim- 
ple and direct way, such as a coding procedure based on the model's outputs, 
or it might use its model as the basis for a surrogate error-controlled pro- 
Types of cess, in which it pre-tested actions on the model, modified them, re-tested 
cause- 
controlled them and so on, before applying them in the. form of an output. Observation 
regulation 
might not always make it obvious which of these forms R 
. 
was using.. The rea- 
son for this may more easily be understood from an example. We recall the 
machine of Fogel & others (2.7.2) that was evolved in such a way that it pre- 
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dicted the output states of its environment. These outputs consisted of a 
cyclically repeated string of randomly mixed zeros and ones. - If instead the 
machine had been evolved to output ones simultaneously with the environment's 
zeros and zeros with its ones, the net output obtained by summation of its 
own outputs and the environment's would have been one invariantly. Such a 
machine, in the role of R, would perform perfectly in its environment S, 
againt disturbances D that produced the environment's emissions. If the re- 
gulator's environment consisted of more than one pattern of zeroes and ones, 
a more complex regulator would be called for, specifically one that included 
an 'anti-pattern' to neutralize each pattern the environment emitted, and in 
addition a device for selecting the appropriate 'anti-pattern' to use Fit a 
given instant.. Such a device would need to incorporate some means of recog- 
nizing what pattern S was emitting and of selecting an appropriate 'anti- 
pattern' from whatever stock of them it might have. Put slightly differently, 
there might be a number of distinct Ss of which R had models, and R would 
therefore need a way of knowing. which one was operating at a given moment. 
Clearly there is room for R to conduct tests using its models of S. That 
these tests achieve will depend upon the rate at which testing can be carried 
out on the model, relative to the time scale of the environment in which re- 
gulation is required. At worst this will reduce the likelihood of disasterous 
actions on the part of the regulator, more or less regardless of the relative 
time scales of S and R's model of it. At best it may promote relatively 
. effective actions of 
R. Where regulation is not error-controlled, in the 
strict sense that the actual commission of error is vital for the regulator 
if it is not to block its only source of information about the disturbance 
it is to regulate, it might more properly be called regulation by error-anti- 
cipation. But error-anticipation must rely upon the availability of some 
kind of model of the environment, within which disturbance is to be regulated, 
so that regulatory actions may be tested, modified, re-tested and so on, be- 
fore they are used; or which, through isomorphism or homomorphism may permit 
iýmul a1 os regulation by some kind of matched reaction. 
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'That very intricate regulator, the brain, is successful because it con- 
tains, in some sense, a model of the environment which is an approximate 
isomorph or homomorph of that environment; on the basis of that model, 
the brain apparently calculates how S will respond to an observed distur- 
bance and then formulates its own regulatory response which is coordinated 
with S. ' (Conant, p. 338) 
SECTION 3 AW IN OPERATION 
8.3.0 At last we are in a position to portray the productive process AW as it night 
operate to produce W, and to examine its goal-generating more closely. To 
permit goal-generation of sufficient interest to justify calling it creative, 
Paradigm we shall suppose that A is provided with a facility for modelling its goals, 
for AW 
and since these will all be concerned with producing W in E- by definition - 
we shall assume that the modelling facility extends also to E or, in other 
words, that A can model W-in-E. This implies that A must also incorporate an 
order-extraction facility to enable it to furnish its models. We propose the 
paradigc 
Figure 8.3.0 
A disturbance D emanating from A's external environment E affects A- sets 
up a disequilibrium say. This is registered at 0 where there is a modelling 
facility to set up a goal for restoring equilibrium, possibly with test and 
modification procedures carried out on the model of the environment E*. Call 
the goal W*-in-E*, or simply W*. 0 sets"R. to regulate against internal and 
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external disturbances, D and DA respectively; and within A's internal envir- 
onment EA, to produce W*. RA also acts via M- omitted from the figure for 
simplicity - to produce W symmetrically with W*. The process ends with the 
restoration of A'S equilibrium. The W that exists at that time is the reali- 
zation of Ors last goal. We mention 0's 'last? goal, because 0 has been de- 
picted as receiving information from both W* and W. The information channel 
from W to 0 makes the system purposeful in the sense of 8.1.2; what, by ex- 
tension from the definitions of 8.2.0 we should call an error-controlled pur- 
poseful system. The information channel from W* to 0 provides cause-controlled 
regulation of the system's controller, so that we should describe it as a 
cause-controlled purposeful system too. Here is the justification for the 
paradigm of purposefulness portrayed in figure 8.1.1.3, which intimates the 
place and importance of a modelling facility. 
8.3.1. W aid W* will be subject to differences of variety and of conformability in 
their structures. Returning to the notation of the previous chapter, let us 
suppose A's goal g has in A the internal representation W*, provided by the 
Realizing set of specifications n G. W*Is variety may be greater than, less than or 
a goal 
the same as the variety available for its realization, W; or its structure 
may be unattainable in reality, a difficulty that might easily come about 
through manipulation of E* not possible for E, or through a bad fit between 
E and E* in the first place. Suppose A commences its operation with an initial 
goal g1, which AW begins to realize as W1. In the absence of obstacles, AW 
continues to the completion of W1. If, for one of the reasons suggested, AW 
either halts or detects discrepancies between W* and W, A will need either to 
find a way of removing the discrepancies or will be forced to alter or abandon 
gl. If A is unable to avoid the discrepancies and wishes the process AW to 
continue - because the state of disequilibrium that gave rise to the process 
in the first place persists - then A will have to alter gl to g2, causing M 
to begin executing g,,, in E as W,, (either'by modifying W, as it has come into "` Li 
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existence so far, or by beginning again). Recurrence of these events will 
result in two sequences, gi and Wi, (i = 1, ..., n) say, of goals anti their 
partial realizations respectively. AW halts at n=k, if Wk realizes gk. 
8.3.2 For this to occur, the sequences gi and. Wi must converge towards equilibrium 
points gk and Wk respectively, and successive gis must find on the whole 
closer approximations to their respective realizations in successive Wis. We 
The devel- picture two sequences gi and Wi (i = 1, ..., k) converging to the point at 
opment of W 
which Wk realizes gk. In general we may relax the condition that makes A set 
out with a fully specified goal g, and assume instead that A's goal is under- 
specified, -call it z! = f1 G, where G has more than a single member. Successive 
Us will form what Wittgenstein calls a 'family resemblance group' (0.3.1.2). 
Similarly successive Ws. + 
8.3.3 The time scale for goal-setting procedures is not necessarily the same as for 
the procedures for realizing goals: goal-setting procedures operate accord- 
ing to the time scale appropriate for measuring 'events' in A, call it T; 
Time realization procedures, 'events' in E, call it t. That is, T instants in A 
scales 
correspond to t in E. The rate at which A can respond to information reach- 
ing it from E, has an upper bound determined by T, while the rate at which E 
can respond to operations on it, controlled by A, has an upper bound deter- 
mined by t. If T is faster than t information from E* regarding W* may cause 
Gl to alter to G2 before G1 can be realized, that is, before W1 can be pro- 
duced in E. It follows that to produce W in E it is necessary for G to re- 
main fixed for at least some minimum time. This formulation suggests that AW 
will always terminate with W as the realization of g, or at any rate G. But 
this is obviously not the case. Apart from those goals that A will abandon, 
+ In practice W is an on-going enter-prize. By 'successive' Ws we mean We delineated by 
changes in G- or g. 
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it will have to show tolerance in the cases of those with which it persists. 
A perfect match between W* and W is unlikely ever to occur. 
146 
PART II AUTHORSHIPIS PRODUCTS 
Part I set out to discover what conditions were necessary for authorship 
and more particularly for constructing a machine that would be able to 
act as an author. ' What emerged defined a category, including entities 
of every description displaying the characteristics of intelligence, 
purposefulness, and imagination or creativeness. (the ability 
to generate their own goals). Moreover it appeared that if the products 
of any entity of this character were to have meaning or significance for 
humans, the entity's intelligence and so forth would have to make sense 
of the world in the same kind of way that humans do. Showing this might 
alone be considered useful, because it makes explicit what is frequently 
overlooked or neglected or simply taken for granted in the theory of art 
- and elsewhere - namely on the one hand, the close relationship between 
the various capacities that the production of art demands, and on the 
other the limits that confine innovatory power. The latter conclusion 
appears of particular interest for art theory, which sometimes tends to 
endow such faculties as imagination and creativeness with powers trans- 
cending such mundane matters as natural laws. Nothing said so far how- 
ever suggests in what way, if any, an art machine might differ from 
other machines for authorship. Part II sets out to deal with this ques- 
tion by-concentrating on W, with the object of discovering differences 
disting'ishing WOAs within the wider class. For knowing these differences 
will indicate differences between an art machine and the wider class of 
author machines, or more simply between artists and a wider category of 
'producers'. As previously, the objective is to arrive at plausible and 
useful conclusions - the use of plausibility as a criterion of truth is 
itself vindicated by Part I- in the least restrictive ". %-ay we have been 
able to find. We therefore proceed as before, from abstract considerations, 
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without appealing to any particular actual state of affairs. The argu- 
ment begins by exploring W's value for A. From here it proceeds, estab- 
lishing descriptive dimensions for W, which it finally uses to arrive at 
a definition of WOA and specific suggestions for an art machine-, followed 
by a brief assessment of the future of the project of constructing one. 
CHAPTER 9 
OBJECTIVE' FK'10WLE]YGE 
SECTION 0 THE UTILITY OF W 
9.0.0 The task Part I set itself was to determine the principles of authorship, 
which we defined in terms of a productive process AW. We deliberately 
avoided restricting W, explicitly allowing it to take the form, either of 
a performance or an object, as long as it left some trace - possibly only 
fleeting - in its surrounding, observable by some observer 0. The 
Practical reasons for insisting on such an unrestricted W will emerge more clearly in 
interest 
in rich-. this chapter. Although our concern has been an artificial system, it is 
ness 
obviously the case that the only real producers, where the term in the 
sense that we use it connotes any acceptable degree of richness, are 
natural systems. Similarly, although we have discussed purposeful activity 
of all kinds, our interest is particularly in those purposeful performances 
that result in fairly permanent Ws that are objects, especially where 
these are of no obviously immediate utility. We are naturally led to ask 
why such is should be produced and what part they may play in furthering 
the - higher level - goals of the As that may produce them. This chapter 
enquires into the nature of Ws of this and other kinds and examines what 
use they may be to A. 
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9.0.1 We begin by noting the characteristics of aW that satisfies Popper's 
requirements for 'objective knowledge'. Objective knowledge is not 
necessarily explicit nor does explicitness assure objectivity: 
empirical systems can never be fully explicit. Effective pro- 
The cedures are examined. If these are objective it is to an observer with 
meaning 
of ob- a view of the whole procedure, not merely its step-by-step execution. 
jectivity 
Conscious and unconscious criticism are compared. Both conjectures and 
refutations by natural systems are likely to include unconscious elements; 
what differs between the two kinds of criticism is not so much A's pro- 
cedure, as the Ws involved. Conjecture and refutation call for objec- 
tivity, but this may be conscious or unconscious. In either case A 
must have the structure of an author. The notion of 'unconscious' pro- 
cesses vanishes if we provide A with a stratified obje3t language. 
SECTION 1W AS OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE 
9.1.0 Recapitulating, we have concluded so far that an art machine must be an 
author, in particular a c-author, for which, we have said, it needs to 
be purposeful and in particular able to generate its own purposes; for which 
Ats we shared it required an order-extracting capacity and a reflexive struc- 
charac- 
teris- tune, to control its production. Furnished with these capabilities, a 
tics: 
recap- machine might produce Ws. Such Ws, in the machine's, A's say, intention 
itul- 
ation would be partial self-reproductions of A in A's world E; in realization, 
they would be subject to constraints due to the structure of E- including 
the effector system A used in their execution - and the characteristics of 
Ats control of E. The relationship of A to W, as we showed (8.2.3) is 
partly that of observer to object, where an object in this case is a 
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distinguishable part of E, namely W. An immediate questions is, What 
will be the general nature of the Ws A produces? 
9.1.1 As a first approximation, because our earlier conclusions suggest its 
possible suitability, we might characterize W as what Popper (1972) calls 
'objective knowledge'. The idea is-plausible because W is 'objective' 
relative to A, enjoying as it does a separate existence in E, where A may 
Objective observe it. What are the"characteristics of objective knowledge? 
knowledge 
'Only objective knowledge is criticizable: subjective knowledge 
becomes criticizable- only when it becomes objective. And it 
becomes objective when we s what we think; and even more so 
when we write it down, or print it '. (p. 25) 
This description conceals certain difficulties. In the first place, 
unless we place severe restrictions on the meaning of Popper's phrase 
'what we think', we shall be forced to allow objective status to c. ny W 
that an A may produce. This is first because, as we have mentioned, W 
is certainly objective vis-a-vis the entity that produced it, being an entity 
distinct from its producer; and secondly because, as a product of. order- 
extraction work, - A's*either by acquisition or 'programming' - it 
qualifies as the objective part of 'what we think', where 'we' refers to 
the producer, 'what' to W and 'think' to the process of authorship or c- 
authorship. In the second place there is a difficulty over the notion of 
the possibility of degrees of objectivity that popper implies, writing down 
what we think being in some sense more objective than saying it (cf N. 8.1). 
It is not immediately obvious whether, in Popper's terms, it is necessary 
to say 'out loud' what we think, rather than say it 'to ourselves'. But 
as we may probably take all these qualifications to refer to practice 
rather than principle, we conclude that, on the face of it at any rate, 
there appears no reason in principle why an idea said out loud should 
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be more objective than one said to oneself, given that both ideas are 
held with the same clarity. Presumably it is precisely the clarity 
that the practical expedients of print and speech are supposed to assist. 
SECTION 2 OBJECTIVITY AND EXPLICITNESS 
9.2.0 In addition to differing in objectivity, what we think - the more so if 
it is not said out loud but only to ourselves - may vary in explicitness, 
Explicit- from the degree of explicitness associated with formal systems, to what 
ness 
may be almost wholly inexplicit, such as the kind of heuristic model we 
may have of the world (of 0.2.2). And even though such models might be 
regarded - following Popper (1972 and elsewhere) - as conjectures about the 
world that are subject to refutation, this in itself would not be enough to 
ensure their explicitness, or even to make us fully 'aware' of them, since 
marry such models, although they are 'used', are never even consciously 
adopted, let alone made explicit. Explicitness does not imply objectivity, 
nor does objectivity necessarily lead. to explicitness. In saying what we 
think, our statements may still carry implications that are quite likely 
to receive subjective interpretations until they are made explicit. For 
example though the axioms and inference roles of a formal theory imply all 
the true theorems of the theory, this alone does not tell us what the 
theorems will. be. Barring subjective intuitions, one would not know what 
they were until they had been explicitly proved. Similarly the end tape 
generated from a given starting tape by a given Turing machine is no more 
than implicit or immanent in the starting tape and the Turing machine, 
until the mechanical procedures of generating it have been completed. 
'Arithmetical propositions are ... always synthetical of which we may 
become more clearly convinced by trying large numbers. t - (Kant, 1934, 
p. 33) (cf. Turing 7.2.3). The explicitness of the formal theory or 
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the starting tape of the Turing machine lies in the furnishing of a pro- 
cedure which, if mechanically followed, will lead to a particular result, 
though the result itself will be synthetic and may not be reached 'by mere 
analysis of our conceptions' (ibid. p. 33). Saying what we think does not 
in itself necessarily make our thoughts explicit. It is a practical 
expedient that facilitates aligning the thoughts with the real'world to which 
they refer, helping us to test them against this reality. But the testing 
itself will not necessarily make the thoughts any more explicit for whom- 
ever entertains them explicitly in the first place. 
9.2.1 In actuality, explicitness may seldom be taken as an absolute. Like 
objectivity, what we think will probably possess . '.. t in varying 
'degrees'. 
In general, implications will unavoidably underlie most explicit state- 
Degrees meats (Löfgren's unexplained explancns (2-3.2)). Only in a closed, 
of ex- 
plicit- formal system might one be certain of making all implications - the syn- 
ness 
thetic propositions- Immanent in the system's axioms and inference rules - 
explicit, and this only in systems in which it were possible to prove 
completeness. In complex, 'open', empirical systems, each new explicit 
statement is likely, in varying degrees, to give rise to new implications. 
Nearly all empirical propositions contain a mixture of explicit and im- 
plicit elements (the following chapter develops this view further). As 
an example we think of a partially-ordered system -a hierarchy or some 
kind of network say - representing a domain of possible propositions. 
Certain nodes, representing concepts say, are explicitly identified, 
thereby implying the identification of certain other nodes, namely 
those that lie on the various 'paths' that lead to the explicitly- 
identified nodes. The possibility of alternative paths interprets the 
notion of subjectiveness. For, if A and B use respectively paths a and 
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b to get to the same concept (node) W. they will each identify different 
sets of (implied) nodes on the way. So W will imply different things 
for A and B. (The operation of PLANNER provides a concrete example: 
two PLANNER procedures with different 'experience' might appeal to 
different back-up theorems in executing a goal. ) In general in an 
open system, each new explicit idea will carry new implications, unless 
there is only one way that the idea may be inferred. 
9.2.2 Summarizing these arguments, we should say that (1) every W is objective, 
in the sense that it is distinct from its producer A. Thus A is like 
Einstein in Popper's (1972) formulation: 
I... the main difference between Einstein and an amoeba ... is 
that Einstein consciously seeks for error elimination. He 
tries to kill his theories: he is consciously critical of his 
theories which, for this reason, he tries to formulate sharply. 
rather than vaguely. But the amoeba cannot be critical vie-a. 
Continuum vis its expectations or hypotheses; it cannot be critical 
of objec- because it cannot face its hypotheses: they are part of it'. (p. 25) 
tivity and 
explicit- A can certainly 'face' W. (2) Objectivity, in the sense merely of 
ness 
something said or written down, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for explicitness; and (3) teile full explicitness may be 
possible, in general in empirical systems many explicit 'ideas' are 
likely to contain implications which, when made explicit, will contain 
further implications, and so on, in an explosively divergent way. 
Thus all Ws will be objective in the sense of (1), and in general will 
vary as to their degrees of explicitness. What distinguishes Einstein 
from the amoeba is his capacity for authorship, the ability to produce 
We. In the terms of the previous chapter, what the amoeba lacks is a 
world model distinct from its own overall structure. But the differences 
are not absolute. The two characters of Popper's distinction are no more 
than two markers on a continuum that we might trace from the explicit, 
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complete, consistent, formal theory on the one hand, to the functioning 
of the amoeba, or of a much simpler entity such as the machine of Fogel 
& others (2.7.2), on the other. Einstein's reflective capacities, his 
ability to 'face' his hypotheses, are due to - and demand -a structure 
of a kind such as we have represented in figure 8.2.3, and shown to 
embody certain minimal necessary requirements for authorship. 
SECTION 3W AND EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES 
9.3.0 Apart from these questions of principle are practical questions we have 
already mentioned concerning the heuristic value of objectifying a theory 
Objec- and the reasons why what is written down is somehow more objective than 
tivity' s 
value and what is simply said or thought. In part the practical advantages of 
user's 
struc- objectifyixg knowledge concern the peculiarities of the working of the 
ture 
human mac. iinery and therefore fall broadly within the domain of psychology. 
To a large extent these advantages are the rewards that Des: artes looked 
for in his 'method': 
ý... never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly 
know to be such; ... to divide each of the difficulties under 
examination into as manyparts as possible, and as might be 
necessary for its adequate solution. ... to conduct my thoughts in such an order that, by commencing with objects the simplest 
and easiest to know, I might ascend little by little, and, as it 
were, step by step, to the knowledge of the more complex; ... in every case to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so 
neral, that I might be assured that nothing was omitted. ' Descartes, 
1949, p. 16) 
A procedure that satisfied these rules might provide an adequate starting 
formulation for a definition of a formal system. But, as we noted (9.1.1), 
nothing in principle demands that we literally say out loud or write down 
what we wish to objectify, nor a fortiori that some non-human entity do so. 
All that is needed is for the entity in question to have a structure of 
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of the kind suggested in 8.2.3, namely one that allows the separation of 
two distinct functions, those respectively of producer and observer of what 
is produced. But notice that it is more than a quirk of the machinery of 
the human mind or psychology that the observer's function is facilitated 
by the heuristic aid of paper and pencil. Rather the reason is inherent 
in the structure of any entity that utilizes a model of its surrounding. 
For A's model E* of its environment E shares with E only such features as 
A may need it to. Isomorphism between E* and E would be impossible, if 
only because of the huge differences in the varieties of the domains in 
which the two structures occur. In effect E* corresponds to some 'aspect' 
of E that has relevance for A. On this account lacking E's constraints, 
E* may be manipulated by A in ways that E may not, with each manipulation 
altering E*ts structure and thereby degrading its correspondence to E. 
Given A's capacities, the use of paper and pencil combined with a method 
of the kind outlined by Descartes, opens the way to developing an effec- 
tive procelure. Because of the structure of the entity that will use it, 
such a procedure may be taken to fulfil the necessary and sufficient 
requirements for objectivity, and not merely to act as an aid towards 
attaining it. 
9.3.1 An effective procedure is explicit at each step. This is the criterion 
of its effectiveness. But it is objective, in Popper's sense, only for 
an observer able to compare it with something else. Step by step the- 
Objec- inputs and outputs of a machine do not even tell 0 whether or not the 
vitity 
and machine is determinated To find this out, 0 must be able to remember 
effec- 
tiveness inputs and outputs as they occur to build up a model, which he may then 
test. If 0 is able to use the machine's procedure to objectify knowledge 
he has, he will have to do so in this overall rather than any step-by-step 
senbeo Thus a given Turing machine's output is fully determined by the 
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machine's characteristics and its starting tape, though the machine has 
no objective knowledge of either. Like Popper's amoeba, its actions 
are part of it. But the machine's. observer does have objective knowledge, 
because he can compare the Turing machine and its starting tape-with its - 
output. It follows from this that no essential difference distinguishes 
the knowledge of the Turing machine that its programmer has from the know- 
ledge that the 0 has who understands its operation. Both need-to know 
the machine's overall behaviour. Von Foerster (1972) observes that the 
scientific method 'rests on two fundamental pillars. ' These are (1) the 
'principle of the conservation of rules' according to which rules observed 
in the past shall apply to the future; and (2) the 'principle of necessary 
and sufficient cause', which requires that 'almost everything in the 
universe shall be irrelevant'. Of interest here is that 'relevance 
is a triadic relation', (p. 86) which relates two sets of properties and 
the mind of whomever wishes to establish the relation; in our present 
terms for instance, the set of properties represented by the Turing 
machine's- starting tape, that represented by its end tape and the 0 or 
programmer of the machine. In the terms of chapter 2, the observer 
must acquire the order that the machine's program represents, so-that 
it can 'understand' the machine, while the programmer must have this order 
in advance. 
9.3.2 " In general an effective procedure need not in principle be sequential, 
though in practice the human observer will probably require any parallel Evidence 
for effec-process to be reduced to a sequential process in order to be able to tiveness 
deter- check it step by step for effectiveness; that is to check its deter- 
mines 
degree of min, cy and to be sure that at every step a procedure exists for deciding 
objec- 
tivity what the next step must be. This practical requirement is no more than 
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an heuristic, offering benefits of the same kind as saying what we think. 
But suppose a parallel process were reduced to sequential form by means of 
an effective procedure, checked for effectiveness and then restored to its 
parallel form by another effective procedure; or suppose more simply 
that a sequential effective procedure were operated too quickly to allow 
for step by step checking of its operation by an observer, then no obser- 
ver could have objective knowledge of the process-in-operation, although 
this would in no way alter the way the operation occurred. Clearly if 
an observer 01 had checked that a procedure P was effective, an observer 
02, who had been unable to check it, might, merely seeing it in operation, 
- comparing input with output say - suppose it to be quite haphazard, that 
is suppose he was witnessing a non-determinate process. Even 01 would 
have no way of being sure that P operated in the same way when it was 
running at high and at low (checkable) speed, although in the former case 
he might devise tests to provide evidence about the way it was operating. 
Thus, though an effective procedure may operate without being observed, 
if it is to p: ovide 0 with objective knowledge, 0 must be satisfied that 
it is effective. The degree of 0's satisfaction w1. ll be determined by 
the extent or weightiness of the evidence to this effect he is able to 
assemble, and may be taken to correspond to the degree of objectivity of 
0Is knowledge. In the limiting case 0 will have to be able to check 
the procedura at every step, and in doing this he may be aided, if he is 
human, by recording his findings by means of paper and pencil. The pro- 
cedure has no value as objective knowledge, except to an 0 who has satis- 
fied himself of its effectiveness by checking it. 
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SECTION 4 UNCONSCIODS PROCESSES 
9.4.0 Our argument so far implies that objective knowledge is a property of some 
particular 0 who is an observer by virtue of being distinguishable from 
the knowledge: he can write down the knowledge as a formal theory ex- 
Uncon- pressed as an effective procedure-for example, and is thereby enabled to 
scious 
conjec- 'face' it. in a 'consciously critical' way. But this image may be mis- 
ture 
leading. For if, instead of picturing Einstein seated at his desk with 
a pencil in his hand, writing on a page already partially covered with 
signs, we imagine successively a tennis player practising his forearm, 
a pianist his scales, a child learning to walk, an earthworm making an 
appropriate turn in a T-maze,. the notion of an 0 facing his theory grows 
steadily weaker. The tennis player may make 'conscious' corrections to 
his strokes, telling himself to stiffen his wrist or follow through and, 
if his shots improve, this may be partly due to his conscious analysis. 
But part at least of any improvement is likely to be due simply to 
'practice' the word psychologists use to describe situations in which 
typically numbers of repetitions of some action lead to a gradual 'improve- 
ment', usually some kind of assymptotic approach to a performance goal - 
activity resembling the amoeba's more than Einstein's. Traditionally 
psychology has viewed such 'practice effects' as the result of gradual 
strengthening of those components of action that mediate closer approach 
to. the goal, and weakening of those components with the reverse effect. 
But even without adopting this traditional view, we shall still find that 
we are left with processes, similar to the consciously critical ones 
Einstein uses, only 'unconscious'. For instance Minsky & Papert (1972) 
take the view that 'The external appearance of slow improvement ... is 
an illusion due to our lack of discernment. Eben practising scales, we 
would conjecture, involves distinct changes in ones strategies or plans 
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for linking the many motor acts to already existing sequential process- 
schema in different ways, or altering the internal structures of those 
schemas. 'Improvement' results from 'definite ... moments of conscious 
or unconscious analysis' that will include conjectures and 'structural 
experiments'. 'Thoughtless' trials are essentially wasted. The 
authors compare the process to debugging a computer program . 'It is not 
a matter of strengthening components already weakly present so much as pro- 
posing and testing new ones. ' (Paragraph 4.3) If this is true of prac- 
tising scales, it is presumably as true of the child learning to walk, 
with the possible difference that the child may turn more to unconscious 
analysis than the musician, though on the face of it there appears no 
obvious reason even for this. For the scientists who Popper says advances 
his theory-by series of conjectures or guesses, and refutations, it seems 
likely that the refutations may result from his 'consciously critical' 
attitude, but that the conjectures are more likely to arise, at least in 
part, 'intuitively', due to unconscious processes, however deeply these 
" may be embedded in the appropriate structures that are part of the existing 
apparatus at the command of the scientist's thinking. 
9.4.1 But it is for being 'criticizable' that Popper commends objective know- 
ledge. Its objectivity is what facilitates the consciously critical 
method of one who seeks to 'kill' his theories. Refutation is what 
objectivity permits. But it appears that even refutations may come about 
through 'unconscious' processes. The child that improves its walking - 
even if it does so in the way Minsky &*Papert suggest, thoughtfully - is 
probably satisfied with the improvement until new inadequacies appear by. 
chance. The scientist on the other hand who improves his theory, sets 
out-to find its inadequacies by design. But even this difference is not 
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as sharp as the way we state it may make it seem. For on the one hand 
the child learning to walk will probably go in for at least some, more 
or less conscious experimentation, in which it tries out 'ideas' (conjec- 
tures) for new techniques in new situations; and, on the other, the 
scientist is often likely to miss obstacles to his theory until he stubs 
his toe against them. Furthermore the conscious criticism that the 
scientist directs at his guesses is itself very likely to rely to some 
extent on guesses. 
9.5.0 Criticizing need not be conscious, and 'unconscious' criticism does not 
call for objectified knowledge. The foregoing argument suggests that 
Popper's assertion (9.1.1) should be understood to mean that only objec- 
Higher tive knowledge is consciously criticizable. This interpretation neither 
and 
lower appears nor aims to violate the spirit of Popper's view, which we might 
objec- 
tivity paraphrase as a recommendation that knowledge should be put where it can 
be got at. Objectivity confers the practical advantage of fixing ideas 
so that they may be tested - 'What you put down stays there'* - which as 
we showed (9.3.0) is a facility indispensible to any entity capable of 
objectifying what it knows. Our object has been to show that, despite 
its advantages, objectivity should not be supposed the only way through 
which knowleüge may be advanced. Conscious criticism demands objectivity, 
but unconscious criticism is also possible, and does not. It is to avoid 
such confusion that Pask (1975) introduces a stratified object language 
into the theoretical structure of his conversational and tutorial models. 
Thus instruction may occur by means of the higher level, tutorial lan- 
guage - English - called the L1 language or by means of a lower level 
language L°, which is a performance or 'task' language. The strat- 
Remark made by David Hockney, during an interview on Omnibus, BBC Television, 
8 Nay 1975" 
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ification offers an escape from the need for undesirable concepts, like 
notions of unconscious processes, to explain practice effects. This then 
permits the assumption that the objectivity of performance - at tennis 
say - is no less, for those processes governing it, than the objectivity 
of a theory for the process that produces it. Essential to both kinds 
of process is a structure that permits the process's controller to 
separate itself in the marmer depicted in figure 8.2.3, from the models - 
of the world and itself - that it utilizes for producing the Ws that rep- 
resent its 'knowledge'. Our interpretation of Popper's assertion to 
mean that objective knowledge should be consciously criticizable implies, 
in these terms, a preference for the higher level object language. But 
such a preference must be based, not on any claim for the greater objec- 
tivity of the higher level language compared to the lower, but to its 
wider applicability, which greatly enhances its capacity for represen- 
ting order. Thus We that are tennis strokes will not easily connect 
with Ws that are piano-playing techniques, as long as both Ws exist at 
a performance level only; whereas a higher level representation may 
reveal connections (2.3.0) between them. Among the concerns of the 
following chapter will be the question of the language level of WOAs. 
ýk 
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CHAPTER 10 
SECTION 0 SUBJECTS AND GOALS IN ART AND SCIENCE 
10.0.0 Chapter 9 explored some of the general properties of W, especially in regard 
to their possible usefulness to A. Here we look for descriptive dimensions 
such as will allow us to distinguish Ws of different kinds. We argue that 
Reproduc- art's distinguishing characteristic is that its We are intentionally closely 
tion of 
experience linked to experience, in contrast particularly to science, whose Ws are made 
deliberately to avoid such connections. Experience is individual, particular, 
unrepeatable and untranslatable. It is not merely what is called 'cerebral' 
but invokes the world of the senses and the emotions. The language of exper- 
ience is a performance language (9.5.0). Art is its simulation. Chapter 0 
cited views that assigned art the status of a kind of second best to science. 
Apart from Medawar's view of art's failure to conform to empirical reality 
(0.1.2), there was Von Mises's explicit contention that art belonged to 
'areas of life not sufficiently explored by science' (0.1.3.2) which George 
(1970) echoes, assigning art 'prescisely the role that science is now taking 
over' (p. 145). Here we contend that the goals of art and science - the sub- 
ject matters or, more properly, what each comes to convey of the same subject 
matter - cluster at the extremes of the continuum that joins respectively the 
concrete . und particular at one end to the abstract and general at the other, 
with less easily-classified works occupying the space between. This - as we 
shall see in the following chapter - dictates to art and science different 
modes of approach to their common subject matter. Here is the origin of much 
confusion and often contradiction in the views and attitudes about these two 
realms. For on the one hand, from the point of view of subject matter,, es- 
pecially with the development of psychology and the social sciences, it has 
become increasingly difficult to deny science and art common interests; while 
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on the other, seen from the outlook of methodology, science and art have 
appeared - literally correctly in our terms - poles apart. Art's concern is 
experience, not its analysis but its reproduction. If play and exploration 
are the route to performance concepts in a performance language, art is their 
objectification and extension. 
10.0.1 The chapter takes the problem of Iindividuation' as its starting point, using 
a formulation of the problem, due to Russell (1948), that depends upon the 
concept of 'compresence'. This formulation is interpreted in terms of a 
A formula- machine with input, which is then used to define experience. Experience is 
tion of 
experience shown to be particular and subjective. The formulation permits some comments 
on objectivity and subjectivity. Problems of derivation and the description 
of experiences are considered with a view to arriving at a notion of the di- 
mensions of the concept experience. There is discussion of the characteris- 
tics of moaelled experience. The chapter ends by characterizing art in terms 
of the reproduction of experience. 
SECTION 1 CONPRESENCE 
10.1.0 We shall base our definition of experience on a formulation that Russell uses 
in dealing with the problem of 'particulars'. Russell's formulation depends 
upon a notion that he calls 'compresence'. 
Individua- 'There is a relation, which I call "compresence", which holds between two 
tion or more qualities when one person experiences them simultaneously - for 
example, between high C and vermilion when you hear one and see the other., 
We can form groups of qualities into single complex wholes, each of which has 
the two properties that '(a) given anything not a member pf the group, there 
is at least one member of the group with which it is not compresent. ' Giving 
its constituents defines such a complex whole but it is itself 'a unit not a 
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10.1.1 
class'. Its existence derives, not from its constituents' existence, but 
from their compresent existence in a single structure. When such a structure 
comprises 'mental constituents', Russell calls it a 'total momentary exper- 
ience'. (p. 315)+ The items of the complex may themselves occur frequently an 
I 
fare not essentially dated' (p. 312), while the complexes, consisting as they 
do of mashy components that depend upon the spatio-temporal position of an ob- 
server, are empirically highly likely to be spatio-temporally unique and 
fore time-ordered, in the sense of being non-recurrent, though repetition of a1 
complete complex of compresence cannot be excluded on purely logical grounds. 
Notice though that, although a 'total momentary experience' is almost certainlyj 
unique, nevertheless we may know and name a complete complex of compresence 
without having to know all its constituent qualities, in the sense that we may 11 
Symbols know - identify -a man by those of his qualities his passport enumerates, 
without the need to scow anything else about him. Moles callc such identify- 
ing qualities 'symbols$. A complex signal E, consisting of the set of 'simul- I 
taneous' elements {Ei}, ti t separately create 'elementary perceptions' {Pi} 
acquires a 'mnemonic symbolization' when some 'well-chosen' element of E is 
sufficient to provoke the set P of elementary perceptions. Moles calls the 
well-chosen element the 'symbol of the set 
EEi' (p. 98). (cf. the observa- 
tions of Bruner et al, 6.1.1). 
*10.1.2 In the physical world a 'complex of compresence' is constructed on the same 
principles as those employed in dealing with momentary experiences, merely by 
supposing an absence of percipients. Events may be defined in terms of 'in- 
Events complete' complexes, where an incomplete complex receives a topological de- 
+ In reality a 'moment' has finite duration. - Empirically, with humans for instance, there 
is a lower limit to the time intervals between which human subjects can discriminates the. 
" length of time for which a musical tone is sounded for example. Moles calls this time 'the length of the present' (p. 15). ,. 
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finition in terms of a region of space-time. Thus an incomplete complex 
occupies a continuous region in space-time, if a continuous route, consisting 1 
entirely of points of the region of which the complex is part, connects any 
2 space-time points of the complex. 'Such a complex may be called an "event". 
It has the property of non-recurrence but not that of occupying only one 
space-time point. ' (p. 322) 
10.1.3 The distinction between a unit and a class parallels the distinction between 
a quality and an 'instance' of a quality. The latter 'is a complex of com- 
present qualities of which the quality in question is one' (p. 3.6). Clearly 
Time order there can be any number of different instances of the same quality. But 
notice that instances of qualities are time-ordered, though the qualities 
themselves are not. Indeed it is wrong to speak of two occurrences of the 
same quality, since, being the same, they are indistinguishable and can there- 
fore only be counted as one. 'When the same shade of colour exists in two 
places at once, it is one, not two' (p. 316). The distinguishing characteristic 
of a ccmplex of compresence depends upon its separability from other complexes; 
and in particular on its time-orderedness. Statements about purely logical 
structures such as classes, reduce to statements about their components, which 
is not possible in the case of time order. 
SECTION 2 STATE DESCRIPTIONS 
10.2.0 We may interpret Russenre formulation in terms of state descriptions. Suppose 
we take a complete complex of compresence to correspond to the state descrip- 
tion of a system at a given instant. Such a state description might be repre- 
Compresenc- sented as a vector whose elements represented the 'qualities' compresent in 
es and 
states , he particular complex. A comrresence composed of 'mental constituents', is 
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10.2.1 
Vectors 
termed by Russell a 'total momentary experience'. Such an 'experience' 
might be represented in the same way as any other complex of compresence. 
Russell indicates that a mental compresence is to be regarded as the result 
of a physical one. A mental compresence occurs in a 'percipient' who may 
be 'aware' or not of certain 'qualities', like redness for example, which 
are constituents of a physical complex. In our terms we might picture two 
systems, or more precisely a single system partitioned into two sub-systems, 
representing respectively the percipient and his world. Inter-connections 
between these two sub-systems permit the percipient to receive inputs from 
his world, which depend on the world's state. In this way the percipient's 
states come to correspond to correlative states of the world, and these states 
of the percipient's are called his experience. The states will themselves de- 
pend upon the internal state of the percipient at the time of receiving them 
as inputs. But this raises no difficulty because the percipient's internal 
mental states are simply correlates of his. physical state, which is to say, 
included in the state description of the total system. The percipient's 
mental states depend upon his 'awareness', which in turn is related to the 
inter-connections between the sub-systems that the percipient and his world 
represent. For this reason 'We can never know that a given complex of com- 
presence is complete, since there may always be something else, of which we 
are not aware, which is compresent with every part of the given complex. ' 
(Russell, p. 232) (cf. the views of Popper and Lofgren, cited 2.3.1; also 
Pask & Scott (1973), who identify mental states with the Cartesian product 
of inputs and outputs of the entity in which the states subsists). 
More formally, if the percipient has internal states S, and input states I, 
then the produce state, Ix2, will be mapped into S under some mapping f 
say, that depends upon the percipient's characteristics, what Ashby (1962) 
calls the 'dynamic drive of the system'. The mapping will correspond to the 
percipient's experience of I. In this formulation, the state description of 
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I may be taken to be the physical complex of compresence and that of S its 
? mental constituents'. Referring this formulation back to Russell's, we 
notice that if we remove the state description of S, we still are left with 
the state description of I. Presumably in the absence of a percipient, the 
physical complex of compresence would consist of the state description of I 
alone; and conversely, that the percipient's experience at a given instant 
is defined by the state description at that instant of S alone, irrespective 
of I. + Events are definable in these terms as groups of transformations of 
vectors, and the experience of an event, consonantly with this definition and 
the definition of experience. The order of the vectors that occur will be 
finite, though high enough to make their recurrence exceedingly unlikely, 
thereby satisfying the requirement of particularity. In nearly all cases of 
experience, most of the variables that define a space-time point-instant will 
be unknown; and in practice a tiny proportion of the variables of a given 
vector will often be sufficient to distinguish the vector uniquely (in a non- 
recurring) way. (of. MMoles's formulation, 10.1.1) The 'qualities' of Rasselllj' 
formulation are to be associated with the values of the individual variables 
that comprise the vectors. 
SECTIOI 3 EKPERIENCE 
10.3.0 The-concept of compresence and our interpretation of it should not lead us 
to visualize a dichotomy, consisting of 'particulars' on one side and 'purely 
logical structures' on the other, no more in the world of experience than in 
the physical world. Complexes of compresence are not necessarily complete. 
Events are examples of incomplete complexes of a special kind, and. as we ob- 
served in 10.2.0, we can never know whether a complex is complete because we 
+ Notice that this accords with common usage that attributes experience to inaminate 
systems so that one may make statements for example about 'the world's experience to 
men'. 
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10.3.1 
Pärticul- 
arity and 
subject- 
ivity 
may be unaware of part of it. We may therefore regard particulars and 
classes as the extremes of a continuum, whose intervening space is inhabited 
by the events and other incomplete complexes of varying particularity. The 
more incomplete a complex, the less its particularity and thus the greater 
the empirical likelihood of its recurrence (where by recurrence of a complex 
we understand that, if given a complex and its recurrence we should be unable 
to say which had occurred at an earlier and which a later date). Correspond- 
ing to this view, we visualize a lcontinuumf of vectors defining states that 
vary in generality roughly inversely with the order of the vector, from the 
completely general single variable at one extreme-to the high order vector 
with all its variables defined and known at the other. 
The greater the degree of particularity, in the sense in which we have been 
using the term, the more subjective the experience of it. The space-time 
point-instant is the total momentary experience of a single observer at a 
single instant. Conversely the experience of a quality, such as redness say, 
is not subjective or private, but may be experienced by any number of observers 
Only instances of qualities are subjectivs, that is qualities taken as com- 
ponents of complexes of compresence. Extending this argument, it follows that 
there will be degrees of subjectivity, which will vary in proportion to the 
size of the complexes of compresence, or the order of the vectors by which 
they are represented. In general experiences will be complexes sufficiently 
large to make the same experience for two observers highly unlikely. Thus we 
should say that almost all experience is necessarily wholly subjective, in 
the sense of being unique to a particular system. While conversely, 'exper- 
ience' that can be shared by any number of observers -a quality say - is 
wholly objective. Notice that this formulation clarifies one of the diffi- 
culties of objective knowledge that was encountered in the previous chapter, 
namely that objective knowledge was likely to have a subýectIve and non- 
explicit content. This difficulty results from a failure to distinguish fully 
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the difference between a quality and the instance of it, which is what is 
experienced. It is the problem of the observer that we shall meet in the 
following section. And we have come. across it before under the heading 'know- 
ledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description'. We recall a quotation 
from Russell cited 1.3.0 ' ... everything except myself is ... only'known to 
me by description, not by acquaintance. And the description has to be in 
terms of my own experience', which is the conclusion to which our present 
argument also has led'us. The ability to distinguish qualities at all from 
instances owes to the power to abstract, as psychologists sometimes call it. 
In our terms we may think of abstractions as logical relations between com- 
plexes of compresence that define instances of the same quality. Thus the 
join of a number of instances of red may contain only the single element red, 
which we should call the abstracted quality, redness. 
10.3.2 As we have defined the experience of an individual as his internal state at 
a given instant, it follows that it will be impossible for him ever to com- 
pare directly'his own experiences one with another, or with the experiences 
Similar ex- of another individual. Such comparisons would require changes in his state 
periences 
{ 
that would obliterate the experience he wished to compare. Yet similari- 
ties do occur between experiences. The comparison of two experiences is it- 
self an experience that is different from either of the experiences being 
compared. Apparent similarities between experiences are in reality similari- 
ties between some kind of representation of them. Thus for example two ex- 
periences, each represented by a vector, could be compared in this represented 
form, by comparing the vectors by means of some form of mapping of one onto 
the other. If the vectors were both of a high order, the likelihood of dis- 
covering some kind-of morphism or 'fuzzy' (7.2.3 similarity between them 
would presumably be lower than if they were of lower order. So the fact that 
similarities between the representations of experience do occur suggests that 
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the representations used are of a simplified kind and possibly acquire a 
degree of uniformity from the way they are arrived at. Thus for two appar- 
ently similar experiences, the individual values of the elements of their 
constituent internal states - the values of the individual elements of the 
vectors defining the experiences - may be 'fuzzily' equal or homomorphic, 
because both occur as the result of similar physical complexes. A visual 
scene viewed by two observers for instance would furnish experiences to each 
that shared numbers of identical components as well as numbers that differed 
by a negligible or unimportant - in the context - amount. Or apparent simi- 
larities might be due to the effects of the internal states of the individuals 
or systems concerned in determining the experiences compared. For, as we have 
mentioned, 'it is not the experiences that are compared but descriptions of 
them. 
SECTION 4 THE DESCRIPTION OF IE2TCE 
10.4.0 Dewey 1,1534) distinguishes between experience and an experienc, 'with its 
own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency' (p. 35). The concevt 'exper- 
ienceI derives from descriptions of experience, of which it is itself a de- 
Experience scripticn. The definitions we have suggested give an indication as to how 
and obser- 
vation descriptions of experience might come about. In humans this is a matter 
for psychology, though broader, more abstract questions concerning descrip- 
tion are, as we saw in Part I, of wide generality. To describe his experience 
an individual must observe it. Now, by definition, experience is subjective. 
Observation by contrast is not, at least in the same degree. For although an 
observer registers an observation as a change in his internal state brought 
about by that he observes, it is not the observer's internal state itself, but 
i 
ý' what it refers to, the state of the observed system, that is of interest. And 
the observer normally adopts expedients to minimize the effects of his own 
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internal states and maximize those of the system he is observing. In the 
case of experience on the other hand it is the internal state of the system 
having the experience that is of primary interest, with any system to whose 
state it refers of secondary importance only. 
10.4.1 Ignoring for the moment difficulties of comparing the internal states of 
different systems, the above arguments will allow certain observations on 
subjectivity. In particular earlier discussions about perceptrons and pro- 
Representa- cedures such as those of Guzman (6.1), Winston (6.2), and Winograd(6.3) have 
tion of ex- 
perience indicated some of the kinds of processing that the data of a complex may 
undergo. Perceptrons for example weight the 'evidence' supplied as the data 
of their inputs by the components of a complex, and arrive at a decision - 
expressed by 'naming' the complex - on the basis of this weighted evidence. 
Guzman's and Winston's procedures also utilize input data as evidence to 
which varying weights attach. Their procedures operate on already-structured 
data. They depend upon complexes consisting of relatively small numbers of 
components, with the 'other', in this case purely notional components - such 
as those that would accompany a human exierience of Guzman's or Winston's 
blocks, for example - assigned a zero weighting by the outside agency of the 
designer of the procedure. 
+ Obviously the effect of such weighting of evidence 
will be to emphasize some - in effect a few - of the components of a complox 
while, usually greatly, reducing the importance of the rest. Clearly such 
compression of the complexes that make up experiences increases the likeli- 
hood of apparent identities between experiences, far beyond what we should 
expect from unprocessed data. 
+ As we noted earlier (6.2) this, as well as the descriptions with which the procedures 
are provided., represent the greatest part of the order-extraction work associated with 
the success of these procedures. It is precisely the extent of this work that defeats 
the perceptron required to build up its own weights from a starting position in which 
every component of its 'experience' has equal weight. (And notice even here that a per- 
ceptron's experience rests on only a tiny fraction of the number of components that make 
up the experience of the experimenter say). We may thereforo regard the experiences that 
such procedures represent, as having been drastically attenuated, by an amount propor- tional, we should say. to the order-extraction wnxk of the des e_ of the procedure, compared to the total amount of order-extraction work that the procedure performs. 
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10.4.2 Clearly Russell's formulation was never intended as a practical guide for 
the observer, to show. him how he might describe the abstract concept of ex- 
perience - rather than individual experiences, from which the concept initia-. 
Character- lly derives - so as to capture its quality in a way he might find 
izing the 
concept of intuitively familiar. But we should not take procedures such as Guzman's too 
experience 
literally either as providing descriptive models. A virtue of'Russell's 
argument is that it emphasizes the transitory nature of experience, while in 
procedures such as Winston's or Winograd's, or more especially procedures 
such as those used by perceptrons, experience tends to become associated with 
fixed descriptions. What is lost in such fixed, 'ended-off' processes is pre- 
cisely the quality of on-goingness or changefulness and, associated wi". h it, 
what is described by words like subtlety and nuance, which, to our intuitive 
conceptions, characterize the very fibre of exper'snce. It is mistaken to 
suppose that, simply because 'awareness' encompasses only a tiny fraction of 
the components to which it has access it follows that experience, stripped 
of these 'unimportant' components, would necessarily retain the quality of 
the notion of experience familiar to us, remain recognizably the sale thing 
that the word 'experience' commonly denotes. What it would be like to exper- 
ience the stripped world of Winograd's 'robot' is literally inconceivable to 
the human mind. Moreover awareness is not dichotomous, it varies in degrees. 
Changes in components of a complex of compresence that were not part of aware- 
ness may make them part of it. It is the case too that an experience can 
exist at varying 'levels' of completeness - number of components of a complex 
of compresence in awareness - and in a way which may make it seem that the 
levels represented separate experiences, following one another perhaps in 
rapidly changing sequence. For instance the experience an-individual des- 
cribes, the one he uses as the basis for some deduction, the one to which he 
gives a name and the one that reminds him of some other experience, may all 
consist of components due to the same physical complex, though each repre- 
sented in experience in different combinations and strengths. It is by no 
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means obvious what descriptions one might use to characterize the concept 
of experience in a way. that would make it as recognizable as the lines and 
vertices used by Guzman's SEE programme make the shapes of its world. The 
more so because experience is ever-present and on-going: to be aware or 
conscious is to be experiencing; to cease experiencing is to be unconscious, 
unaware. 
10.4.3 Compresence appears able to furnish the attributes that a description of ex- 
perience requires. The concept captures at once the qualities both of sim- 
ultaneity and time-orderedness, which introspective awareness distinguishes 
Compresence as characteristics of the abstraction 'experience'. And it is also able to de- 
and the 
character- scribe other characteristics of experience. Thus the experience that the 
istics of 
experience observer may describe or the experience that has some utility for him beyond 
itself and which he therefore strips of what, for his purpose at the time, 
are its inessential . omponents, has less the characterizing qualities of ex- 
perience than the fuller experience from which these derive. And progress- 
ively the more 'inessential' components that are discarded, the less the 
residual ones are able to embody these characterizing qualities. Yet the 
concept of compresence is quite as able to interpret these qualities as it 
is the more subjective, particular ones. That the irrevocably subjective 
character of experience as it is present to subjective intuition, as well 
as the non-subjective nature of abstractions, such as qualities arid logical 
constructions, is captured by the single notion, compresence, and that more- 
over we can formulate the notion in terms of vectors and their products, 
familiar to cybernetics, appears a sufficient justification for adopting it 
as a basis for interpreting experience. 
0 
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SECTION 5 ART 
10.5.0 Chapter 2 interpreted the Ws that A produces in terms of order: as the out- 
come of order-extraction work. A's goals have the force of procedures whose 
execution reproduces order extracted in the form of Ws. Chapter 8 showed 
Character- the necessity of having Ws of one kind or another for the operation of any 
ization 
of art interesting control procedure: the Ws furnish such procedures with the ob- 
jective models of the world that the procedures require for predicting the 
world's behaviour. Chapter 9 noted the heuristic value for the extension of 
order extraction of being able to 'face' aW in the consciously critical way 
called for by the need to eliminate errors. The foregoing section of this 
chapter showed that, while experience is wholly subjective, descriptions of 
it are possible and permit objective operations with subjective experience 
as a basis. Without the possibility all objective knowledge or even comm- 
unication could be impossible (of. Russells observations on 'egocentric part- 
iculars' (1.3.0)). These descriptions are normally operated upon in a trimmed 
and generally more tractable form than the one that might portray the actual 
experiences that they describe. We showed how trimming was achieved, by re- 
ducing the characteristically high order vector by which we might describe 
the internal state constituting an experience of a given individual, to a 
vector or vectors of lower order, either closed within the same set of ele- 
ments or homomorphic to them. It was suggested that these reduced homomorphs 
of experience steadily lost those qualities by which we should normally 
characterize them as experiences, becoming, as the order of the vectors repre- 
senting them diminished, increasingly disembodied and abstract. We noted too 
that while experience was necessarily subjective, we might picture a 'conti- 
nuum', with subjective experiences at one extreme, non-subjective 
+ abstrac- 
tions at the other, and 'events' of varying degrees of abstraction somewhere 
+ In view of the problems associated with the notion of objectivity (10.;. 2. et sec. ), 
we prefer to avoid the term here and to uze 'non-subjective' instead to den to what is 
not purely private, but enjoys public, shareable characteristics. 
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between. We shall define as WOAs those Ws concerned with experiences, as 
we have chaxacterized them (10.3). 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE METHOD OF ART- 
SECTION 0 SYNTHESIS AND SIMULATION 
11.0.0 The previous chapter argued that the objectives of art and science differed. 
It was shown that while art aimed at'producing We that were particular and 
therefore needed to be in some measure self-sufficient, science aimed at 
Art's aim general Ws based on previous non-evident structure. Here we contend that 
determines 
method this difference of aim dictates a difference of method which, more than 
differences of explicitness or objectivity or conformity to empirical reality 
distinguishes and characterizes art and the artistic content of Ws generally. 
The difference between art and science is broadly that between simulation 
and s+vthesis. The ontological status of WOAs is analagous to that of a sim- 
ulation program for a computer. Ws that are scientific theories axe the 
occasions for synthesis. This view appears to furnish a basis for a resolu- 
tion of the conflict between art or science. Theoretically at any rate noth- 
ing can prevent science's taking over art's function, insofar as this is to 
provide Ws that constitute objective knowledge. On the other hand, nothing 
can take the place for 0 of the experience that a WOA affords. The success 
of a given synthesis or simulation represents a W's merit, which is variable, 
whichever way the particular W inclines. This chapter completes the answer 
to the problem we set ourselves initially, to determine the principles of 
an art machine. Part I showed what kind of machine would be needed. Thus 
fax Part II has shown what the machine will have to be able to do. The argu- 
ment here yields a number of conclusions which, though they follow from the 
arguments that have led to this point, represent, in some respects, a more 
speculative departure than any others so far. 
176. 
11.0.1 This chapter begins with a view of art as a model, of a model, capable of 
answering questions of a general. nature about experience. It discusses the 
differences between models of reality and of experiences of it, and diffi- 
Real and culties arising from the relatively greater variety of the real world than 
surrogate 
experience A. This leads to discussion of surrogate experience and the means of supple- 
menting A's variety to facilitate its producing such surrogates. It appears 
that art produces surrogate experience by a mixture of simulation and syn- 
thesis. Differences between real and surrogate experience are discussed. 
Finally the chapter examines the ways in which A may approach producing . 
surrogate experience. It emerges that WOAs have a dual existence, as sur- 
rogate and real experiences, and that each furnishes A with a language con- 
sisting of the same words but with different meanings. The chapter ends 
with a discussion of aesthetics. 
SECTION 1 REPRODUCING EXPERIENCE 
11.1.0 So far, in discussing W we have concentrated on the minimum requirements for 
a procedure that would produce W (c-authorship), the sort of structure the 
procedure would need and the relation of tho procedure to the W it produced. 
Art's Only at the end of Part I did we show explicitly how W might stand as a 
function 
model of A's world or part of it, and we left for chapter 9 touching on some 
of the brjader advantages (objectivity) of such models for advancing under- 
standing of what is modelled. The reason for following this course has been, 
as we have previously observed, to avoid restricting unnecessarily the gen- 
erality of the conclusions reached. Thus we have narrowed the area of spec- 
ulation only where necessary. Recapitulating, we picture W as some kind of 
observable (to a properly constituted observer) object or set of objects, 
distinguishably (physically) separable from A and modelling some part of A 
177. 
which may include some part of the 'model' A has of the world. By 'model' 
we understand a broad notion, like the one Minsky (1965) describes. 'To 
an observer B an object A* is a model of an object A to the extent that B 
can use A* to answer questions that interest him about A' (p. 47). In our 
terms W* is A's 'internal'-model, which W is supposed to represent. Thus 
W is a model of W*, in Minsky's terms, the model, WX*, of a model. From 
0.2.2.0 we recall that such a model of a model, W-, answers questions about 
the kind of model W* is. Part II has dealt with aspects of this question in 
some detail, and has confirmed and in some respects extended Minsky's view. 
Thus the models art is able to furnish of particular experiences are the 
means by which to answer questions about the kinds of experiences they are. 
We shall devote the rest of our discussion to examining how this is accom- 
plished and finding out what we can about the kinO of procedures it requires. 
11.1.1 The difficulty of modelling experience results from our wish to model the 
experiences themselves, not simply conceptual abstractions. What kith of 
model of an experience would provide a means of answering questions about 
Models of that experience, without reference to the experience itself? (As we indi- 
reality 
and models cated (10.4.0), referring to an actual experience is ariyway impossible, as 
of ex- 
perience the 'reference' would destroy the experience. ) Such modelling is evidently 
possible; for, although experiences are by definition unique, unrepeatable 
and momentary, we can and do remember and reflect upon 'them'. Memories of 
experiences must be models of the kind we are discussing. They are not 
themselves the experiences - although they are experiences - but enable the 
recollection of the experiences, to some slight degree their re-enactment. 
Here we must notice an important distinction, namely that between the model 
of an experience and the model of what occasioned the experience, the exper- 
ience's physical, publicly-observable correlate. An example will make the 
distinction clear. A visual scene affords a visual experience to the indiv- 
idual looking at it. The ecer. e is Romethire the individual observes. His 
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internal state that results from the observation is his experience of the 
scene, but the scene itself (cf. 10.2.1) represents the state of a system 
distinct from the individual. We shall call it the original of the exper- 
ience. All a given individual can tell about the scene must come from his 
experience of it, which is to say that, for the same individual, a perfect 
model of the scene would not differ from a perfect model of his experience 
of it. In so far as the individual's models fall short of perfection, the 
purpose for which he intends them will, at least partly, determine their 
form. Thus the 'true' model of a scene and the model of an individual's 
experience of the scene are likely to differ. The best model of anything 
is one that provides answers to any question about the thing. Thus the 
best model of a physical object is an identical or fully-isomorphic object. 
Similarly the best model of an experience. Were experience exclusively of 
the physical world, then modelling experience and modelling the physical 
world would, if perfect models were the aim, present identical tasks. In 
such circumstances, art and science would be indistinguishable. But from 
the definition of experience proposed in 10.3 it appears that this is not 
the case. 
11.1.2 In (7.3.4) we cited Spencer Brown's comments concerning description and in- 
junction and suggested that descriptions referred to goals and injunctions 
to the paths that led to them. Or, as ors might put it, that descriptions 
Simula- referred to ends, injunctions to means. Accordingly it appeared that des- 
tion's 
building criptions were to be associated with heuristics, injunctions with algorithms, 
blocks 
and it was shown that the division between the two was not entirely clear 
cut. The tacit assumption that underlay the discussion referred to was that 
possible goals were relatively fewer in number than possible starting points 
from which to set out for them. In the discussion of hill-climbing for in- 
stance (4.3.1) we supposed that the climber might begin from any of an in- 
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finity of points below the summit with the same aim, to arrive at the 
single point that was the summit. Modelling experiences faces us in one 
sense with the reverse situation. The same original may occasion inumerable 
experiences of it. In the'formul. ation of 10.2.0, given an individual with 
internal states S and inputs - from the original - I, the experience will be 
represented by the mapping of IxS. into S. Even supposing S's variety were 
very much smaller than I's, as it will in any event be large, the Cartesian 
product as it stands offers no sensible limits to S. To limit the variety 
. of experiences 
that a given original may occasion, we rely upon the 'correla- 
tion' that we suppose exists between the individual and his world. That is, 
for the reproduction of what we shall'call an original experience, we suppose 
that the individual has at his disposal descriptive components corresponding 
to the components of the particular original, such that these components en- 
able the originäl in some sense to be computed from them in a manner such as 
that suggested in chapter 2. (of. e. g. Craik's assertion that 'thought models 
or parallels reality' - 2.7.2 footnote. ) These descriptive components are 
the descriptions of 2.3.0 or the descriptors of chapter 6, and thus fulfil a 
synthetic role. So that the reproduction of experience is evidently a mixed* 
synthetic-simulatory procedure. The synthetic components may be taken as 
the building blocks of the simulation procedure that we call a WOA. These 
building blocks constitute the artist's prior structure that we discussed 
in chapters 4 to 6. If 0 lacks any of the descriptive components that A 
relies upon, he will be unable to reconstruct that part of the original to 
which they refer. Such lacks will appear as lacunae in the experience that 
the WOA occasions and may distort the entire simulation. Distortions will 
also occur if 0 and A synthesize A's descriptive components differently. 
Such problems are the subject of N. 8.4. 
 1 
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SECTION 2 SURROGATE SCE 
11.2.0 Thus a WOA enjoys a dual role. It provides at once the occasion for what is 
an experience in its own right, while standing also as a surrogate for an- 
other experience for which it provides a simulation procedure. The previous 
Supple- paragraph referred to descriptive components that A uses as the building 
menting 
variety blocks of this procedure. If, ignoring possibly different hypothetical 
possibilities that are of no interest here, we suppose that A's variety is 
very much lower than Eis, we may usefully look upon the descriptions A uses 
as ways that A employs to increase it's variety. For example, among A's 
descriptors are a class often called percepts, which, following the terms 
we have been using, we might think of as the building blocks of perception. 
The vertices of Guzman's SEE program are crude examples of what is meant. 
These vertices have a real existence in the world in which the program 
operates - as observers of the program in its world we are qualified to 
say so. Thus in a sense the program exploits its world as a kind of 
memory store to supplement its own limited one. In this interpretation A's 
percepts have the force of accessing sub-routines aimed at this memory. We 
should argue in favour of this view that an important part of W's role as 
we have depicted it is simply to be an extension of this accessing facility, 
one in which A actually builds the kind of memory store'he wants in the 
physical world, rather than relying'oi what he can find there -A the cul- 
tivator, no longer simply A the hunter. Among the empirical evidence that 
might be taken to lend general support to this view of A. 's relation to and 
connectedness with its surroundings is the intuitive difference made between 
recognition and reconstruction. We may reco&mize a bird for instance from 
appropriate clues (6.1.1), as we may Imow a man by his passport (10.1.0). 
But to draw the bird with a pencil it would probably be necessary to have it 
in front of one for frequent checking of details whose absence from the mental 
picture of the bird pass unnoticod, like the blind spot passes unnoticed in 
normal vision. Instead of storing the bird in memory, a way of accessing 
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11.2.1 
Descrip- 
tors and 
reduction 
in variety 
birds is stored instead, called a description of birds. The rapid loss of 
function of subjects in sensory deprivation experiments appears to offer 
further vindication of the view advanced here. 
This view of A's use of descriptors furnishes a basis for a way of under- 
standing the operation of the descriptive components A uses in simulation 
procedures. In the formulation of 10.3 we took experience to be defined by 
a complex of compresence consisting of mental constituents, and we showed 
that 'total momentary experiences? were highly unlikely to be repeated. 
Experiences consisting simply of the raw data of some complex might trrn 
out impossible to compare at all, and therefore a fortiori impossible to 
judge as similar. The unfulfilled promise of perreptrons, as we saw in 
chapter 5, owes largely to'a too simple belief in their power to process 
such raw data, without the inter.; eseion either of local or global descriptors. 
But remarkably, experiences are comparable and similarities between them 
commonplace, as long as descriptors are available to simplify descriptions. 
Descriptors' power derives (as in 2.7 and 2.8) from the way they 'Permit 
shortening of descriptions. Or, put in terms more useful here, from the 
way they reduce descriptions' varieties. For instance to describe a grass 
lawn say by means of a numerical representation of some finite 'retinal' 
projection of it would require a variety proportional to the number of 
points on the retina, raised to higher powers according to the number of 
wave-lengths and intensities distinguished, a variety that 'lawn' reduces 
to a single word. So we reach the conclusion we have reached a number of 
times in different contexts, that without the structure, the heuristics, 
the descriptors or whatever, WOAs are impossible. And moreover, also as 
we have previously said, because 'there is no a priori unique information 
output in communications between individuals' A's audience will need to 
share most of his structure. 'The real information depends or. the common 
l howled ;e of the tr i' n itter aT, d rP. eptnr'. (Moles p. 52) 
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11.2.2 With the description A has at his disposal he can do more than simply re- 
produce experience, he. can create it. The idea of a WOA reproducing an ex- 
perience is paradoxical. For what we have called the original, which is the 
Real and occasion of the original experience, may bear little resemblance in its 
imaginery 
experience physical reality to the WOA, and. 0 may thus in a sense be thought of as hav- 
ing an experience without having it. An analogous state of affairs exists 
in physiology, which distinguishes between adequate and inadequate stimuli. 
Thus light is the adequate stimulus for the cells of the retina; pressure on 
the eyeball, when it activates them, the inadequate stimulus. We may think 
of hallucinogenic drugs or electrical stimulation of the brain as displaying 
comparable inadequate-stimulus properties, defining the domain of imaginary, 
as distinct from real - 'adequately based - experience. In cases of drin 
engendered hallucinations and even dreams, experiences may be difficult to 
describe or even retain. In support of the contention of 11.2.0 that A's 
perceptions are also a facility that permits using the physical world as a 
back-up memory, we might argue here that the difficulty of dream image re- 
tention resulted at least partly from the poor correspondence of the images 
with 'reality'. This would then lead to inadequate access (percepts) to 
the back-up memory, 'reality', with resultant difficulty of storing, leading 
to the kind of poor retention usually associated with dreams. In the case 
of other forms of hallucinatory experience - such as that reported by 
Penfield (1958) - due to direct electrical stimulation of the brain using 
micro-electrodes, what the patient experiences may be precise, explicit and 
even familiar. One is tempted to suppose what many theorists have had in 
mind, most explicitly possibly since Craik's (1949) exposition, that anyone 
knowing and able to operate the brain's equivalent of a computer's machine 
code, would have it in his power to induce in any given individual, any ex- 
perience he wished by means of an appropriate inadequate stimulus. It appears 11 
that during hallucinations the descriptions themselves may become distorted, 
in the sense that the reality they generate does not resemble the 'normal' 
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32.3.0 
The 
duality 
of WOAs 
reality of the physical world whose correlates they should be. In addition 
the constructions that axe made out of these distorted building blocks may 
themselves be bizarre. 
SECTION 3 CREATING SURROGATE ý'R CE 
A's task is to find appropriate 'inadequate' bases with which to make such 
Woks as will provide those imaginery experiences that he wishes them to occ- 
anion. Among such bases he must find the techniques he requires, whether 
they are merely the coding procedures necessary to produce the illusion of 
perspective on a flat surface, or the injunctions to bring about the simu- 
lations that will induce some particular mood or emotion. But we must qualify 
what has been said so far. The foregoing argument of this chapter has been 
put in a simplified form, as if it had been believed that 0 might be unable 
to disUngutsh an experience due to a WOA from one due to an original that 
the WOA represented. This was never supposed. It might be A's intention to 
make a WOA such as would delude 0 into believing that it were real, but this 
would not generally be the case. As we remarked at the beginning of this 
section, WOAs have a dual role, as the occasions of real experiences in their 
own right and as surrogates for other real experience due to originals that 
they represent as 'copies' - achieved as we have asserted by means of mixed 
simulatory and synthetic procedures. Both A and 0 are aware of this duality, 
which A is expected to and generally will use. Thus A's purpose may be illu- 
sion and he may achieve it with considerable success. Or he may wish the 
surrogate to provide for the detached contemplation of the real. Clearly 
W's capacity for 'fixing' in reality some more or less fluid condition of 
A's (8.3) is of particular value in WOAs that are able to apply this capacity 
to the transitory, moving aspect of experience, so that a single experience, 
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or at least an aspect of it, is available for repeated review (See N. 11.0). 
A may wish to utilize the immediate juxtaposition and alternating presence of 
the experience occasioned by a WOA and by the original of which it is a surro- 
gate. Clearly A may have any among numbers of objects. 
11.3.1 In 9.5.0 we raised the question of a stratified object language for A. The 
previous paragraph makes it clear that A commands not merely an object lance 
uage but a meta-language too, in which he may discuss such matters as the 
A's two relation of the WOA and its original. As we suggested, these meta-linguistic 
languages 
discussions may be - and often axe - themselves included as aspects of WOAs. 
We should be clear what these terms mean when applied to a WOA. Notice first 
that the language that concerns us is the one in which the WOA speaks to 0. 
Ignoring the question of a meta-language for the moment, it is clear that A 
may use a mixture of higher and lower level languages in a WOA. Because of 
the duality of the VOA, he may often, within a single statement, capture the 
force of both higher and lower levels at once. A speaks two languages at 
once, using the same words. In a sense this is the crux of artistic achieve- 
ment and the examples of it are so numerous that choosing among them is nec- 
essarily highly arbitrary. But take the instance of Michelangelo's pieta. 
Jesus's figure depicts, in a higher level language, the limp body of a young 
man recently dead. But in addition its presentation offers 0a sst of in- 
junctions in a lower level performance language that induce an experience of 
limpness, in his own body. Such an experience may often only be conveyed, 
or at any rate is usually in practice more faithfully conveyed, by such lower 
level injunctions that have the force of a simulation procedure. Injunctions 
in a higher level language, - in this case to 'be limp' - would probably 
fail to be effective, simply because 0 lacked the synthetic components nece- 
ssary to carry them out. 0 simply does not know how to 'be limp' or cannot 
acaeve limpness through his Own devices as well as he can by means of 
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empathic control of his muscles. 
+ Considerations of a similar kind apply 
no less when A's 'medium' is language itself or even, in some cases, music. 
Notice that nothing compels A to use his two languages as in this example, 
to convey sympathetic or reinforcing messages, on the contrary he is free 
to seek effects by any number of means including the languages' antitheti- 
cal use. The joint effect of A's dual messages, frequently commenting on 
one another, implies A's view of his WOA as it strikes him in his role as 0. 
In this way his stratified language provides the vehicle for his meta-lin- 
guistic comments. Here again is language stratification. A's implied state- 
ment about a WOA, which emerges from the mutual commenting that takes place 
between the two levels of his object language, is itself like a performance 
language, which induces a 'frame of mind' in 0 without explicit statement. 
In certain circumstances - chiefly in literature -A may make explicit 
-comments too.. But one would not wish to stretch this notion of a strati- 
fied meta-language too far. For the division of levels is nob clearly de- 
fined. and The notion of no obvious use here. 
11.3.2 Why make WOAs or Ws for that matter at all? A's complex purposeful structure 
ensures that the reason must form part of the overall 'teleonomic project'. 
that Monod speaks of, whose main goal is survival; ' ... it is survival that 
The WOA's is the lynch-pin of our motives ... ', 'the fundamental feature' in the mot- 
utility 
for A ivational hierarchy. (George, 1970, p. 142). In several places we have men- 
tioned W's broad utility for A, without attempting to decide whether it might 
be possible to distinguish WOAs as a sub-class of Ws, simply from knowing 
their utility to A. This chapter contends that WOAs deal with experience, 
extend experience, 'fix' it for contemplation and repetition. Paragraph 
11.3.0 observed that WOAs generally were concerned with more than simply 
mimicking 'real' experience, and paragraph 11.3.1 showed A's capacity to 
sterol back from real exnerienco and observe the relation between it and the 
+ This is not to deny that such effects might be achieved synthetically, by means of descr-" iption. Techriques such as the Method of Mattheus Alexander aim at just this. But the descriptions this Method employs are complicated and lengthy, took years to evolve, and in 
Qthe end are seen 
to depend more upon actual physical manipulation than verbal descrip- 
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experience occasioned by WOAs. This latter is clearly a necessary part of 
A's equipment. Without it no productive activity he began would ever end. 
For being trapped within an on-going experience, A's goal for producing W 
would be continuously changing, rendering its realization impossible. Among 
the advantages for A that might be associated with these and other of his 
characteristics, which he in turn imparts to his WOAs is one we mention spec- 
ifically. It is the capacity that WOAs provide for allowing A gradually to 
move from simulation to synthesis, from imagination to description. The con- 
of experience repeatedly re-provided by a WOA facilitates order templation 
extraction. It provides hindsight, which Polya among others identifies as a 
powerfial problem-solving heuristic. Understanding 
when A is able to map a description (2.3.0) onto the WOA's set of injunctions. 
As a final observation, notice that A is self-sufficient. It requires no 
observers or audience. Once it exists communication with other entities that 
may exist also is incidental. Li effect however, as a complex machine, A 
must be the product of a complex process controlled by some antecedent complex 
individual, and so on, back, and would therefore normally find itself one 
among many, with questions of audience arising naturally. Theoretically 
though, in so far as it might be possible to identify A as the end product 
of the continuous evolution of the same, single individual, it might exist 
and produce WOAs quite unaffected by the absence of an audience. 
SECTION 4 AESTHETICS 
11.4.0 It remains to say a word about aesthetics, - the appreciation and, in our 
case, also the production of beauty - though the theory of art, which has 
been our concern, and aesthetic theory, are largely separate interests. Art 
does not necessarily aim to create beauty nor is what is thought beautiful 
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Aesthetic necessarily art. Here, following the principle we have adopted from the out- 
value 
defined set, we shall examine only such aesthetic questions as might have a general 
on a 
relation application to art machines as well as human artists. That is we shall look 
for criteria that are not merely free from cultural or eductional or socio- 
economic influences, but that have a universal applicability, what Clive 
Bell (1914) showed must be a quality common to all objects that provoke it, 
though we should have to add to this the severe and possibly vitiating 
qualification that the quality need only be apparent to the objects, producers. 
The quality that we therefore shall be seeking will not be a quality of ob- 
jects as Bell supposed, but, as chapter. 1 suggested, a quality of a relation 
between objects and entities that asserted that the objects were WOAs. 
3.1.4.1 Paragraph N. 2.4 introduced the concept of 'information potential' and asserted 
the existence of a positive relationship between the degree of this quality 
and the aesthetic value of the object - description, image, or whatever - to 
Objective which the quality was attributed. Information potential is part of what we 
criteria 
have called the synthetic aspects of the WOA, and in genera]. is not connected 
with the siluulatory aspects - in human terms, the experience of emotions or 
sensations, which may be harrowing or grotesque at least as easily as they 
may be beautiful. 
+ We conjecture that this quality, together with the posi- 
tive - albeit indirect and distant - associations that the WOA may have with. 
A's - and his species - survival, whose c-rerriding importance we have S1- 
ready noted, constitute the only objective criteria of aesthetic value. And 
this only because the survival criterion subsumes the criterion of informa- 
tion potential. For the accumulation-of correlatives, descriptors, &c., 
having high information potential, must be of primary importance for survival.: 
The assertion is that compression, economy, &c. has acquired intrinsic and 
+ There is a sense in which the simple Power of a feeling that a WOA occasions is some- 
times interpreted as being beautiful, irrespective of its content. The interpretation 
is partly related to the Aristotelean notion of catharsis and we shall not pursue it here. 
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11.4.2 
Aesthetic 
qualities 
and human 
character- 
istics 
overriding aesthetic value, over and above what it may convey, because its 
quality of economy or whatever, is important for survival at a higher more 
general level than any message it may be used to communicate. 
There is a danger in any argument that attempts to deal with a. subjective 
idea like aesthetics being pitched at too general a level, for it may easily 
end in meaningless abstractions. The alternative is an empiricism that may 
vitiate the aim of achieving objectivity. There is some excuse for applying 
to an art machine criteria that might be valid for humans, since we have 
shown that any art machine that we might make ourselves would be bound to 
turn out WOAs that resembled those of human artists. However when we turn 
to aesthetic theory we find little agreement amon¬ authors as to what such 
criteria might be. The indirect and distant associations with survival that 
we mentioned in the foregoing pa-ýagraph have to do with notions connected 
with physical and structural perception. Certain physical structural features 
and perceptual mechanisms in animals have been of very general importance 
in survival. The generality of a few of them extends throughout the living 
world and beyond. No more convincing empirical evidence could argue their 
importance. Symmetry is such a structural feature. One might regard symmetry 
as a morphism of gravity, against whose downward pull it offers a general 
protection, at least in regard to orientation. Symmetry is as much a featuro 
of plante, especially the more primitive 7arieties, as it is of'insects, fish 
and animals. With symmetry clearly such concepts - or sensations - as balance 
must be closely associated. Rhythm is another such structural feature and 
has predictive value, creating the expectation of its continuance. There 
are other phenomena in this class, such as for instance the sensitivity of 
the human retina to light of different wave-lengths which coincides closely 
with the distribution of intensity of the varying wave-lengths of the sun's 
radiation. Taylor (1962) expounds a theory of perception which is of part- 
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icular interest in suggesting the closeness with which perception is tied 
to its physical correlates. According to this theory spatial co-ordinates 
are learned through the references of gravity and self - providing orienta- 
tion and centrality respectively - and the differentiation of sensory moda- 
lities according to responses. His notion is that correct response must 
precede perception, rather than that perception permits response. Such a 
theory leads naturally to the idea of 'good' and 'bad' responses and so by 
association perceptions, and so provides a possible starting point for aes- 
thetics, not far removed from the eighteenth century idea expressed by Same 
that a certain natural relationship existed between aesthetic qualities and 
the constitution of the human mind. The difficulty about theories of this 
kind is that the primitive correspondences - supposing they exist - between 
structural features and so forth and aesthetic values are not more than the 
theory's building blocks. Elaborating these into a structure that will 
account for all the detailed problems of aesthetics moves the subject deeply 
into the realms of psychology in its more speculative avatar. 
11.4.3 The more philosophically orientated approaches to aesthetics appear fraught 
with disagreement. Discussion ranges over questions as to what are the ob- 
jects of aesthetic attention, the nature of aesthetic experience and the 
Problems grounds of aesthetic judgement, with differing views as to which aesthetic 
of 
aesthetics theory should emphasize. Under the. -first head come questions as to what is 
a WOA, with suggestions, sometimes based on hedonistic assumptions, that a 
WOA should provoke aesthetic attention. This naturally leads. to the next 
question, What is aesthetic attention, or, more broadly, aesthetic experi- 
ence? Some characteristic is sought that renders objects able to sustain 
aesthetic attention. Without such a characteristic it is argued aesthetics 
becomes simply a study of subjective taste. The aesthetic attitude is sup- 
posed to lead to the apprehension of objects for their own sakes, rather 
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than for pleasure of the extension of understanding. What then axe the 
grounds of aesthetic judgement? How does it differ from judgements of 
taste? Is natural beauty a legitimate object of aesthetic attention? The 
>C theory we have devioped suggests answers to numbers of these questions with- 
in the confines of its own framework, though it is not our purpose to pro- 
pose them here. It appears more important that none of these pre-occupa- 
tions of aesthetic philosophy suggest effective steps that we might take 
to ensure that an art machine would produce aesthetic objects. We are thrown 
back on our suggestion of the first paragraph of this section,. that if an 
art machine produces WOAs as we have characterized them, they will have aes- 
thetic value for those Os able to apprehend them. In other words we define 
aesthetic value as being a quality that belongs to WOAs, and content our- 
selves with defining these. 
3.1"4.4 Moles attempts to define aesthetic value in terms of such a quality. He 
approaches the problem through information theory and identifies what he 
calls 'aesthetic information', though it never emerges quite clearly what 
'Aesthetic he understands by the term. It 'refers to a repertoire of knowledge common 
informa- 
tion' to the particular transmitter and particular receptor' -a pragmatic com- 
ponent. 'One may liken it to the concept of personal information'. It 'has 
no goal properly speaking. It does not have the characteristic of intent; 
in fact it determines internal states' (pp. 129,130). Unlike 'semantic in- 
formation' it may not be translated - into a foreign language say - nor 
transposed into another medium. To an extent apparently it resembles what 
we call the simulatory component of WQAs. Moles suggests ways of measur- 
ing aesthetic information, based upon various kinds of methodical destruc- 
tion of WOAs by known perceptible quantities, 'following the variation in 
aesthetic sensation, value and knowledge as a function of this destruction' 
0 
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(p. 201). Unfortunately such a method, while destroying one WOA would be 
creating another, due-to the creative role of the 0 being tested, as he 
apprehends the W0A at each stage (N. 8.4), and this would no doubt be a 
factor difficult to control. In another place Moles suggests that aesth- 
etic information is to be associated with the individual A's preferences, 
expressed, for example, as a 'choice of certain frequencies and certain 
combinations, to compose spectral symbols, of certain lengths of phonemes, 
of certain phonemic combinations, etc. ' (p. 132), rather like what we des- 
cribed (N. 7.3.1) as the creative contribution of the musical performer to 
the performance of some printed score. Similarly, he finds aesthetic in- 
formation in the orator's tone, semantic information in his message. Over- 
all the concept of aesthetic information appears to add nothing to oar form- 
ation, and itself clearly suffers from serious defects that would make it 
of little effective value in constructing an art machine. For instance, if 
as Moles suggests, a speaker's words convey semantic information and the 
timbre of his voice aesthetic, then to use this fact an art machine would 
need criteria for distinguishing what we might call 'positive' from 'nega- 
tive' aesthetic information. And finding what such criteria might be is 
precisely the main problem of aesthetics. 
192. 
CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS 
SECTION 0 THE PRACTICAL PROBLEM 
12.0.0 The earliest and most primitive examples of art are cave paintings, many of 
which, like those of the Bushmen in Southern Africa - some relatively re- 
cent - appear to have a frankly practical aim, to promote success in the 
Art as the hunt. At a literal level the scenes portrayed are crude models - in the laboratory 
strict sense that an architect's plan is a model - and, if there were no 
more to these paintings, we should have to admit, at any rate for them, a 
second-rate status compared to science. But we may suppose that the paint- 
ings did more than merely provide a plan for the study of minting strategy, 
that they elso offered the occasion for a kind of enactment of the hunt, 
complete with its fears and dangers and excitements - all quite practical 
problems for the hunter, though not susceptible to the same kinds of study 
and planning as the manoeuvres of stalking say. Perhaps the best way to 
learn about hunting is by doing it, as the best way to learn tennis is by 
playing it. But instruction from experienced hunters, or 'textbooks' also 
have an important role in matters of technique and strategy. Only art how- 
ever provides the laboratory where feelings and experiences may be studied, 
in forms similar to the ones in which they occur, yet 'in tranquility'. 
This of course is no more than the basis of a claim for a role for art and 
should not be taken as a suggestion that its aims are restricted to merely 
functional objectives, as if its cathartic qualities were its only justif- 
ication. 
12.0.1 On the basis of the conclusions we have reached, one might approach the 
practical problem of building an 2_t machine from either of two directions. 
193. 
On the one hand one might argue that significant ext could only come from 
Simulat- a machine that incorporated about as much structure as a human artist, since 
Ing a 
human a much weaker device would be unable to conceive of art and so could never 
artist 
set out purposefully to produce it. This would imply that the 'best' art 
machine would take the form of a'simulation of a human artist. Similar 
reasoning underlies the choice of approach in a number of-problem-solving 
procedures, such as most chess-playing programs for instance, which pre- 
fer to incorporate human chess masters' heuristics, rather than build up 
their own from scratch; or financial investment programs that set out to 
simulate the activity of investment managers, rather than seek wholly novel 
patterns of share price movements say, to guide them. All such examples 
reflect not simply a tacit admission of the difficulties and slowness of 
order extraction, but go further in accepting that, without exploiting the 
humanly acquired structures that already exist, many procedures simply will 
not be got to work. But hu-pan simulations achieve their successes only by 
largely sacrificing the goal of novelty. They search for solutions to their 
problems only those parts of the tree which have been searched before, be- 
cause it is to those parts that human mimicry leads them. Perhaps solutions 
from unfamiliar parts of the tree would be incomprehensible, and therefore 
unrecognizable as solutions to the human programmers. In any case we have 
shown sufficient reason for supposing, on theoretical grounds, that art of 
too novel a character would be rejected by its audience, a view art's his- 
tory amply supports. So this is another reason for setting out to simulate 
the human artist. But chess is a limited activity, art a broad one. For a 
machine to play chess it is unnecessary for it to be able to conceive of 
playing it. The problem with the argument that led us to decide on simul- 
ation is that it is self-defeating: a true art machine must be capable 
of conceiving of producing art, and to do so would have to incorporate much 
of the apparatus of human intelligence which we are . not at present able 
to 
furnish. 
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12.0.2 The alternative approach is more modest, and promises correspondingly less 
in the realm of art, though perhaps more for the art machine. It entails 
making the most of available devices, aiming to provide them with heuristics 
Extending that will lead in the direction we want. We have already come across de- 
existing 
devices vices that in various ways model their worlds and their problems. Chapter 
6 in-particular dealt with examples that had the appearance of being the 
kind that might extend to meet the needs of an art machine. Winston's'pro- 
gram constructed simple concepts and Winograd's robot incorporated an 
arrangement resembling in some respects what we have called the isymbiotic' 
relationship between W (in this case statements in English), and its in- 
ternal representation of W, W*, represented by PLANNER. The robot's state- 
ments do not have the characteristics of true Ws because they do not, once 
made, then assist the PLANTER language. The incorporation of a facility 
whereby the robot's statements were recorded, not merely as references for 
future statements, but as references that might advance PLANT deductions 
as well, would remove this defect. But this would still permit production 
of only very simple and limited kinds of Ws. Greater complexity would de- 
mand not merely more output but also a more complex world than the 'blocks 
world' of the make-believe robot. When a child builds a tower out of wooden 
blocks we might argue that we were seeing an activity that included as part 
of itself embryonic creativity. The environment of the real blocks is 
vastly richer than that of Winograd Is CRS robot. In fact the robot's blocks hav 
no environment, they are the environment. A real robot that constructed a 
real tower, if its construction took the place of Winograd's robot's state- 
ments, in the extended kind of Winograd robot that we have suggested, might 
be judged creative equally with the child. It is not too difficult to en- 
visage, as a next phase in this development, a robot whose constructions 
not merely advanced its deductive capacities, but also initiated its next 
construction., and so on. Clearly error, an inability to handle the blocks 
perfectly, would advance such a machire's conceptualizing not hinder it. 
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For we may suppose that aiming for a goal not within too easy reach might 
be the best way of keeping some or other constructional activity going. A 
real robot with both a constructional and a language facility, able to ad- 
vance its internal world by both, and able to use both to initiate further 
statements and constructions, where statements might be about construction 
and constructions suggested by statements, would be well on the way to be- 
ing an art machine. One might call it a child art machine, because one 
might expect it to have about the same kind of relation to its statements 
and constructions as a child might have to constructions it made. But to 
turn the machine into an adult would require a further level of 'self-con- 
sciousnessI. The machine would need not merely to be able to make block con- 
structions and discuss them, but would require to be doing so as part of a 
wider project, entailing possibly some kind of model of its own internal 
system. A machine with these accomplishments could probably produce Ws 
that, for its purposes - which we have defined as a sufficient criterion - 
might have the characteristics of WOks. Even such a machine would repre- 
sent an extensive, if conceivable advance on anything at present available. 
But its WQAs would still be limited. To extend their quality, breadth and 
complexity so as to make them acceptable to a human audience would can for 
enriched contact with an enriched world, an elaborate sensori-mo'or sytem 
and, in particular a facility for acquiring socio-cultural experience. For 
either the machine must itself be able to have experiences for which it may 
attempt to produce simulation procedures, or it will have to be programmed 
with or acquire for itself - by order-extraction work - descriptions of ex- 
periences. In this latter case it would then face a task roughly the re- 
verse of that of science. For while science attempts to describe what art 
may only be able to simulate, the machine would have to try to simulate 
what it had only been equipped to describe. 
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SECTION 1 PROSPECTS 
12.1.0 Was Turing's (1950) prediction of a machine, by the turn of the century, 
that could succeed in his interrogation game too optimistic? Half the 
period is over but no clear indication has yet emerged. It is not even 
Faustus and obvious how impressed one should be by achievements to date. . 
From one 
Mephisto- 
pheles point of view, Winograd's conversations with his robot are startling, from 
another, paltry, like Faustus and Mephistropheles, one marvels at the devil- 
ish power, dismayed at the triviality of what it is called to accomplish. 
It is clear that computer size and speed are not alone enough. And it is 
clear too that evolving order within the computer is a problem not to be 
lightly brushed aside with a mention of helping it along. As Ashby warns 
us, there is no getting selection for nothing; the Law of Requisite Variety 
will not be ignored. Perhaps the real shortcoming of Turing's argument 
is its failure to emphasize sufficiently a holistic view of the individual 
in his world. The individual is part of a total reactive system with a 
variety vastly greater than his personal variety. His receptor and resp- 
once systems link him too intimately with his surroundings to allow total 
definitive importance to his own 1010 neurones. But the computer, locked 
securely in its cabinet, enjoys only the slenderest links with its world. 
Nor, until they are greatly strengthened, does it seem likely that increases 
in computer storage capacities will 90 far towards compensating for their 
lack. 
12.1.1 The problem is to estimate what point on the growth curve of artificial in- 
telligence we have reached. Should we look for a growth rate for intelli- 
genre of an order comparable to that for the growth rates of so many other 
phenomena now? In the light of his analysis of animal intelligence, Sommerhof 
(1969) believes that 'we are compelled to the conclusion that true machine 
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A limited intelligence is still a long way off' (p. 20). This view must justify the 
objective 
wholly abstract nature of the undertaking here that is now concluded. No 
art machine was ever seriously envisaged as a true possibility at present. i 
{ 
The machine was proposed simply as'an exercise by which to clarify certain 
aspects of art theory and to close, within the single frame of organiz- 
ation, art along with all other enterprizes that call upon the resources 
of intelligence. If we could make a machine capable of producing art, it 
would probably produce it without the need to provide it with special. 
features. If we were to look for special features, they would probably 
have to resemble those Beckett mentions (0.5.1), which, through negligence 
or inefficiency, incline art toward the omission of the duty of Habit, so 
opening for it 'a window on the real', for our machine, like the human 
artist, enlarging its world by increasing its responses to its conditions -! 
even at the risk of its own extinction. The alternative, the adequate 
performance of the duty of Hab; t, is the prescription for Boredom, with 
attendant risks of its own, which, as the science of steersmanship, cyb- 
ernetics has a peculiar duty to notice, if it is not to perish like the 
unfortunate Palinurus, who fell into the sea in his sleep. Palinurus 
'was three days exposed to the tempests and waves of the sea and at last 
came safe to the seashore near Velia, where the cruel inhabitants of the; 
place murdered him to obtain his clothes: his body was left unburied on 
the seashore. ' (Lempriere, cited by Palinurus, p. ix) 
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NOTES 
Beyond a formal understanding of art theory that one might expect from 
the methodological expedient of making an art machine is the promise of 
fresh intuitive revelations about the subject. The hope is that these will 
unfold bit by bit over the whole course of the argument. The object of the 
notes that follow is-primarily to assist this revelatory process by means of 
examples and explanations taken, for the most part, from art and from the 
everyday world. Helpfulness towards-this object has mainly dictated the 
choice of examples, and numbers of questions are raised to provoke intuitive 
insight, rather than with the intention of proposing firm answers to them. 
The inclusion of a number of fairly lengthy quotations, many from practising 
artists, or more particularly, writers, is intended not merely to add 
corrobative comments on conclusions reached in the text, but also to illus- 
trate directly the concern of practitioners with theoretical questions, and 
to convey the closeness of many of their notions to those of a theory derived 
from considerations seemingly quite different from their own. The reason 
for so far pursuing the ideas of a single artist has been to obtain a view 
of the completeness of the concern that occurs. 
The division of these Notes into chapters corresponds to the text'3 chapter 
divisions, and in many cases individual paragraphs in the notes refer to 
specific paragraphs in the text. However, to allow the notes their own 
continuity, correspondences of this kind are not mentioned. So far as 
possible the notes have been written to permit reading' them consecutively 
as a section of the text in their own right, one aimed at furnishing a novel 
insight, untrammelled by preconceptions and hidden assumptions, into the 
workings and character of both art and cybernetics. 
a 
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C &PTER 1 
N. 0.0 It should quickly become apparent that our art machine is no merely simple- 
minded device for arbitrarily turning out objects without interest for any 
audience beyond what the audience can itself invest in them. As this is the 
case, it is therefore hopefully superfluous to embark upon a catalogue of 
things the machine is not. Nevertheless it worth stressing explicitly at 
the outset that we do not propose to assume that art is necessarily a 
peculiarly human activity; it is precisely the unquestioned assumption that 
it is which is one we desire to escape. This wish would in itself justify 
avoiding at least initially, human-imitative procedures and arguments, like 
that advanced by Turing (1950). But there is the added reason that the 
imitation argument itself suffers from an inherent weakness that dissuades 
against its use, especially in connection with art. This is the common sense 
objection to it that it depends on 'mere' imitation. Vindication by rigorous 
cross-examination seems the least owing to 'other minds' by the egalitarian 
aspirations of non-humans - with evasions like 'III never could write poetry"' 
(Turing, 19; 0; p. 434) strictly outlawed. Consider for example a machine 
capable of painting a recognizable scene in some accredited 'style'. Such 
an imitator, negligently approached, might seem deserving of classing as an 
artist. Yet its procedures might be quite simple, and easily within present 
technological capacities. One envisages for instance a mechanical paint 
brush depositing dots of pigment on a canvas, at points and using such colours 
as might be determined according to some extremely simple algorithm from a 
scanned visual image. Pointillist paintings of the image would result. Yet 
the device would be a trivial example of an art machine, quite lacking in 
ability to make choices of any kind, as say to style, subject matter, or even 
picture size. There is no important respect in which such a machine might 
claim to resemble an artist, in spite of its pointillist pictures, hardly more 
than, analagously, a punch-card reader might claim to resemble a seeing machine- 
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N. 0.1 What should be grasped at the outset, because of what it reveals about a lot 
that is commonly taken for granted in discussions of art, is some of the pro- 
blems that the notion of an art machine poses. Implicit in the concept of 
artificial intelligence is the idea of machines outstripping their makers. 
Beer (1972) for instance shows that a machine operating a suitably chosen 
heuristic programme is likely to take decisions beyond its programmer's com- 
prehension. A point is imaginable, say when an artificial system first 
became able to construct a system like but 'better' than itself, after which 
intelligence might grow with increasing rapidity in successive generations. 
From a system with human-like intelligence, the evolution of systems vastly 
superior to humans is at least conceivable. Questions as to how such evol- 
ved systems might manifest their superiority do not appear, on the face of 
it at any rate, to present any particular difficulties, seeming to call for 
answers of the same kind as questions about human intelligence. Such sys- 
tems, one supposes would undertike the tasks of human intelligence with greater 
and steadily growing efficacy. But would it look like that to weaker sys- 
tems? The question is obviously relevant in a wide range of contexts, par- 
ticularly where there may be conflicts of strategies. (Answers could pro- 
bably be developed as the basis of a justification for Leibniz's assertion 
that God had chosen to create the best of all 'possible' - in the sense of 
logically allowable - worlds. ) Here the object of raising the question is 
simply to provide an analogy by means of which to interpret the equivalent 
question relating to highly artistic rather than highly intelligent systems. 
Bowden (19,8) suggests that a sonnet written by a machine might 'appeal only 
to another machine' (p. 321), though he makes little effort to understand why, 
or even what might be meant by 'appeal'. But it is still pertinent to ask 
what kind of output a highly evolved artistic system might have, and how 
lower order systems - humans say - might interpret it. At first sight it 
appears that the kinds of objective criteria suitable for recognizing and 
perhaps even for rating intelligence in artificial systems might be useless 
.I 
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for dealing with art, where the grounds for evaluation are even less secure 
than they are for intelligence. But it is suggested and we hope to show in 
the course of the argument, that the divisions separating the two kinds of 
assessment are largely artificial, and positively obstruct proper understan- 
ding of the problem. 
N. 0.2 The strict separation of reason from imagination ('analysis' from 'originating' 
results in anomalies like for instance the expressionless speech attributed to 
the robots of science fiction. Vocal expression is supposed to be connected 
with 'feeling', which is distinguished from ? meaning' and, so popular belief 
goes, machines can deal with the one but not with the other. Insistence upon 
such differences would deny existence to the subject matter of pragmatics. 
Vocal expression itself conveys meaning, and part of a speech's meaning is 
what it tells of the speaker's feeling. The written word has to make good 
vocal expression's absence by means of greater precision, as well as by the 
use of various devices and conventions such as carry information about 'mood', 
'tone of voice', and so on. A computer candidate hoping to compete success- 
fully in Turing's (1950) 'interrogation game' would certainly need command 
of actual voice tone and expression, or at least the skill to use existing 
conventions for investing its written responses with these qualities. For 
human-like intelligence displays capacities to reason and to use imagination 
and intuition, as well as the ability to grasp meanings conveyed by others 
through the use of different tones of voice and the like, all exercised 
together. Meaning and feeling are not separable. Both belong to the 
realization of an intention. 
N. 0.3 In art it is clearly possible to appreciate merit, without knowing the 
artist's intention, as for example in the case of ethnological objects viewed 
by someone ignorant of the culture from which they sprain;; or to 'see' in a 
WOA something more than, or different from what the artist had intended. 
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N. 0.4 
N. o. 5 
The creative role in such cases is clearly at least partly filled by whom- 
ever does the seeing, or exhibits the -'unintended' meaning to him. The 
case of 'found objects' is another example of this kind. Such objects 
show no artistic intention. The object's finder fills the artist's role, 
providing an 'intention' by discovering its outcome in the object. But 
clearly these remarks apply in some degree to the audience's role in relation, 
to any WOA, and in particular to the artist as his own audience. 
Relating to the artist as author - as distinct from audience - of his work 
are questions of the meaning of 'creativity' and the 'creative process'. 
At every stage in the making of a WOA the artist is likely to a'. ternate 
between both roles. As audience, his concern is judgement, interpretation, 
meaning and so forth; which he may weigh against his intention as author. 
For this reason intention should not be taken to imply anything either 
explicit or fixed. Each time, during the process of making a WOA, that the 
artist reviews what he has done so far, he engages in two activities: he 
assesses his relative success or failure in realizing, by means of the 
object, which is called the WOA, a stamme of mind that may be called his 
intention; and he modifies or alters the intention in the light of the 
object so far actually produced. 
Extending the formulation of the reflexive structure of creativity to an 
art machine raises interesting questions concerning the character of inten- 
tion and judgement. This suggests the possibility of degenerate cases in 
which one or other was missing. In the case of the machine lacking 
judgement, would it be meaningful to speak of intention at all, when the 
machine would have no way of deciding how far, if at all, its efforts 
represented the intention's realization? An observer discovering an 
intention (N. 0.3) might attribute it to. the_machine.. 
_. 
More. prcbably, if 
* For a formal definition of this term see N. 8.0 
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the machine appeared to the observer to be operating in a 'mechanical' way 
- which is likely, as such a machine would be acting without showing any 
'awareness' of what it was doing - he would attribute the intention to the 
machine's maker. If such a 'mechanical' machine suddenly appeared to 
develop an intention, an observer would probably suppose that the intention 
had entered it by way of a controlled input, to which the intention properly 
belonged. The second degenerate case, that of the machine lacking inten- 
tion with respect to its output and consisting simply, of an evaluating 
facility, would be the equivalent of a WOA's audience. 
N. 0.6 A machine with outputs interpretable only by itself is conceivable as 
another degenerate case. Such a machine might simulate a dreamer rather 
than an artist, though much that will apply to mechanical artists is likely 
to apply equally to mechanical dreamers. 
CHAPTER 1 
N. 1.0 The two concerns of chapter 1 are the paradigm for production and its 
interpretation, and the evaluation of its products. As these products may 
be altogether exotic, their assessment needs to adhere to an explicit method. 
Nothing supposed in the paradigm for the produotive process AW implies any 
restriction on the characteristics of its elements A, W, &c., beyond the 
needs of A I. o be able to communicate with M, and M with E. Specifically 
there is no requirement for A or observers of W to be human. Provisionally 
W denotes any product whatever of AW, whether it is a poem, painting or 
musical recital, the solution of a problem, a theory, a strategy or an 
object or assemblage excluded from human observation or even understanding. 
Ultimately we wish to assign AW the characteristics of the 'artistic process', 
in which A is the artist; M his craftsmanship, the artist's technical skill 
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N. 1.1 
at operating on his medium; E his world, including his medium; and Wa 
WOA of which A is the author. Extending this interpretation, 0 becomes 
WI s'aud. ie nce', and in conformity with the general properties of the other 
elements of AW, may thus be any suitable entity in U, human or not. 
Partly this suitability will depend upon W. since not every W will be open 
to human observation and some minimal conformability_of the various elements 
is clearly called for. 
'I realised that it is not only the material world that is different 
from the aspect in which we see it; that all reality is perhaps as 
dissimilar from what we think ourselves to be directly perceiving; 
that the trees, the sun and the sky would not be the same as what 
we see if they were apprehended by creatures having eyes differently 
constituted from ours, or, better still, endowed for that purpose 
with organs other than eyes which would furnish trees and sky and 
sun with equivalents though not visual. ' 
(Proust, 1957, vol. 5, p. 83. ) 
The need for an objective procedure for deciding what qualifies as a WOA 
is not merely fanciful, nor a protlem confined to some shadowy boundary 
area dividing WOAs from the wider class of Ws. As-long as art remained 
within the confines of readily apparent formal structures, such as the 
representationalism of painting and sculpture, melody and fixed formal 
patterns in music, prosodic rules in poetry, and so on, the search for some 
essential quality common to all forms of art that the right decision pro- 
cedure would discover seemed reasonable. But the widening of artistic 
interest beyond the boundaries of Europe to the artistic achievements of 
other ages and cultures, and the relaxation of the hold exercised by the 
traditional forms, has steadily eroded the plausibility of prescriptive 
definition. We have seen (0.3.1) some of the difficulties that have re- 
resulted for art theory from the need for a changed approach. Adopting a 
method that relies on abstract entities implies that to deal with these 
difficulties, it is necessary to step back from too close an involvement 
0 
in the subject matter. Such a view is of quite general application. 
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N. 1.2 Problems of finding evaluative criteria are not confined to art. 'Value 
judgements' generally are subject to difficulties resulting from confusion 
between the two sets of procedures of 0 and 0. Moral judgements are 
peculiarly susceptible to these anomalies. Moral judgements are those made 
by a meta-observer b in which the Ws are ways of behaving or sequences of 
behaviour, but often fail to distinguish 5- from 0-assessments. Failure 
of a similar kind leads to identification, especially among children, with 
the plots and characters of novels, plays and the like. Here 0, the reader 
or audience, slips-into the-role of the character in the novel or whatever, 
who may, in that context, himself play the part of 0, vis-a-v± the other 
characters. Art, as we shall see, greatly relies upon this happening, and 
often deliberately sets out to make it happen. Conflicting decisions 
between 0 and b correspond in art to confusion in artistic judgements. 
Thus the critic's belief that others should accept his evaluation of aW is 
an example of b using as a criterion a decision reached as 0. Being 'in- 
fluenced by! others' judgements is an example of the reverse. A single 
entity = in practice always human - expresses his taste as. 0 and his judgement 
as Taste relates to 0's experience of his acquaintance with W, judgement 
to b's, experience of this experience. Minsky's remarks (0.2.2.0) about the 
inadequacy of the notion of the relation 'contained in', when applied to 
information processing structures, may provide a basis for an understanding 
of the reasons for confusion and the difficulty of Avoiding it. 
CHAPTER "2 
N. 2.0 
'Only connect' E. M. Forster 
As will appear in the following chapter, the foundation for a more rigorous 
definition of authorship is now layed. Complex 'things' - which may or may 
not *be WOAs - pre-suppose complex purposes, and -at least equally complex 
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agents to entertain the purposes. These agents in turn must thus also be 
the outcome of purposes, and so their agents and so on. Complexity does 
not spring into being at a creative stroke but evolves slowly. The paths 
of evolution and examination of some limits on its rate will form successively 
the subjects of the following three chapters. Here we wish to emphasize 
the implications for art of the connexion between structure, purpose and the 
notion of antecedents as causal explanations. First, it appears that any 
object interesting enough to be called art presupposes a structure at least 
as evolved, both in the artist and, by implication, in his audience. 
Secondly, explanation's evolutionary character, both its formal and intuitive 
aspects, and the other parallels that are seen to exist between these two 
modes - the latter which appeals to 'things' as explanatory principles, 
rather as formal explanations appeal to theories - point to similarities 
between art and science that are not always intuitively obvious. 
N. 2.1 The notion of producing any work is seen from the outset to be bound to con- 
(2.2) " 
trol, control to purpose and purpose to intelligence. Fogel & others 
emphasize that intelligence must involve a 'wide variety of goals under a 
wide range of environments'. 'Certainly, without the existence of a goal, 
decision-making is pointless and the term "intelligence" has no meaning' (p. 2). 
Ashby (1962) also insists on largeness of scale: an organism that evolves 
in an 'isolated' system must be able to go to an equilibrium involving only 
a 'small fraction' of its overall number of states, which must yet be of a 
sufficient number to permit 'a good deal of change and behaviour' (p. 273)" 
N. 2.2 The parallels between organisms or theories evolving to completeness and con- (2.4) 
sistency is obvious, and intuitively may often seem quite plausible and 
natural, though in the theory of art it is more often claimed than plausibly 
demonstrated that WAS may have organismic features. One of the principal 
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" ideas of this chapter, consonant with its cybernetic aims, is to. elucidate 
the correspondences between organisms, explanations and ideas, and their 
evolution. The connexion between explanation and WOAs will be taken up 
explicitly only in Part II. Here we merely observe the evolutionary process 
as it occurs in its several incarnations. 
'Thus the empty spaces of my memory were covered by degrees with 
names which in taking order, in composing themselves with relations 
to one another, in linking themselves to one another by an 
increasingly numerous connexion, resembled those finished works 
of art in which there is not one touch that is isolated, in 
which every part in turn receives from the rest a justification 
which it confers on them. ' * 
(Proust, 1957, Vol. 6, p. 314) 
The 'finished' WOA is evidently a kind of 'knowledge structure', (cf. Gagne, 
1962). What Proust describes is clearly similar in many respects to Pask's 
entailment structures, which are closed 'relational nets'. This is expec- 
ted, as WOAs'are simply a sub-class of the wider class of We, and knowledge 
structures are morphisris of effective explanations, procedures which them- 
selves correspond to the processes AW from which Ws emerge. 
N. 2.3 Less obviously it appears that value judgement is another feature common (2.4.3) 
both to Ws and WOAs, for it is intrinsic to evolution. 'Good' and 'bad"- 
or their equivalents - are indispensible labels, distinguishing between 
mere 'self-connecting' and 'self-organizing', from which scientific theory 
is no more exempt than art. 
N. 2.4. Explanations evolve towards shortness and simplicity. (2.6) 
"'Interesting" functions usually have features that permit enormous reduc- 
tions in the sizes of the nets required to realize them. ' (Minsky 1972, p. 55)" 
The nets, descriptions in Solomonoff's sense (2.3.0), starting tapes for 
* Proust's observations concern a dinner at the Geurmantes when the names of'the guests 
make links in his mind with the French and European history with which the names are 
connected. 
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Turing machines, may all be thought of as having information potential, 
which becomes an information flow when these are realized in operation. 
'The overall scheme of a complex, multimolecular edifice is contained 
in posse in the structure of its constituent parts, but only comes into 
actual existence through their assembly' (cf. 'Step-by-step' effectiveness, 
chapter 9). 'The epigenetic building of a structure is not a creation; 
it is a revelation. ' (Mond, p. 87) (This suggests an answer to the 
question posed in 0.3.1.6 as to whether art is creative or revelatory. ) 
Extending explanations (2.8) by 'joining' them, so that they may generate 
larger runs of information flow, might in these terms, be thought of as 
'adding' potentials - perhaps in ways analagous to the composition of 
mathematical functions, the addition of vectors or procedures for incor- 
porating computer programmes as sub-routines in lar: er programmes. 
Lofgren's definition of order (2.3.2) or Solomonoff's assignment of a priori 
probabilities to strings of symbols according to the way they might be pro- 
duced by a universal Turing machine, suggest possible bases for information 
potential measures. 
N. 2. 
-, 
Thus U-forms with lengths that were small compared to the lengths of the 
(2.7) 
........ sequences they generated, or high a priori probabilities of strings generated 
by a Turing machine would measure high information potentials; and con- 
versely. Of interest is the evident aesthetic value of information poten- 
tial. Sensitivity (among human subjects) to form and pattern of high or 
low information potential may be extremely acute. Moles observes. that an 
intelligible auditory message requires a noise level four to eight times 
higher than its fortissimi to destroy it. 'Intuition' and conjecture are 
frequently more sensitive detectors of pattern than available statistical 
techniques. High information potential assumes aesthetic value. Notions 
"A 
of elegance in mathematical proofs, as in design, are closely linked to 
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N. 2.6 
brevity and economy. I ... "beautiful" often means short in the sense 
that we have discovered some abstract concept of invariance, that permits 
a short recursive description. ' (Lbfgren, 1967, p. 167) Images, including 
metaphors may have a high information potential. For they have the infor- 
mation potential of descriptions raised, as it were, to a higher power, 
possibly a number of times, by morphisms between the domains the images 
describe and other, analagous, but distinct domains. That is, an image 
is a description of more than one thing, by virtue of pointing to morphisms 
between the things. This 'evoluted' information potential provides 
greatly heightened aesthetic value. I ... the image is not an idea. 
It is a radiant node or cluster; it is what I can, and must perforce, - 
call a VORTEX, from which, and through which, and into which, ideas are 
constantly rushing. ' (Pound, 1914, p. 469) Pound'a 'node' is an image, 
but Minsky's 'net' is closer to a literal reality. Though the value of 
the concept of a net in automata theory has probably been at least as great 
when it has been an image as it has when an actuality. A node with numbers 
of connections in a real net of the kind Minsky means, or in some conceptual 
net such as a knowledge structure for example, would in reality have 
qualities like those Pound mentions. 
Very much the object of 2.7 is to indicate the stubbornness with which 
regularities persist. 0 does not believe in purpose arising spontaneously, 
nor in regýdarity existing in isolation, and part of the aim here has been 
to show that 0 has reasonable theoretical grounds for his prejudices. One 
might take as a simple model of 0's views a chain of related regularities 
with purposes linking them. (For a more detailed view of this notion see 
the examination of chapter 7, which should provide a reasonable plausibility 
argument for present assertions. ) A more complex model entails a net in 
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which purposes join nodes of regularity. 
'Since there are flowers whose fertilisation is impossible except 
by means of an insect, flowers which eat insects and therefore 
understand them, since so low and unconscious an order has these 
correspondences with the one above, may there not be animals and 
birds who make use of man and study his habits and if they do, why 
not insects and vegetables? What grape, to keep its place in the 
sun, taught our ancestors to make -wine? 
' 
(Palinurus, 1961, p. 13) 
CHAPTER 3 
N. 3.0 The most important idea to grasp from this chapter is that a WOA is seldom 
likely to be a product purely of c-authorship. Indeed, by the arguments 
of the preceding chapter, this could be the case only if A. or that part 
of it responsible for W, had come into existence more or less spontaneously 
and without antecedents. As an actuality, such a state of affairs is next 
to inconceivable. What appears to occur generally in reality is almost 
the reverse of this. In the case of art, fizst and foremost the artist, 
as a human, is a product of millions, the culture in which he develops, 
of tens of thousands, of years of evolution. Thus, his art, his technique, 
his medium, the work of particular artists, all contribute to an overall 
structure to which he may add a little. What he adds will be his creative 
effort. Because of its relative smallness, it may be difficult to assess. 
This is not peculiar to art but is also the case in science. As in science, 
'the order which the scientific discoveries reveal will be talked about not 
only by the scientists themselves but also by their colleagues in other 
fields, and eventually will be taught to a new generation of scientists. 
In this way, a potential is created for asking deeper questions about the 
systems revealed, and finally new or related orders and systems may be 
found. ' (L6fgren, 1972, P"342). Science is frequently distinguished from 
6 
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art on the grounds of its progressive character. The view we have worked 
towards does not show this distinction. If science and art both rely on 
the use of developed forms, both must have similarly progressive natures. 
'I was led to ask myself whether there was any truth in the distinctions 
which we are always making between art, which is not more advanced 
now than in Homer's day, and science with its continuous progress. 
Perhaps, on the contrary, art was in this respect like science; each 
new writer seemed to me to have advanced beyond the stage of his 
immediate predecessor; and how was I to know that in twenty years 
time, when I should be able to accompany without strain or effort the 
newcomer of today, [cf. 46 ] another might not appear at whose approach 
he in turn would be packed off to ... limbo...? ' (Proust, Vol. 6, pp. 22,23) 
What gives science its apparently progressive character is the impression 
of the almost pre-destined course of its development; an impression gained 
from events like the very nearly simultaneous but independent invention of 
" the calculus by Ihibniz and Newton for example - though such coincidences 
might be explained on the basis of Spencer-Brown's observation that proofs 
are found for those theorems that lead somewhere. The review of scien- 
tific development commonly tends to emphasize the convergence of whole 
domains of knowledge into some single new 'discovery' (heuristic; explanation) 
and to neglect the huge new vistas that such discoveries open up. Among 
great discoveries one would include Mendelyev's Periodic Table, the Theory 
of Evolution, Bragg's Law, Maxwell's synthesis of magnetism and electricity. 
After such discoveries, the problem of finding alternative explanations for 
the knowledge they draw together is even more difficult than that of coming 
by the explanation offered in the first place. An alternative to the 
Theory of Evolution for example, which would 'explain' the same set of 
data as the Theory, would need the same order-extraction effort as was needed 
to create the Theory, plus an additional effort to overcome the 'blinkering' 
effect (6.2.2) the Theory has, once created. This is one reason for the 
tendency to emphasize the convergent aspects of scientific development. 
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But what leads away from discoveries is highly divergent (see N. 5.0). 
Without Bragg's Law for instance the discovery of DNA would probably have 
been impossible, yet this discovery would have been hard to predict, even 
in approximate form at the time the Law was first enunciated. Art does 
not take along all its knowledge at each new departure and is often 
contrasted with science in this. But with science too, much becomes use- 
less and is discarded. As we shall see in the following chapter, there 
is no escape from the difficulty that results from having to build new 
order upon old. In art or science, order extraction is limited by the 
relatively low variety of the processor that does the order-extraction work, 
compared with the high variety of the surrounding from which the order is 
to be extracted. 
N. 3.1 This conclusion raises a question as to the interpretation of W, in par- 
ticular of a WOA; namely how much difference is tolerable between the 
order accumulated in A and in 0 (in his role as audience), before the WA 
produces ceases to be a WOA, or even distinguishable as aW by 0. How 
much creativity is an artist allowed? Chapter 1 dealt in part with this 
question, though on the assumption that W would be distinguishable. When 
this is not the case, the argument of chapter 1 fails, but then the ques- 
tion never arises. But even in. the absence of bizarre differences between 
A and 0- when both are human say - what are the chances that the WOA A 
produces will receive featly varying interpretations from the two individuals? 
The question is clearly wide and outside the scope of the present argument. 
Here we restrict ourselves to observations on the effects of 0-A differen- 
ces on taste, interpretation and expression. 
N. 3.1.0 Moles asserts that the size of the public interested in a concert varies 
inversely with the concert's originality, (where he defines the programme's 
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N. 3.1.1 
originality H as H= -5 pi log2 pi; -5 derives from five categories of 
composers grouped in terms of frequency of performance; and pi = pw x 
pc, with pc being the composer category and pw the composer's work category). 
Implicitly this defines public taste in terms of frequency of performance. 
In a sense such a definition is circular, since it defines taste in terms 
of audience size and makes audience size depend on taste. But the 
definition also suggests that people like what they know. Knowing the 
music increases the audience's capacity as a receptor, so raising what we 
have called the information potential of, in this case, the concert. And 
we have already noted (N. 2.4) the aesthetic value of information potential. 
'Any study of the value or quality of a message' - taste - 'must be based 
on the capacity of the ultimate receptor' (Moles, p. 19). 
Clearly this approach raises questions of the artist's and his audience's 
education, socio-cultural milieu, and so on. Misconstruction is possible 
at many levels. Intelligibility at one level does not ensure it at 
another. Karen Blixen (1964) records telling the story of The Merchant 
of Venice to her Somali servant in Kenya. The Jew should have used a 
red-hot knife, the servant argued, it draws no blood. What about the 
pound of flesh, neither more nor less? He could have taken a little at 
a time. 
I 
'But in the story the Jew gave it up. ' 
'Yes, that was a great pity, Memsahib. ' (p. 279) 
N. 3.1.2 For the artist such difficulties raise problems of expression: how much 
creativity will destroy intelligibility? Many artists, especially in 
this century, have been content to ignore such considerations. Others, 
without either the intention or the wish to do so, have fallen foul of 
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their own creative achievements, only to be vindicated by later generations. 
N. 3.2 
In any event, the problem of the balance between novelty and banality remains 
interesting. According to Moles, intelligibility varies inversely as 
originality. The difficulty of transmission of a message increases with 
its information content. '... a proper balance between banality and 
oxiginality is now a cornerstone of aesthetic perception' (Moles, p. vi) 
To pursue this question (5.3.6) we shall want a more detailed understanding 
of what choices the artist has. Montaigne quotes Horace: 'I strive to be 
concise/And grow obscure'. -' Here we observe that these problems vanish only 
if A and 0 are identical individuals, that is if 0 and A are subsets within 
the same set of procedures, both drawing upon the same data 
base. In chapter 8 we shall show that a structure of this kind is not sim- 
ply desirable but actually necessary for any art machine. 
If for the present we dispose in this way of problems of audience and 
interpretation that results from differences in the accumulated order of 
A and 0, the question of A's *'creativityi remains. Newell & others define 
creativity within the context of problem-solving. This is not in itself 
restrictive, as any purposeful activity might be defined as problem solving 
in which the problem was to achieve the purpose. However the four con- 
ditions they list as sufficient to characterize creativity in general are 
wholly based on experience of human creativity. The conditions are: 
(1) 'novelty and value' (for the thinker or his culture); (2) unconven- 
tionality, achieved by modifying or restricting previously accepted notions; 
(3) the need for high motivation or persistence 'over a considerable time, 
or 'at high intensity' (p. 4); (4) part of the problem consists in for- 
mulating the problem itself. The notion of order extraction covers the 
first two of these criteria. The way the authors stipulate them simply. 
adds to our terms a vague and arbitrary requirement as to the quantity of 
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order that must be acquired before the acquisition qualifies to be called 
'creative'. The third criterion is psychological. While it is likely 
to be a feature of human creativity one would not regard it as a necessary 
one. The creative act might be quick and depend entirely upon previously 
programmed (in our terms) order that, by definition, did not depend upon 
prior activity. Nor would one suppose the condition sufficient. Neither 
is the fourth criterion sufficient to justify giving the name creative to 
thinking that required it, since re-formulating a problem does not neces- 
sarily solve it. But it is probably a necessary condition of creative 
problem solution; for a problem stated in such a way that it needed no re- 
formulation would contain its solution in posse, rather as the starting 
tape of a Turing machine contains in posse the end tape it generates. 
Fogel & others liken 'creativity' and 'imagination' to artificial intel- 
ligence and suggest that, given these qualities, 'it is possible to seriously 
consider programs that would provide the machine with self-awareness and, 
ultimately, with an ability to select its own goals' (p. 123). So, if this 
were the case, we should argue from our proposed definition of authorship 
that self-awareness would be one of the characteristics it determined. 
x"3.3 Our definition's chief advantages are, that it is based upon a rigorous 
conceptual foundation, and that it recognizes the connexion between struc- 
ture and purpose, and so, the inevitably self-reproductive aspects of 
purposeful productive activity, and the overriding homeostatic purpose 
concerned with equilibrial states and the invariance of identity. For 
art theory the definition is satisfactory. It provides a framework within 
which to examine the qualities 'we demand in our sensations' from an 
'object of art', which 
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'will be order, without which our sensations will be troubled 
and perplexed, and the other quality will be variety, without 
which they will not be fully stimulated ... there is something 
more - there is the consciousness of purpose ... ' (Pry, 1937, pp. 32,33)" 
CHMER 4 
N. 4. o Chapter 4 takes up the theme of the difficulty and slowness of order 
extraction from a point of view that differs from the two chapters 
that precede it. The implications for an art machine of the chapter's 
conclusions remove some of the difficulties that earlier chapters had 
revealed, though at the cost of limiting the scope of possibilities of 
what we may hope to construct. The results of order extraction may be 
used as heuristics to advance further order extraction: c-authorship 
fuels itself. But finding heuristics is slower than it often may seem, ' 
simply because habituation conceals how such structure many common 
heuristics - like Beer's dog-training heuristic (4.4.1) for instance - 
may incorporate. Moreover, because of the slowness of order extraction, 
any art machine will have to depend for its initial structure upon what 
its maker-is able to provide. As the maker will have to rely for this 
on his own structure - what he has been 'programmed' with and what he 
has acquired (N. 3.0) -the art machine is bound to resemble its maker. 
in what it produces. Chapters 5 and 6 explore this furt: ler. 
N: 4.1 1 ... the codification of a proof procedure, or any other directive 
process, although at first useful, can later stand as .a threat 
to fur- 
ther progress. ' (Spencer-Brown, p. 10) In other words it is not just 
error in the normal sense to which heuristics may lead but, more broadly, 
to determining the path of evolutionary development. (See notes to 
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chapter 7) The action of the mechanism that leads to this determination 
is what also conceals it from us, precluding awareness of the part our 
received structures play in determining what structures we discover and, 
more particularly, what we do not. Pask, Scott & Kalliakourdis (1973) 
examine the dependence of problem solutions on problem structures. In 
heuristic problem-solving programs the problem is largely solved before 
the outset of the 'solution' by the program's operation, either because 
the problems themselves are embedded in highly structured domains - chess, 
theorem-proving or the like - or because the author has already selected 
what he considers relevant to the solution in specifying the problem. 
And his selection may entail a huge reduction in variety between the 
actual problem and its specification., The alternative, a system that. 
had 'not evolved to match the world into which it was born' (McCulloch, 
p. 221), would have to acquire its own heuristics and face the slow task 
of reducing the world's variety to manageable proportions. 
N. 4.2 The author is bound to feel ambivalent about heuristics, which increase 
his power as a c-author on one hand while they diminish it on the other. 
The author cannot escape from old, long-developed structures, his human 
form for example. But at the frontiers of authorship there is some 
opportunity for him to choose his own forms (heuristics). Here one of 
his problems might be communication with an audience. For c-authorship 
is innovatory by definition, and therefore a departure from, a 'creation' 
added to, the world of the author - and so, a fortiori, his audience. 
The question is, What degree of departure is permitted an author before 
his message becomes unintelligible to an audience? But the author's 
problem is only secondarily one of communication (Notes to chapter 7). 
As heuristics are really variety reducers, his deeper problem remains that 
of choosing them, in so far as choice is possible. The author oust 
strike his own balance between doing more with less and less with more. 
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x. 4.3 Art (including music and literature) provides examples both of authors 
drawn towards forms and turning away from them. With the modern aban- 
donment of traditional forms (see notes to chapter 7), artists have 
sought new ways of reducing variety. IMandarinismt in literature, 
pre-occupation with the medium over the subject in painting, are possibly 
examples of attempts to escape from variety, as for instance are such 
common new expedients as the use by artists of photographs to provide 
preliminary studies. Overall the 'space' for choice is narrow. Accor- 
ding to Moles the gross redundancy of French is forty-five percent; 
redundancy based on letters is nineteen percent. 'The difference is 
due to the overall structure of the language ... the impact of thought 
on language takes place at this interstice'. (p. 46) 
CHAPTER 5 
N. 5. o 
I... one of those perfect wholes 
that it takes centuries of time 
to, produce ... 
(Proust). 
The considerations of this chapter impose strict limites on the scope 
of any art machine to be a c-author. For it follows from our argument 
that an art machine capable of producing an output such as we should be 
able to distinguish (from randomness) would have to rely heavily on struc- 
tures with which we provided it. Unfortunately, this is the only kind 
of machine we should be able to make with an output rich enough to be of 
interest. We should be mistaken though to over-emphasize the importance 
of this restriction. First by definition it is no more severe than the 
restrictions on the c-authorship of every human artist - or on every form 
of human activity. Theoretically at least the restrictions on the 
machine should represent a relaxation of human limits, depending as they 
do on systemic considerations and not on physiological or physical ones, 
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connected with the materials of which the : : ^. hine might be built. * 
Secondly, the restrictions that the need to 'pass on' structure implies, 
are themselves flexible, standing as points of departure from which 
" there is a wide choice of directions in which further exploration may 
embark. Chapter 6 examines the operation of a few structures in 
greater detail. 
N. 5.1 Restrictions on c-authorship are a problem for any artist (cf. N. 3.1.2): (5.3.6) 
how to make use of others' efforts without stifling originality. On 
the other hand 'power flows through the for--s, [n this case, of poetry, 
though the reference could equally have been to nusic or painting] so 
that to study them is to plug oneself in to a source of imaginative 
strength'. (Wain, 1975, p. 50) Form 'is a source of strength, of subtlety, 
of awareness' (ibid. p. 56). But form ur± vigorated by imagination 
becomes banality, habit, which 'Of all hum-, -i plants, ... req. ires the 
least fostering, and... is tue first to appear on the seeming desolation 
of the most barren rock' (Remembrance of T-ings Past, Marcel Proust, 
cited and translated by Beckett, 1970, p. 23) (cf. 0.1.5). Wain'D words 
are a plea for forms that comes late in a cycle which began with a 
rebellion against them: I ... Poets in our civilization, as it exists 
at present, must be difficult ... The poet must become more and more 
We must remember that systemic structure, in the sense in which we have been dis- 
cussing it, is bound to be largely inseparable, in a quite fundamental way, from 
physical structure, - This is-so because conceivably there could turn out to be 
important systemic structures, attainable only by wa: y of certain physical (atomic) 
events. Altered, these physical events might produce corresponding alterations in 
the logic of the system of a kind that could be neither avoided nor nullified by 
other atomic events - because of the structure that '_s already a part of physical 
atoms. Theoretical equivalents between McCulloch-Pitts neurones and natural ner- 
vous-systems do not furnish grounds for supposing that, natural neural logic might 
not have differed had natural nervous systems developed in some other form. 
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comprehensive, more allusive, more indirect, in order to force, to dis- 
locate if necessary, language into its meaning, (Eliot, 1951, p. 289). 
'Difficult' poets will rely less on form, and it is an easy step that 
brings a shift emphasis from Eliot's positive injunction to a negative 
abjuration of form itself; which, in the end, Wain argues, is 
impoverishing, as our own conclusions would make us expect. I... it 
is not given to any human artist to be so original that he breaks free 
of all influences and still remains an artist... ' (Wain, p. 54) In 
other words, the choice, as we have suggested, is between retaining 
much of the received structure - most is in any event too deep to 
reject - and suffering a degradation of creative power. Complete 
individualism is impossible, there is only 'a choice of different 
categories of alignment' (ibid p. 50). (See also Notes to Chapter 10) 
CHAPTER 6 
N. 6.0.1 Artists' use of descriptors, comparable to the ones discussed in this 
(6.1.0) 
chapter, may be explicitly called for: di San Lazzaro (1949) cites 
C6zanne's precept, 1Traitez la nature par le cylindre, la svhere, le 
c8ne'. More often they will be explicitly present in WOAs, without 
verbal vindication. Examples are numerous: the match-stick figures 
of Iflee; the shapes of Kandinsky & Miro; the descriptive rather than 
representational figures of 'primitive' artists and of children: 
painting in which 'importance' rather than perspective dictates size, 
as in Japanese landscape painting. But to some extent the very 
possibility to 'depict' with paint or, more obviously, by drawing, de- 
pends upon descriptors, more complex and numerous perhaps, but of a kind 
similar to those Guzman uses. Representationalism depends in the first 
instance pn knowing how to do it, having the right heuristics and des- 
criptors; Byzantine painting is without perspective. Giotto 
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'discovered' perspective but much of his work shows that he did not 
fully understand its use, perfecting it came to fascinate renaissance 
painters. Later European painters take it for granted and appear to 
lose awareness that it is dispensible. Habit has concealed the effort 
that discovered it in the first place. The modern movement seeks to 
throw off its constraints, but vestiges cling until after cubism, until 
in fact Clement Greenberg (1947) announces that Flatness is painting's 
aim and the 'integrity of the picture plane' comes to dominate modern 
painting (cf. N. 5.1) 
N. 6. o. 2 Descriptors in literature and music are less obvious. Music is an 
'abstract' form, which means that it is not in general part of its aim 
to establish direct links between itself and the 'real' world. 
Literature usts words, which are already descriptors of a kind. Their 
relation to other kinds of descriptors, such as those of the SEE pro- 
gramme emerges in the'use Winograd makes of them. But literary forms 
" arg not restricted to words alone. Symbols, in the literary sense, 
may be descriptors of a kind. Moles calls them forms which 'may be 
normalized and repertoried' (p. 59)0 Pound (1914) likens them to 
images (cf. N. 2.4) only where 'symbols have a fixed value, like numbers 
in arithmetic, like 1,2, and 7 ... images have a variable significance, 
like the signs a, b, and x in algebra' (p. 463. ). Prosody and poetic 
forms are not descriptors in our present sense. Nor is form in music. 
Discussion of the function of these forms must wait for Part II. 
N. 6.1 
(6.3.2) 
A's problems of expression and communication, or 0's of interpretation 
are partly alleviated by O's position, 'between' A and W, somewhat 
analagously to PLAMM's position 'betweent the 'blocks world' and 
the syntax of Winograd's language prograL. Just as Winograd's pro- 
gram is able to economize on syntactical rules by importing structure 
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from the 'physical' world of the blocks, so 0 is able to interpolate 
knowledge he may have of A to fill gaps in his understanding of W. 
Such a procedure enables 0 to distinguish A's intention from his 
execution, simply by comparing his knowledge of A, or possibly even 
the techniques A has employed, with W. 0 progresses like a man climbing 
a rope using first his feet then his hands in alternate extension. 
Chapter 2 intimated some such process when it showed (2.7.3) how 0 
distinguished W or A and then used it to discover respectively a mat- 
ching A or W. The effect is analagous to that of a ratchet: 0 fixes 
himself to A as he scales W as far as he can reach, then he fixes himself 
to W and scales A. In chapter 9 we shall discover similarities between 
this technique and the conjectures and refutations described by Popper 
(1963) by which, he argues, science progresses. In Winograd's pro- 
gramme, W is the 'blocks world', in scientific progress, W is what 
Popper calls 'objective krc-dledgel. Chapter 10 will argue that WOAs 
are We with a similar r8le, though in a different sphere. 
CHAPTER 7 
N. 7.0 At best any art machine we can make will resemble the human artist; 
that much has emerged. Osborne remarks that lit is always necessary 
to regard the work of art as an intentional object, created by a human 
being within a cultural milieu and subject to specific social conven- 
tions' (p. 23). The cultural milieu and the social conventions are a 
part of the WOA's structure because the artist has deliberately used 
them as part of his heuristic repertoire. He musters whatever struc- 
ture he can from himself and his history - specific and personal - in 
order to lengthen the strides of his own creative progress. But doing 
so he pays a price in the narrowing the limits of the kind of creativity 
he may achieve; and incidentally, the audience he can reach: Moles 
notes that meaning is not 'transmitted'; it pre-exists the message, 
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resting on a set of conventions, which receptor and transmitter hold 
a priori in common. (cf. what Monod says about 'creation' and 'revelation', 
N. 2.4) The art machine will not escape the human artist's dilemma; it 
will be no more able to do without cultural milieu and social conventions 
than the human, not unless it reduces its own capacities. The artist's 
and the art machine's goals and goal-generating potential - creativity - 
extend both backward and forwards in time. The relevance of chapter 7 
is in tracing some of the aspects of this extension from the goal's incep- 
tion, or conception, back towards its origins and forward towards its 
execution. 
N. 7.1 In the creative process AW we may characterize the generation of A's goal 
as imagination, inspiration, creativity. For A the artist, the goal is the 
idea, which is. part of him, distinguished from the thing he makes, which 
exists separately from him. His skill at manipulating his medium enables 
him to Itrat. slatel his idea into something not hiiaself, when it becomes 
the object of his own and others' contemplation. (of. Fry, 1961) As a 
paradigm, AW clarifies the distinction between the artist's conceptual and 
imaginative skills and his technical skills, which the single term artist 
confounds. The artist's technical skills are the means by which he makes 
an observable thing, those skills denoted by the word craftsmanship. A's 
goal corresponds to what Collingwood (1963) calls the 'work of art proper', 
which exists 'in the head' of the artist. Whatever the merits of this 
idea, it is clear in its emphasis of the importance of the artistic creativity, 
the c-authorship content of the WOA. But Fry's demand appears no less 
important. However secondary or 'incidental' Collingwood may believe the 
'bodily or perceptible thing' that we call the WOA, without it there can 
be no way of knowing, even for the artist himself, whether the contents of 
his head amount to art, or simply some trivial banality, heightened in his 
estithation by euphoria. As we shall show in chapter 10, the WOA 
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N. 7.2 
represents 'objective knowledge' without which no A can be more than a- 
dreamer. 
Presented with a WOA, we look for the artist, for evidence of c-authorship, 
and will even withold or assign the name WOA together with its associated 
qualities according to the degree of c-authorship discernible. . 
In the 
limiting case for instance a painter copies someone else's canvass. 
Making an exact copy requires him to use the same kind and mixture of 
paints, the same quality and size of brush, the same kind of canvas, of 
brush strokes, &c. Indeed it is probably to gain understanding of these 
features of another painter's work that an artist decides to copy his can- 
vas in the first place. A perfect copy may lead us to admire his skill, 
though we should not think of him as the artist any more than we should a 
computer that reproduced a picture according to some relatively simple pro- 
cess, by scanning an existing one say, and translating its light intensities 
into a pattern on a CRS or some kind of print-out. (Yet pictures made in 
just this way have been described as 'computer generated'! Harmon & 
Knowlton, 1968). The WOA must exhibit the artist. We wish to recog- 
nize the painter in his portraits of different sitters, the actor in the 
character he plays, the performer in his rendering of a piece of music. 
N. 7.3.0 But the credit we accord an author also depends on our knowledge of his 
(7.4,7.5) 
problem, of what he set out to accomrlich. A move on a chess board may 
- win aesthetic approval though only from one who understands chess. 0 
assesses the solution against the problem and takes both into account in 
arriving at a judgement of the author. In cases of shared authorship this 
acts to diminish the degree of c-authorship that 0 is prepared to assign 
to the various partial authors. This is what happens in practice. 
Paragraphs 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 provide the practical situation with a theoretical 
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framework, while suggesting grounds on which c-authorship might be appor- 
tioned, roughly according to the scope for c-authorship left to successive 
partial authors acting within the confines laid down for them by their 
antecedents. 
N. 7.3.1 Thus a musical score shows a high degree of structure (information content), 
being a selection of one from all possible musical scores. Whereas the 
degree of structure of the performer's rendering of it shows a lower degree 
of structure, being a selection from the narrower range of variety that is 
left to the performer, between the injunction of the score with its limited 
capacities to designate gradations of amplitude, tempo &c. and the finer 
discriminative capacities of the individual's auditory apparatus. 
C-authorship is credited both to composer and performer though generally, 
if not invariably, a higher degree to the composer. The performer is the 
composer's instrument as mach as the performer's may be the piano or the 
violin. 
N. 7.3.2 The architect A*, the builder A and the building W provide another example 
of shared authorship. In the case of this example, 0 apportions c-author- 
ship in different shares. A* sets A's goals by realizing a sub-goal in 
the form of his plans and specifications for the building, but receives most 
of the credit as author, not simply for the plans, which are quite likely 
to be forgotten once the building has been completed, but. -for the building 
itself; while the builder receives an author's credit, only for such a 
limited interprative role as architect may have allowed him. 
N"7.3.3 Other oo-authors are the computer and its programer - what conditions 
'allow us to assert that the programs problem-solve'? (Newell, 1962) - 
and, at the other end of the scale, the patron and the artist he employs. 
The patron may commission a work from an artist, specify the subject and 
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even make stipulations as to its treatment but, unless he were to take a 
substantial role in at least planning the details of its execution, he 
would receive little credit for playing a creative part in the finished 
work. In all these cases the information-content test for authorship 
applies, at least in principle. These cases are all sequential situations, 
in which purposeful systems operate in. linear series. Other possibilities 
may be more complicated, such as for example the production of a play or an 
opera, a film or a television programme, though such cases reduce to sequential 
forms, as we mentioned in 7.5.3, if the various participants in the productions 
are assigned priorities. Indeed this is almost certainly a necessary prac- 
tical condition for the achievement of such productions at all. 
N. 7.4.0 What about group production processes in which the participants may not 
(7.6) 
be supposed - as hitherto - to have the same goals, but may share no more 
than certair sub-goals? Such processes are the milieu of designers 
rather than artists, though the distinction, as we shall see, is somewhat 
blurred. We may assess the designer as c-author according to the sarge 
principles we used for apportioning c-authorship among groups of partial 
author., namely by the variety within which his order-extraction occurs. 
Suppose a productive process consists of a chain comprising a number of 
purposeful systems to each of which priorities have been assigned, so that 
the process 3s sequential, as above. Suppose A has voluntarily (7.3.3) 
accepted a relatively low priority in the chain. Then A's freedom to 
generate goals will be circumscribed by the goals of all the systems in 
the process that have higher priorities. For instance A might be an 
industrial designer, required to design an object for mass production, 
conforming to specifications laid down by various different departments 
of a manufacturing firm, variables occurring under such heads as accounts, 
tooling, material costs and availability, sales and so forth. Clearly 
these variables show a high degree of inter-dependence: A more expensive 
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material might increase sales but put up costs; or a popular material 
might need special manufacturing equipment or have unreliable suppliers. 
Now each department would have its own main goal to which A would have to 
conform. The tooling department might wish to use available machinery; 
the sales department to compete with some particular item on the market, 
and so on. Or A might be a 'craftsman' making a table, say. In this 
case his own sub-goals will take the place of the main goals of the various 
departments of the industrial designer's firm. The cases are clearly 
equivalent. In terms of the formulation of 7.1.1, A faces a double task, 
first to form an explicit goal sets made up of elements that comply with 
all priority goals and sub-goals, and then to select from this residual 
set a complete set of compatible, non-redundant specifications of his own 
goal, - or in the craftsman's case, his own artistic, goal. This is a 
problem whose solution, to an observer without knowledge of it, displays 
little if any evidence of how it has been reached. 
' Clearly the variety 
of A's residual goal set (what the constraints due to prior goals have not 
eliminated) will be greatly reduced compared 'co those of the artist on 
whom constraints of comparable severity seldom result from goals of higher 
priority than the making of a WOA. Credit for c-authorship of a design 
normally goes to those for whom the design has been the main goal. But 
in evaluating the quantity of c-authorship, the character of the design='s 
task inevitably emphasizes his problem-solving ability in circumstances 
that frequently conceal from the design's judges, the problem he has solved. 
N. 7.4.1 The reduced variety of the world within which the designer may be a c-author 
is seen to detract from his achievement and to assign him and his works a 
position of importance inferior to that of the artist. Similar con- 
siderations, which detract from the assessed artistic merit of Ws, applies 
in all cases in which the object of making a WOA has not been paramount. 
Examples are propagandist writing or painting, advertizing, or any form 
228. 
of art in which the communication of a 'message' or some other didactic 
purpose has taken precedence. We should emphasize that this view derives 
from the conclusions of our theoretical arguments, though various empirical 
arguments support it. Two in particular seem important: (1) the notion 
that art should be didactic ('committed' as it is sometimes called) has 
been present to a greater or lesser extent at most times, within Western 
culture at any rate. Ethnological evidence suggests that probably most 
art originates in solving quasi-didactic problems. But the art whose 
merit has survived the judgement of successive generations of critics has 
tended, in modern times, to be non-didactic; and of the art - including 
ethnological artefacts - of earlier, more explicitly and generally d. idac- 
tic periods; has tended to survive despite its didactic intent rather than 
because of it. (2) All the arguments we have used so far have applied 
equally to art and science. Science at least casts no empirical doubts 
upon the conclusions they have led to. Scientific theory or experiment 
whose in goal is anything other than that of extracting order from its 
data, or of adding to the data by discoveries, is judged worse in so far 
as it is seen to be the result of pre-conceptions. Alchemy, and Lysenkean 
genetics are among the more obvious examples of its consequences. * 
*Monod draws attention to Engels's (1935) applications of Dialectical Materialism to 
science. In elementary algebra for example this reveals that, 
ýstrippcd cf the veil of mystery in which it was wrapped by the 
old idealist philosophy and in which it is to the advanta of 
helpless metaphysicians ... to keep it enveloped', (p. 152) 
for any algebraic magnitude whatever, call it as 
'negated, we get -a (minus a). If we negate that negation, by 
multiplying -a by -a, kM get +a2, i. e. the original positive 
magnitude, but at a higher degree, raised to its second power. 
In this case also it makes no difference that we can reach the 
same a2 by multiplying the positive a by itself, thus also 
getting a2. For the negatad negation is so securely entr nche& 
in a2 that the latter always has two square roots, namely a and 
; 0'. (p"l53) 
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N. 7.4.2 In modern times the movement against ulterior purposes in art, flourished 
partly in reaction to earlier didacticism, but was also associated with 
notions of individual liberty. Williams (1961) traces the rise of-the 
idea of the individual to the idea of the individual soul, which nourished 
the Reforation, $man's direct and individual relation with God', rather 
than his 'destiny within an ordered structure' (p. 91). Artists frequently 
had had to fill the diminished role of designers and had been wholly depen- 
dent on patronage. Duchamp's answer when he was offered a number of com- 
missions after his success in 1913 expresses a widely held attitude: 'No 
thanks. I prefer any liberty. ' (Cited by Lake & Maillard, 1956,. p. 84") 
Though by this time the attitude was probably hardly more than what Tom 
Wolfe (1976) refers to as 'the anti-bourgeois sin-along of bohemia, stan- 
dard since the 1940's, as natural as breathing by now [the 1920s]ß and 
quite marvellously devoid of any rational content'(p. 74). 
N. 7.5 In addition to constraints on d due to other purposeful systems, among 
which we should include A's culture and the history, and traditions that 
affect his chosen field, are constraints due to the (real' world. On the 
one hand, a human A owes his own structure very largely to the lc--ig, 
evolutionary order-extraction process that has permitted the development 
and survival of the human species. As we showed in chapter 2, this process 
has led to correlations between A and those aspects of the world with which 
A's antecedents have survived contact. Ate perceptions farther these 
correlations, reflecting, not simply some treall world, but the one with 
which At both specifically and individually has a relationship. For 
creatures to survive, 1the self image must be in close correspondence with 
the reality of themselves and their environment., (Fogel & others, p. 122) 
If A is a machine then, as chapters 4&5 showed, much of its structure 
will derive from its human maker. To this extent, any A is also a W. 
It is the product of a process in which both purposeful and non-purposeful 
processes have played a part and, in this, is constrained in the goals it 
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can generate and thus the Ws of which it can be the c-author. But for 
A the controller, the constraints that make up the structure of M and E 
also restrict the Ws that AW can produce. These limits being 'physical' 
naturally are most confining for As working in the 'physicals world, like 
painters and sculptors, or those who rely on a physical medium, such as 
musicians, whose music depends on the phenomena of sound and the charac- 
teristics of musical instruments. But no A is free of physical constraints. 
Commonly A will turn constraints to his purpose. They do not 'make the 
work any less individual, and whether it be that of an architect, a cabinet- 
maker or a composer, [they reflect] no less minutely the most subtle shades 
of the artist's personality'. (Proust, Vol-4, p. 292) These constraints 
do not detract from A's achievement. Unlike the designer who may be com- 
pelled to work in oak or stainless steel when he might have chosen walnut 
or pewter, the artist is normally freer to make his own choice, and uses the 
choice to achieve the effect he wants. The painter cannot determine the 
position of every particle of paint. Instead he relies on choosing oil 
paint, water-colour or whatever as his Imedium', picks his brushes and the 
kind of surface on which to work and allows these to 'arrange' the paint 
particles for him. The musician chooses his instrument and relies upon his 
choice for achieving what he would be unable to do in any other way. 
Simulating the attack and decay of sound patterns for different instruments, 
using a computer, has so far proved an intractable problem. Writers, es- 
pecially poets, deliberately draw upon 'physicals qualities when they might 
have been supposed relatively free from the restrictions these impose. Their 
repertoire consists of rhythms, rhymes, the tonality of words and imagery 
appealing to the senses - including the kinaesthetio, what William 
Empsom calls tmuscular imagery'. Indeed the artist uses the constraints 
of his chosen medium to extend his own variety into the wider variety of 
the world. * 
*Aspects of this notion, especially in the form in which we have consi. ered it here 
are treated by Kepes (1965), Radofsky (1965) and Whyte (1961). 
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CHAPTER 8 
N. 8.0 Chapter 8 ends our examination of authorship. It argues that A must 
include among its various features one that resembles 0; such a member 
is a necessary part of its control and regulatory apparatus, without 
which it would be unable to realize any goal in E. This conclusion pro- 
vides a basis for an answer to an important question that we have so far 
neglected; What is a WOA? Beyond asserting that a WOA must be the pro- 
duct of authorship, we have nowhere so far been explicit about its distin- 
guishing characteristics. Paragraphs 0.4.2 dealt with some of the 
difficulties of arriving at a satisfactory definition of a WOA. Either 
the definitions turned out to be too wide, admitting all comers without 
providing sound reasons why, as in the case of Wittgenstein's 'family 
resemblance group' (0.4.2.2); or they tended to depend upon other notions, 
as difficult to define as the idea of a WOA, for which they had been 
invoked. The breadth and evident arbitrariness of what legitimately 
claim to be WOAs has increasingly, in this century, particularly since 
the Dada movexent,. made the task of definition impossible. But the problem 
partly vanishes if we adopt a paradigm for an author that acknowledges the 
controller-observer's role, which, as wa have seen, other reasons demand 
in any event. For if A asserts that W is a WOA, then, if no hoax is 
intended, it is - for A. We mention in passing that knowledge of brain 
structure makes our present paradigm by no means far-fetched. George 
(1965) for example, observes that 'the total motivational system operates 
on a conceptual basis' (p. l20) and that 'there is ... good reason to 
accept curiosity as a drive' (p. 121). This notion of conceptualization, 
which George bases on brain models, implies at least the possibility of 
a natural model of the kind we have proposed. The problem of possible 
hoaxes, which might have been serious, turns out not to bei because any 
claims A makes for W will have to satisfy the individual judgement of 
0 
0 
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N. 8.1 
each particular 0 whose assessment may be sought. This is the case 
whether A claims that W is a WOA or that it is not. Thus ethnological 
objects are not intended as WOAs by their makers or even their users, 
yet may be judged to be WOAs by certain Os. Indeed ! found objects' may 
become surrogate WOAs simply on the judgement of their finders. Mayer 
(1969) defines a 'found object' as 'An-object which is found selected and 
exhibited by an artist, usually without being altered in any way ... 
The artist's role in its presentation is creative only in that it points 
out aesthetic values that the object already possesses but that were not 
deliberately considered in its construction' (p. 153). How this comes 
about will appear in the following paragraph. But before advancing any 
explanation. we should claim that the overall assertion of our argument is 
not implausible. Agreement between art critics and arts wider audiences 
is not so great that we should feel a need to seek an explanation of it in 
some unifying principle of WOAs. On the contrary, taste is so disparate 
among the different g-oups, distinguished by history, culture, class, 
education and so forth that it appears to be the variations more than 
the agreements that call for understanding. In any event we have seen 
in a number of contexts, beginning in 2.2, that any order that appears 
does so relative to some particular observer. The present contention is 
merely a corollary to this assertion. 
Of particular interest in AW, as chapter 3 newly depicts it, is the 
relationship between W and. W*. How do the two entities affect one 
another and where does A stand between them? Paragraph N. 6.1 intimated 
that 0's position lbetweent W and its producer enabled 0 to use each as 
a source of information about the other, and we likened this procedure to 
the use of PLANNER in Winograd's language programme. The present paradigm 
clarifies these earlier ideas. Some 0, as we now see, must be part of A 
and, though W may have other Os, considering them rather than the 0 that 
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belongs to A, introduces separate and, in this context, extraneous problems. 
Thus, in the greater detail that chapter 8 furnishes, 0 appears symmet- 
rically between W* and W. Looking forward to the discussion of objective 
knowledge that follows, at the beginning of Part II, we anticipate the main 
idea that the argument there advances, that all We which AW may produce 
represent objectification of W*s, and that therefore WOAs, as members of the 
class of Ws, represent objective knowledge. We shall look to our present 
argument to support this view. For our present conclusion imparts to W, 
from consideration of AW alone, irrespective of the kind of W it produces, 
the status of objective knowledge. Since, as we have observed, the value 
of the objective knowledge that any W provides is to be assessed relative 
to the 0 that uses it, this value will depend upon similarities and differen- 
ces between the user-0 and the particular 0 that was part of the process 
that produced it. 
N. 8.2 According to 8.3 the creative prccess is by no means a unitary event, but X8.3) 
proceedb rather by successive approximations, during which not just W but 
W* too, the model of W that A's goal-setting procedure uses, alter, if AW 
succeeds, in gradual convergence, un'vil the correspondence between them 
is sufficient to permit the process to halt. This occurs in the manner 
N. 6.1 describes, with the 0 in A- that is A in its capacity as 0, write 
A(0) - alternating between two production processes, AW*, the construction 
of W*, and AW. W provides a test facility for ideas that develop in W *# 
according co the results of which W* may be modified and the ideas further 
developed. Such a procedure is possible provided the time scale T of 
events in W' is more rapid than the time scale t of events in the real 
world, which is the case for the human A. We recognize in this process, 
a resemblance to a 'scientific method', though lacking formal proof pro- 
cedures that enable the connecting together or ordering of ideas, in 
the manner described in chapter 2. The symbiotic relationship between 
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W and W* depends upon the differences in variety and structure of E*, A's 
representation of the environment, and E, the environment itself. In 
general correspondences between E and E* will be both loose and changeable. 
E`*Is variety is lower than Eis with the result that ,& will use E as a 
stimalus for its own creativity. A's initial goal is likely to be quite 
inexplicit. TS Eliot has observed that a poem may begin from no more 
than the idea, in the sense of an experience, of a rhythm, say. Perhaps 
it may be less explicit still, no more than a sense of restlessness for 
instance, sufficient to set AW in motion. From here A may seek to narrow 
his goal's specifications through recourse to E. This may even take the 
form of an appeal to the characteristics of the medium itself. Thus 
artists will allow colours to 'run' and generally to use physical constraints 
in the manner we have noted (N. 7.5). Such procedures have become highly 
explicit this century. Arnheim (1971) cites works of Abstract Expressionism, 
particularly Jackson Pollock e paintings of the late 1940s which (show a 
random distribution of sprinkled and splashed pigment controlled by the 
artist's sense of visual order' (p. 23). The Dadaists cut up printed poems 
with scissors and drew the cut up words out of a hat to make new poems. 
William Burroughs (1970) reports somathing similar. Francis Bacon reports 
(Sunday Times Colour Supplement, 24 March 1975) making use of the artis- 
tically suggestive qualities of partially destroyed photographs. Less 
randomly, though still providing explicit 3xalaptes of the nourishment 
afforded W* by W, Steiner (1972) shows how writers who write in more than 
one language are able to cross-fertilize their linguistio styles. He cites 
the example of Samuel Beckett, who has translated his own writing in French 
into English, showing how he will often develop the words of an expression 
when he translates into English, from expressions suggested by the French 
written previously 
0 
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'No outside translator would have found the equivalents chosen by 
Beckett for the famous crescendo of mutual flyting in Act II of 
Waiting for Godot ... The English version springs from the French 
not by translation but by intimate recreation; [italics added] 
Beckett seems capable of reliving in either French or English the 
poetic associative processes that produced his initial text' (p. 18). 
Most finished WOAs conceal the developmental process that underlies them, 
as much or more than a scientific paper or the proof of a theorem conceals 
the intuitions and heuristic stratagems that led to it - more, because it 
is often the object of the artist to conceal his way. (See for example 
Medawar, 1969) Moles observes that 'The artistic deed is autoro mous, 
independent of its technique of construction. It may be accessible 
through its structures, but nothing a priori indicates that these are 
connected with the technique of construction' (p. 114). Pentimento or 
original manuscripts of music or writing reveal what the finished WOA 
does not, the deletions, additions and changes of mind of partial goals 
partially realized. 
Notice that A's'goal, whether fully specified or not, is reached only 
if and when W satisfies A as-sufficiently realizing it. In general A 
is likely to be unable to give objective specification of its goal, - 
except by means of W. (Chapter 10 takes up this-subject in detail. ) 
So what A's goal is may never be more explicit even to A than W makes 
it. In practice A may employ various criteria for determining whether 
or not W realizes a goal. A may seek justification for the development 
of W by making explicit reference to the received criteria of his art, 
rather as a mathematician may seek proofs to justify his intuitions. 
But what indicates to A whether or not a goal has been attained, may 
equally remain quite vague. Nadezhda Mandelstarr (1971) for example 
reports that her husband, the poet Ossip Mandelstam would experience a 
sense of buzzing in his head during the composition of a poem, which 
would persist, evidently outside his control, until the poem assumed 
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the form that he then took to be 'right', The goal is known only when 
it is reached. It is worth stressing this because the reverse is often 
supposed: unless failure occurs, A's goal - final goal - is what W. more 
or less, realizes; and although alternative goal descriptions may be 
offered - such as a verbal description of a painting given by an artist - 
W still furnishes the only means for-fully revealing the description's. 
meaning. Thus a young child, asked to draw a man, may be satisfied with 
lines resembling a spider. One would look for reasons for this, con- 
nected with the child's repertoire of descriptors, with his 'understandings 
of the instruction, and with the state of his perceptual and motor develop- 
ment. Klee's figures that sometimes resemble children's naturally call 
for quite different explanations, reflecting as they do the realization 
of different goals. Before modern times, art, especially in the West, 
has often been deceptively clear in-its objectives, which is why modern 
art, which often deliberately sets out to destroy the subtleties that 
veil the goals WOAs express, provides many illustrations in which it is 
easier to see the operation of the processes that are our concern than 
earlier works. What goals for instance are realized in Morgenstern's 
poem Nightsong of the Fish, a wordless composition consisting merely 
of prosodic markings? We have mentioned these various questions mainly 
because the theory so far developed appears to offer a richer source of 
answers than approaches that ignore artistic purpose, such as for 
instance the information theoretic approach of Moles, or the Gestalt 
psychological one of Anheim (1967) 
lWe must have imagination awakened by the uncertainty of being 
able to attain our object, to create a goal which hides our 
other goal from us**. 
'There must be between us and the fish which, if we saw it for 
the first time cooked and served on the table, would not appear 
worth the endless trouble, craft and strategem that are necessary. 
if we are to catch it, interposed, during our afternoons with the 
rod, the ripple to whose surface come wavering, without our quite 
knowing what we are intended to do with them, the burnished gleam 
of flesh, the indefiniteness of a form, in the fluidity of a 
" transparent and glowing azure. ' (Proust, Vol. 4, p. 133) 
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N. 8.4 The argument of N. 8.0, that every WOA is particular to the 0 that claims 
it is one - an assertion whose truth only the general agreement that 
sometimes occurs among groups of Os conceals - implies that to apprehend 
a WOA, 0 must undertake a process similar to the creative process on 
which A produced the WOA in the first place. Analagously with the way 
we have portrayed A's creative process, we may picture O's role as 
audience. ' We envisage a state of disequilibrium induced in 0 by W- or 
more properly, by 0's addressing himself to the task of apprehending W. 
This, 0 will. gradually reduce by means of a series of references back 
and forth between W-in-E and 0's representation of E, Eß(0) say. The 
disequilibrium vanishes when 0 has extracted order from W, which he can 
represent as a W*(O) that matches W. Two immediate consequences of this 
portrayal of As audience are, first that, if W is to cause 0 to enter 
a state similar to A's at the completion of W. then 0 and A must share 
similar kinds of structure, and more particularly, the variety of 0's 
representation. of E must be at least as great as Atsa Osborne mentions 
RK Elliott (1972) among a number of theorists who have insisted that aestl 
apprehension of a great work must have 'full imaginative commitment to 
its evocative forcer. Secondly, 0 may need, in addition to the indicators 
W provides, evidence, such as W does not display, of A's intention in pro- 
ducing W. 
N. 8.5 Various indications support such a view of Ols r8le. In N. 8.0 we men- 
tioned the 'artistic' Ale of the finder of 'found objects', or of the 
0 who viewed some ethnological artefact as a WOA, even though its maker 
had never intended it as one. We may take this argument further. For 
0 must settle questions of A's intention generally. 0 is not passively 
manipulated by W, like a computer by a simple program' he assumes meta- 
r8les, and reflects on his own reactions and the relation between A's 
goals and product, using evidence that is likely to come from a wide 
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variety of sources besides any particular WOA that may be the subject 
of his attention at the time. 0 does not differ from A in any of this. 
Questions of A's intention in a WOA touch on problems of 'unconscious' 
intentions; multiplicity of interpretations - such as of Shakespeare's 
plays, especially in production, for example; how A's intention may be 
known if he has failed to express it in a WOA; how knowledge of A's 
intention from an external source might influence interpretation or 
judgement of a WOA by 0; what the relation is between 0 and a WOA. 
Answers will come from the criteria and conventions governing the use 
in the judgement of WOAs of what we have elsewhere referred to as know- 
ledge of the problem; in our terms, through a study of the structures 
by which A may have been previously programmed (3.2.0), with the object 
by means of this study, of gaining an understanding of the kinds of goal 
structures that A might have been trying - perhaps unsuccessfully - to 
realize by leans of some given W. The problem of which knowledge is 
sought here includes the full contextual specifications of A's task. 
There is the context of 'art' itself: Nightsong of a Fish is a poem 
only because it is proclaimed to be one by inclusion in a poetry book; 
just as a heap of leaves is a ! sculpture'. only when an art gallery, say, 
exhibits it as one. There is the historical context, the particular 
tradition and development of which W forms a part, with which it may con- 
sciously associate itself by alluding to some-specific aspect of the 
tradition - allusions whose force will be, lost on an audience ignorant of 
their objects. There is A's biography and his development as an artist, 
.,: 
his sketches, cartoons and first draughts, his critical evaluations. 
And there are wider contexts known by names such as 'Zeitge_il 
'Weltangschaung' and ethos', which may involve, m6. ny aspects of the world 
in which W is produced. All this and much more, besides makes up 0's 
I 
evidence of A's intention. This is why, beyond A's intention, 
an artistic intention may be internally' apparent in the work itself, 
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N. 8.6 
although this intention may not correspond with any conscious or uncon- 
scious intention in the biography of the artist'. Nevertheless, 'it 
is-possible to judge how far a work of art succeeds in realizing the 
intention implicit in its. (Osborne, p. 22). 
So A may betray an emotion as well as express one, or generally-endow 
a WQL with content, without being aware of it simply, because he has 
been 'programed' with it. And 0, by discovering A's programming may 
uncover what the content is. A acknowledges 0's creative role. We 
have already given the example (N. 8.3) of Nichtsong of the Fish. We 
turn once more to other modern examples because of their caricaturing 
way of deliberately revealing the tricks they use. 'Minimal' art is 
an example of A explicitly calling upon O's creativity. Similarly, 
the simple act on A's part of placing W in a context associated with 
art - publishing Nightsong of the Fish in a book of poems, or hanging 
a plain black canvass or placing a heap of leaves in a picture gallery 
- may often be sufficient to embark 0 on his creative role. Osborne 
cites Cioffi: 'A conviction that a poet stands in a certain relation 
to his words conditions our response to them'. With this relation 
established, 0 may at once undertake his creative task. Notice how 
the theory of the mutual convergence of W* and W is what enables us to 
assign 0 his creative role. The creative process of A and that of the 
independent 0 differ only in that 0s carries the restriction which re- 
quires W to remain physically fixed; so that, the direction of 0's 
creative process is the reverse of Vag with 0 seeking a W* to match W 
rather than the other way about. Thus Duchamp may present his 'ready- 
madesl, * or the Dadaists their picture painted by a brush, tied to a 
*'Ready-made': 'A man-made object, usually mass-produced, that was not made with 
any artistic consideration in mind but is mounted or displayed as an aesthetically 
. significant structure; a form of found object. ' (Mayer, p. 322) 
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donkey's tail, and Os will emerge to create W09s out of them. And when 
they have done so, the hill received critical apparatus will be at their 
disposal to reinforce their creative achievement with critical acclaim. 
The critic's role is the last line of argument we cite. The critic, as 
a particular 0, apprehends aW in a particular way. He then proceeds 
to try to induce the same apprehension'. in others; and, by drawing atten- 
tion to particular properties and presenting particular kinds of descrip- 
tions of the W, to induce others to adopt them. His selection of pro- 
perties and presentation of his description mimics A's on operations. 
N. 8.7 Presumably it is the separate creative roles of A and each individual 0 
that gives art a bad name with science (chapter 0). Though nothing we 
have assumed in arriving at our view makes it apply only to WOAs and not 
to other Ws. If there is a distinction to be. mentioned here - Part II 
will deal with W in greater detail - it nest be connected: with the 
relative degrees of agreement between the judgements of different Os 
that We in science and We in art command. A scientific theory for 
instance such as the Theory of Evolution brings together into a connected 
whole a large body of knowledge, about which there may already have been 
a wide measure of agreement; a new theorem attaches to the axioms and 
inference rules within which it is proved and, unless some 0 disputes 
some notion with a very wide acceptance - such as the nature of proof 
for instance - there will be little ground for major differences between 
different 0's assessments of it. Clearly the case of WOAs is different, 
though the differences are exaggerated for several reasons. First, it 
is true that a random collection of smudges on a canvase may be pronounced 
a WOA by some and dismissed as a random collection of smudges by others. 
But, in practice, discrepancies will generally be less bizarre. For the 
rule of connectibility, which calls for each W to fit into some existing 
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structure, applies to art too; and wide discrepancies of interpretation 
are unlikely to persist for very long, as each particular WOA or group 
of WOAs, is required, over a period of time, to connect to a wider and 
wider base. Secondly, the extent of agreement between Os in science 
may easily be over-estimated, if only because of the unifying power of 
sciences 'successful' concepts, which allows 'failures' to be neglected 
and quickly to vanish almost without trace. Thirdly the explicit tech- 
nicality of science successfully excludes from among its judges many of 
those whom ignorance of its problems properly disqualifies from that role; 
while art, lacking arty.. comparable technical barrier, attracts judges with 
too little knowledge of art's problems to permit them meaningful assess- 
ments. In short, scientific Os axe screened by the filter of science's 
technicality, while art must accept the disparate opinions of all comers. 
N. 8.8 We note that, although we have approached the problem quite differently 
from Collingwood (1963), the WOAs that AW will produce within our for- 
mulation satisfy all Collingwood's criteria for works of'art, namely, 
(i) that art is not a means to an end - goals extraneous to a WOA detract 
from it (N. 7.4). (2) in art there need be no distinction between planning 
and execution, - W* alters along with W; (3) following from (1) and (2), 
no reversal of order is possible from ends to means or execution to 
planning; (4) there is no distinction in art, between raw material and 
finished product (cf. Molests obserration, N. 8.2). A uses the constraints 
of his medium to make W's production progress (N. 7.5) and W* moves there- 
fore with the medium; (5) by (4), there is no distinction in art between 
form and matter as there is in craft , the product of design 
(N. 7.5); 
(6) Art lacks the hierarchy that crafts show, each dictating ends to the 
one below it, and providing either means, or parts or raw materials to 
the one above (N. 7.4)" 
6 
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CHATPER 9 
N. 9.0 Here, explicitly, begins a drawing together of art and science. The 
attitudes and arguments that chapter 0 cites of mutual antagonism between 
the arts and the sciences needs to be differently founded. Because we 
have allowed W such full generality, all that has been said of authorship 
is equally true whether its products are scientific or artistic. In 
N. 3.0 we noted similarities between scientific and artistic progress. 
Subsequently (N. 8.5) we suggested, using similar arguments, likenesses 
between scientific and artistic 'justification' (Reichenbach, 4.1.2). 
Here we explore the uses of W. Distinguish features of scientific 
and artistic Ws are seen to be less sharply defined than they are usually 
represented to be. Objectivity and explicitness and their opposites 
are not dichotomous features but the poles of continua, or more properly 
of continuous mixes. Effectiveness depends on knowledge of it. Con- 
jectures and refutations will have unconscious as well as consc+ous 
elements. Medawar's objection to literature (0.1.2), that though it 
is required to be internally consistent it is not expected to be empirically 
true, might apply equally to an axiomatic system. But a correspondance 
might become apparent between the latter kind of system and the real world, 
in which case the system might provide the basis for an empirical theory; 
and if the correspondence were 'close', the theory might extend the notion 
of reality beyond the realm of experience, as for example in the case oi. 
modern physics. No reason is immediately apparent why an internally con- 
sistent piece of literature or other work of art should not be put into 
a similar kind of correspondence with reality, though art might prove 
more suitable as a model of a somewhat different 'aspects of reality from 
that for which we should use an axiomatic system. The different aspects 
of reality that the axiomatic system and the work of art might be used to 
model could for example be those corresponding to the two parts of the 
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bi-partite structure of the heuristic that Minsky mentions (0.2.2.1). 
In other respects the conclusions of this chapter suggest no reason 
in principle, on grounds of explicitness, objectivity or effectiveness, 
for denying artistic Ws equal status with scientific ones. 
CHAPTER 10 
N. 10.0 In his essay Politics and the English Language George Orwell enunciated 
a number of rules for writers. What he advised included recommendations 
to prefer the active voice to the passive, the particular to the general 
and the concrete to the abstract, * Tom Wolfe (1976) writing about modern 
painting in an essay entitled The Painted Word argues that, as art turned 
away from realism towards abstraction, the theory underlying it became 
more and more important until now he can quote Hilton Kramer, chief at 
critic of The New York Times as saying, 'frankly, these days, without a 
Y theory to go with it, I can't see a painting. ' Juxtaposing these views 
makes an important point about art, especially as it differs from science. 
Approaching the question from different sides, both Orwells and Wolfe's 
arguments - Orwell's concern here is writing and particularly writing with 
a purpose, but there is nothing in the spirit of what he-says to preclude 
its extension to the wider field of art. - imply a need for self-sufficiency 
in art, a belief that art's concern is with the particular, the concrete, 
the actively observable, the thing that exists in its own right, accessible 
" without the aid of special liowledge'or analytical apparatus. Without 
this self-sufficiency, art ceases to be art. No such demands are made 
*Orwell argued roughly that unclear writing reflected unclear thinking, and that if a writer could not express what he wanted to say, it was because he was not 
sure of it himself. This is a view that positivists would accept, and which 
extends naturally to the notion of effective procedures. 
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upon science. On the contrary: science's concern is with the abstract, 
the general, with conclusions based upon the broadest possible theoretical 
foundation. No scientist would expect to be able to understand the 
papers in a scientific journal without a grounding in the theory on which 
they are based. Wolfe's view must not be pressed too far. We have 
argued throughout for the importance of forms and structures for art. 
Nevertheless we should interpret the development that Wolfe complains 
of in painting, as vindi: ating the ideas we have advanced. For, as we 
observed (N. 5.1, N. 7.4.2) the movement towards abstraction in painting 
began as an attempt to break with what was seen as the tyranny of received 
forms in art. And now 
'How far we've comet How religiously we've cut away the fat! 
In the beginning we got rid of nineteenth-century storybook realism. 
Then we got rid of representational objects. Then we got rid of 
the third dimension altogether and got really flat (Abstract 
Expressionism). Then we got rid of airiness, brushstrokes, most 
of the paint, and the last viruses of drawing and complicated designs 
(Hard Edge, Colour Field, Washington School). 
'Eh h? Hardly, said the Minimalists ... I 
(Wolfe, p. 79) 
But in soi, ie degree at any rate these forms had all been readily accessible 
to almost anyone in Western culture and well beyond. Abandoned as 
tyrannies, the forms now appear to have been artts indispensible framework, 
which surrendered, had to be replaced, if art were to be possible at all. 
If structure does not exist, it is necessary to invent it. Though replace- 
ment by private theories of art's publicly accessible tradition is a move- 
ment towards a subjectivity that denies art the general value that it 
otherwise enjoys as a W. And though the theories are individual, they 
tend nevertheless to be unoriginal, - as we should expect from what we 
have said (especially in chapter 4) about the slowness and difficulty of 
invention - ecclectic assemblages, heavily dependent on other orthodoxies. 
N. 10.1 * I... what it is that the artist, as such and essentially, produces ... is 
two things. -Primarily it is an "internal', or "mental" thing, ... some- 
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N. 10.2 
thing of the kind we commonly call an experience. ' (Collingwood, p. 37) 
To this 'mental' thing Collingwood gives the title, the 'work of art proper'. 
A WOA is one owing only to its relation to this 'work of art proper'. 
Within the theory developed in chapter 8, this view is untenable as it 
stands. It requires the relaxation of the condition that demands that the 
'work of art proper' should exist in the artist's head alone. As chapter 
8 showed, the WOA is only apprehended and given the name by an observer, 
when he has constructed his own 'mental' thing to match what he observes. 
The problem is related to questions of knowledge by acquaintance and know- 
ledge by description. Experience represents ! mowledge by acquaintance 
(10.3). If a WOA represents experience, it does so by description. 
George (1965) compares the two kinds of. knowledge respectively to the 
machine languages and the automatic programming languages of general pur- 
post digital computers. How art's automatic programming language operates 
is the subject of the following chapter. Here our concern is with the 
idea of transmitting experience, which results from the interpretation. 
of art we have arrived at. 
In a certain respect it is obviously true that art is its own justification, 
sufficient for those who want it and unconcerned about detractors. But 
is there a defence against the charge (N. 10.0) that art is merely doing 
- in a second-rate kind of way -a job that science will eventually take 
over? Is there anything that art can do which science cannot? 'Experience' 
must provide the answers to these questions, in particular its uniquenes. 
Paragraph N. 8.3 looked at the way A's goals develop. We have mentioned 
(N. 8.2) the gradual convergence, during the progress of AW, of W and A's 
representation of it, W*. And we have argued that the finished W is the 
most specific description of A's goal that is possible. Suppose though 
that this were not the case, that it were possible to describe in words 
say, the goal that some particular A had realized in some given WOA, a 
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painting for instance. In order to replace the description that the 
painting provided, clearly the words would have to convey the same 
experience as the painting. It follows that, though the alternative to 
the painting might be possible, it would be (by 10.1.0) highly unlikely. 
+ 
In the final instance, the meaning of a painting is the painting; the 
meaning of the poem, the poem; the symphony, itself. Other descriptions 
- usually; though not necessarily verbal - can be no more than approximations. 
Pictures, novels, poems, music are not illustrations of ideas, they are 
the programs. of experience. And though it may be possible to abstract 
ideas from them - especially their verbal forms, in which ideas specifically 
may feature as part of a wider ensemble - or describe in words - or some 
other form - what they are, it is next to impossible to find substitutes, 
for them. The chief reason for this is the time-orderedness of experience 
(10.1.0). A poem for instance may include images, symbols, rhythm, sound, 
associations, &c., all occurring simultaneously or in a fixed pattern, ' 
as complexes of compresence, giving rise to sequences of 'total momen- 
tary experiences' in some fixed order. 
N. 10.3 But WOAs are no mere surrogates for the reality that is experience's usual 
source, they are sources in their own right. They do more than simply 
'help us extend our personal experience' (George, 1970, p. 130) in the 
sense of multiplying it, providing surrogates of experiences we might 
not have had. Though WOA's may resemble recognizable realities they also 
extend them. This view is widely accepted and has been associated with 
creativity. Thus Osborne observes that, lin so far as it is creative1,, 
+ We avoid cluttering the argument by not introducing the complications of A-0 
and between-0 variations, and variations in the experiences occasioned for a 
single 0 by the same complex at repeated presentations. These questions are not 
germane here. 
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poetry has been supposed to embody imagination and meaning, in the sense 
of being 'something added to all reality outside the poem and ... not to 
be gauged by its correspondence with that reality' (p. 2). Moles notes 
that 'the peculiarity of a work of art is that its richness transcends 
the individual's perceptual capacity' (p. 166), and that its value. is 'as 
a creator of sensations' (p. 2) 'A painting by Kandinsky gives no image 
of earthly life - it is life itself. If one painter deserves the name 
". creator" it is he'. (Diego Rivera cited by Guy Brett in The Times, 
17 April 1973). 'Only a work of art can say with validity and force, 
as Anna Karenina does, "This is life"t (Leavis, 1967, p. 13. ). The notion 
is always the same, that the WOA has brought something new into being: 
'He had shown in this water-colour the appearance of the roses 
which he had seen, and which, but for him, no one would ever 
have known; so that one might say that they were a new variety, 
with which this painter, like a skilful gardener, had enriched 
the family of roses. t (Proust, Vol. 8., p. 123) 
The precision here resolves nicely the conflict between this view of art 
as creative and the-idea of art's purely revelatory role. It. is clear 
that Als revelations result from order extraction that he has carried out, 
which, as we have shown, is his creative effort. 
N. 10.4 When the question of aesthetics comes up (11.4) it will appear that 
aesthetic value is often associated with the 'uniqueness' of aesthetic 
experience (cf. 1'. 10.2), what our terms associate with the order of size 
of the complex of compresence that a WOA represents, the closeness of 
the given W to the extreme of particularity, on the continuum that joins 
it to generality (10.3.0). Science, as we have seen, aims for the 
opposite extreme. The continuum therefore possesses an evaluative as 
well as a definitive function. The region between the extremes contains 
We of varying scientific and artistic merit. At the extreme of generality 
one looks for the 'best' science and expects zero aesthetic value. Notice 
that there is no conflict in supposing this while simultaneously admitting 
the high aesthetic appeal of the best science. To anyone lacking 
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knowledge of the background of 'facts' and theory that some new scientific 
formula draws together into a relatively short description - one with a 
high 'information potential' (N. 2.4) - the theory will be devoid of aes- 
thetio interest, missing the self-sufficiency (N. 10.0) art demands. 
But there is still an anomaly when it comes to scaling the aesthetic dimen- 
sion. Ws that fall at the zero point of the particular-general axis are, 
in the terms here, neither art nor science. Here questions of aesthetics 
do not arise. This, not the generality extreme, appears the appropriate 
point at which to assign zero aesthetic value. Then the generality 
extreme would acquire a negative rating of magnitude equal to the positively 
rated particularity extreme. Thus we should be assigning high negative 
aesthetic values to non-self-sufficient We of high information potential, 
and high positive values to self-sufficient ones. These ratings might 
also act as 'accessibility' indicators. In terms of the compresence 
formulation, the world of 'events' occupies the neutral zone, which accords 
with what we find in practice. Novels usually receive lower aesthetic 
ratings than poems, genre painting than landscapes, and so on. 
CHAPTER 11 
N. 11.0 Notions about how art 'works' and the beginnings of the idea of artists 
producin causes to bring about somewhat different effects are one of the 
chief pre-occupations of art theory. 'Feindre, non la chose, mais Reffet 
gu+eile Product. ', was the way Mallarxn (Hartley, 1970) expressed his dis- 
covert' of this phenomenon, as he saw it. The difference between having 
an idea of something and having an experience of it is a matter of what 
is often called feeling. Normal usage applies the word impartially to 
sensations and emotions. And artists - including as usual here writers, 
musicians and so forth - and art theorists have proposed numbers of 
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explanations as to how art should set about capturing 'feeling'. Under- 
lying many of these explanations and more or less explicit in some, is a 
view shared with the one this chapter advances, of WOAs engendering 
simulated experiences, but in such a way that the experience engendered 
enjoys more the status not simply of a surrogate experience but of a 
comment on it or something to be contemplated from a position of detach- 
ment (11.3.1). Nineteenth century theories developed early in this cen- 
tury, tto formulate the view that the artist embodies or symbolizes in the 
art work an emotion or feeling in such a way that the observer savours 
and enjoys it without experiencing it in the full sense' (Osborne, p. 18) 
This is what 11.3 referred to as art's dual r8le, and accounts for the 
conflicting views of those on the one hand who hold that art is no more 
than revelatory and those others who hold that it is creative. 
Langer (1953) adopts a'view similar to Pound's notion of images (N. 2.4). 
For Pound to image is at once something to be grasped in an instant and 
something which may yet be finely and lengthily elaborated into minute 
detail. Pound cites the Comedia Divina of Dante as an example of an 
image. The notion is not contradictory. The work forms a single unitary 
whole. (: 1.2.2) For Langer art is not a language, but each WOA reproduces 
by means of its own structure some pattern of feeling. Bullough (1957) 
stresses. the notion of the WOA's dual status as a surrogate experience, 
able at once to evoke and comment upon some real experience. He proposes 
the idea of the artist's 'Psychic Distance' from his subject (cf. 11.3.2), 
which may be seen as an extension of Wordsworthts view in the Preface to 
the Lyrical Ballads that poet- (takes its origin from emotion recollected 
in tranquility. ' Tolstoy (1929) emphasizes art's r81e in extending 
experience (cf. George, N. 10.3). 
'To evoke in oneself a sensation which one has experienced before, 
and having evoked it in oneself, to communicate the sensation in 
such a way that others may experience the same sensation ... so that other men are infected by these sensations and pass through 
them; in this does the activity of art consist'. (p. 123) 
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Roger Fry calls art 'the chief organ of imaginative life; it is by art 
that it is stimulated and controlled' (p. 29). Freud (1966a) 
thought of literature as a controlling and controlled mode, reaching to 
the private depths of the poet's consciousness and connecting with 
universal human problems. 
N. 11.1 How does the artist achieve these objects? He 
'has gradually evolved the law, the formula of his unconscious gift. 
He knows what situations, should he be a novelist - if a painter 
what scenes furnish him with the subject matter, which may be 
anything in the world but, whatever it is, is as essential to his 
researches as a laboratory might be or a workshop' (Proust, Vol. 4, 
p. 210). 
The artist learns gradually the performance language that provides the 
characterizing feature of his WOAs. By means of this performance lan- 
guage, 'Genuine poetry can communicate before it is understood' (Eliot, 
195k; )p"238). This is because its basic language is injunctive and 
has the capacity to induce states in 0 by simulation that 0 could not 
induce in himself, lacking synthetic understanding of them. The 
communication guides him to the understanding, and so produces new syn- 
thetic components, new building blocks out of which to construct new 
WOAs and sfimlation procedures, in a continuing chain. Pound reports 
on incident that provides an example. He gets out of a 'metro' in 
Paris and sees 'suddenly a beautiful face, and then another and another, 
and then a beautiful child's face, and then another beautiful woman. ' 
He tries all day to find words for what 'this had meant to him but can 
find none 'worthy, or as lovely as that sudden emotion'. But later he 
suddenly finds the expression', not 'words, but ... an equation ... not 
in speech, but in little splotches of colour ... a "pattern "'(p. 465). 
* 
*Notice the hallucinatory quality of the anecdote and compare the report (N08.3) of 
Oseip Mandelstarr at work composing poetr, T0 In these cases at least the comparison (11.2.2) between the hallucinatory and creative aspects of imagination do not 
appear too far-fetched. 
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Art is not self-defeating, constantly allowing new synthetic knowledge 
to erode its own preserve. For, every new synthetic description it fur- 
nishes is immediately available as a new module for further building. 
Thuat Pound believed that his discovery provided the basis for a new 
'school ... of non-representative painting, a painting that would speak 
only by arrangements in colour. ' (p. 465) In this sense art progresses 
no less than science (cf. N. 3.0, N. 9.0). Its traditions, the evolution 
of its forms, the development of individual artists, coalesce - though 
not necessarily to enhance art's uniquely characterizing powers. These 
are always to do with the experience it can provide. And this is the 
realm of the artist's performance language. 
'The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding 
an "objective correlative"; in other words, a situation, a chain 
of events which shall be the formula for that particular emotion; 
euch that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory 
experience, are given, the emotion is inediately evoked' (Eliot, 
1951b p. 145) " 
N. 11.2 This procedure confers considerable freedom on A. It frees his creators, 
his WOAs, from the confinement of physical reality. A may 'extend' 
reality either by relaxing the constraints that bind his world picture or by 
securing new constraint; or by both procedures, with his only restriction 
the possible consideration of an audience, which conceivably might lose 
itself in the unfamiliar landscape his actions created. Similarly he may 
loosen the binding strength of form or seek escapes from the limitations 
his medium imposes, cr he may invent new forms and new media. But whether 
relaxing constraints or inventing new ones, his actions require order extrac- 
tion - are creative. To relax a constraint he must first discover that 
it exists. And, in any case it is not always obvious how a particular 
'extension' of reality has been achieved, whether by relaxing or adding 
constraints. The devils and hobgoblins that decorate Gothic cathedrals 
for exanple, are they the result of relaxing reality's constraints or of 
Strengthening them? And if both, which of their-characters if due to 
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which procedure? The more that enters A's work that is private to him 
alone, the less an audience will be able to apprehend of it. However 
neither A nor the audience need fear too greatly on this account. For, 
structure being hard to come by, if a WOA were truly complex - highly 
structured - it could not contain more than a relatively small quantity, 
of 'new' order, due to A's creative effort. And if 0 found it unin- 
telligible, apparently due to A's excessive inventiveness, he could re- 
assure himself that his failure to understand must be due to a degradation 
of structure, which from his point of view it would be, not to the reverse, snc 
to offer himself the comfort that what sense he made of the work was 
attributable to his own efforts. 
N. 11.3 A's objects in producing 'distortions' of reality might. bei and perhaps 
usually are, part of an attempt to achieve the opposite effect, that of 
rendering reality more sharply. We have seen (10.4,2) how A will arrive 
at descriptions of experiences that suit his purposes. His habituations 
will strip the experience of-reality of such 'inessential' constituents as 
fail to further A's aims. In memory, for instance, Proust says, 'Habit 
weakens every impression'. The 'better part of our memory exists outside 
ourself ... wherever ... we happen upon what our mind, having no use for 
it, had rejected'. (Vol. 3, p. 308) What we store in our memories is what 
is useful to use It is recalled by the cues most commonly associated with 
it. Suppose the memory is of a thing or of a person, and suppose, whichever 
_, it is, vanishes or ceases 
to exist. The common cues will vanish too. 
But other, more 'loosely' associated cues may still occur, being not part 
of the vanished object itself, but part of some experience in which the 
object was present - an instance of the object (10.1.3). Then these 
cues may re-evoke the memory of the object when it is neither expected 
nor desired. Without a goal' 'memory is blind and even survival hinges 
on pure chance. ' 
(Fogel & others p. 122). The shock of memory evoked 
253. 
without a purpose, or of reality otherwise surprised, are effects A may 
deliberately seek. For this he may blind memory or twist reality to 
force some aspect of one or other upon 0, in this respect the manipulable 
and passive subject of chance's experiments, ' that A simulates. 
6 
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